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Preface
bent greve
I went to a happiness conference, researchers looked very unhappy.1
The search for happiness has been there for very many years. In the old times 
Greek philosophers discussed, for example, what constituted the good life 
and how it could be achieved. The American Declaration of Independence 
from 1776 saw happiness as important for society and individuals, and the 
same can also be seen in the French constitution from 1793.2 Societies have 
thus historically, as well as today, shown an interest in how to ensure a good, 
prosperous and happy life.
Recent years have further seen a dramatic increased interest in the 
search for an understanding of what happiness is as well as what might pro-
mote both individual and societal happiness. A whole new brand of research 
across traditional disciplines within social science has tried to cast light over 
what happiness is, whether we can measure happiness, and if we can com-
pare happiness across societies.
The search for and use of indicators related to happiness and well-being 
has also its roots in a growing awareness that economic measures, such as 
GDP and GDP per inhabitant, although being objective in themselves, do 
not properly include the impact of economic development on, for example, 
the environment. Robert Kennedy is quoted as having said: ‘It measures ev-
erything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile’. In the same vein 
it has been argued, that there is a need to ‘shift emphasis from measuring 
1 Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2010) The Tale of Procrustes. London: Penguin, 24.
2 Greve, Bent (2012) Happiness. London: Routledge.
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economic production to measuring people’s well-being’.3 The international 
economic organization OECD has at the same time increased its focus on 
non-economic factors including publication of data related to the How’s 
Life?-project. Many countries have also embarked upon how to find infor-
mation to supplement the more traditional economic types of measurement. 
The same has been done by many and very different kind of think tanks 
around the world. In general the quest for happiness and ways to measure 
and understand conditions for the good life and good society has increased.
It is thus timely to ask, as the title of this book does, is ‘all well in the 
welfare state’? Especially in the Nordic welfare states, often portrayed as the 
happiest nations around the globe, this question is an important one. How 
can it be, I have often been asked in Denmark, that the Danish often come 
out as one of the happiest people in the world when we have so many sui-
cides, people suffering from depression, and stress-related diseases? Can we 
really mark ourselves as a happy nation when so many are outside the labour 
market or in other ways excluded from societal development?
The simple, but naturally not fully sufficient answer is, that an average 
of many happy people does not mean that all people are happy at all times. 
We know that well-being also depends on changes over life time and people 
losing one of their beloved (wife, husband, partner, family member, children 
etcetera) will, for example, have times when they are not happy. Having had 
a hard time looking for a job and being rejected many times is not the best 
starting point for being a happy person. Happiness also changes over the 
life-cycle – typically happy as very young and as elderly (often with different 
kinds of arguments), as less happy during the hard working years establish-
ing families and with difficulties to balance work and family life. Therefore it 
is also obvious that not all is well for all – at least not all the time, as pointed 
out by Carl Marklund in the introductory chapter of this volume. Still, this 
also raises the question of whether it is possible to ensure that most people 
most of the time have conditions and options – or set of capabilities, in Am-
artya Sen’s view – to pursue the good and happy life.
3 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Sen, Amartya & Fitoussi, Jean-Paul (2009) Report by the Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Paris: Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 12.
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By looking into various issues and concerns of different groups in the 
welfare state, this book thus supplements existing knowledge and broadens 
the perspective on how and to what extent all actually is well and how the 
search for happiness is both an individual and societal issue. However, by 
raising issues related to the absence of happiness (unhappiness) in the first 
three chapters, health and mental illness as central aspects of modern wel-
fare states are emphasized. This further underlines how the focus on being a 
‘normal’ citizen might influence the well-being of others in society. The risk 
is that happiness will be mainly for those fulfilling the ambition of the mod-
ern welfare states and who are, in the active life years, gainfully employed 
on the labour market. This should remind us that modern welfare states also 
have tendencies of social exclusion.
The relation between health and societal development, including well-
being has been known for a long time. However, recent focus on the impact 
on societies of inequality of health has highlighted that society might help in 
ensuring a better life for all citizens, and that societal focus on how to ensure 
better health for the individual may not only have an impact on inequality 
and daily living standard, but also on the general well-being and happiness 
in societies. This also implies a focus on not only physical diseases, but also 
on mental health. Likewise a focus on prevention of substance abuse, as dis-
cussed in the chapter by Pekka Sulkunen and Trygve Ugland, is an indicator 
of an important area for welfare states having an ambition to ensure welfare 
for its citizens.
It is sometimes argued that a smile can be infectious. This might also be 
the case for happiness, for as is shown in Olli Kangas’ chapter, immigrants 
are happier in happy nations. Naturally, there might be differences depend-
ing on where you are moving. Southern European men seem happier in the 
Nordic countries, more so than Southern European women. Still, as written 
by Kangas: ‘Happy immigrants live in happy countries’. They have also a 
larger degree of trust. It might be that the institutional and structural fea-
tures of the Nordic welfare states imply that the citizens are having, at least 
for the clear majority, a good life.
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Studies of happy nations often focus on adults and overlook the children 
and young persons. In her chapter, Margrét Einarsdottir focuses on young 
persons in Iceland, many of whom want to have money of their own, as this 
will imply a better well-being. This again highlights that, in accordance with 
Richard Easterlin’s position, money matters at least until a certain level, and 
that comparison among individuals have an impact on the degree of happi-
ness. Even for young persons, work can be an important part of life, as this 
makes it possible to live life like their peers do. Furthermore, it may serve as 
a very early indication that work has become a still more central part of the 
Nordic welfare states way of life.
The balance between work and family life, between work and free time, 
and the balance between included or excluded in modern societies are thus 
an important issue for the happiness of nations. This is also the issue of the 
last chapter in the book, which discusses whether in principle individual is-
sues of subjective happiness can be made part of political debate and politi-
cal decision making. It thus also raises the issue whether there is an emerg-
ing global politics of happiness that attempts to combine our knowledge in 
very diverse areas – such as economic growth, equality, health, and environ-
ment, etcetera.
A further question concerns the criteria by which to distinguish between 
different policies and to choose between different projects. Even in the rich 
Nordic countries, there is a constant quest for economic efficiency and need 
to prioritize between different policy goals. The question of how to balance 
a perspective on happiness with a perspective of efficient use of resources is 
thus still open for debate. Just one example to illustrate: From an economic 
perspective more police in the street will be a waste of money, but for ensur-
ing an increasing level of personal security and thereby possibly increased 
level of happiness this could be an important issue.
Conflicts on how to prioritize in the welfare state have thus not been 
solved with the increased interest in what makes us happy. Neither can we 
ensure that the quest for happiness will not imply a further division in so-
ciety between those who are well and those who are not. However, the in-
creased focus on happiness has made us more aware that even if money 
preface
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matters, money is not the whole story of a good life. By bringing to the fore 
these issues the welfare state will no longer only seek to provide material 
goods and income security, but presumably also adopt a broader role for 
social inclusion with a new focus on more subjective and individual needs. 
At the same time, the welfare state has to respect that individual lives are 
lived differently and that there is an individual right to choose a lifestyle fit-
ting the individual. The welfare state’s role revolves to a large degree around 
setting the framework. This also implies a role for the welfare state in ensur-
ing capabilities for individuals to make choices, and to be active in society’s 
development.
In this way this book, by questioning whether all is well in the welfare 
states, contributes a new perspective while at the same time continuing in 
the tradition of welfare research, emphasizing the importance to also keep 
the focus on the vulnerable and those in need.
References
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Introduction
Carl Marklund
Introduction
From having been treated with considerable scepticism by politicians and 
scholars alike during much of the post-war era, happiness has recently won 
renewed actuality in public debate, both as a target of scientific enquiry as 
well as an explicit concept in public policy evaluations.1 While individual 
well-being has long been closely connected with prosperity, high material 
standards of life, and good physical health – in short, welfare – recent in-
terest has increasingly turned towards the role of various non-economical 
factors in promoting healthy living, psychological well-being, quality of life, 
and subjective happiness on the societal level.
This renewed attention has, among other things, manifested itself in a 
recent surge of international rankings which aim to measure the level of 
quality of life, satisfaction with life, and subjective well-being (SWB) – as 
distinct from objective well-being (OWB) – within and across different so-
cieties.2 Recently, ‘satisfaction with life’ has been added to traditional mea-
sures, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), according to which different 
societies are being compared and evaluated. Other examples include the 
Human Development Index (HDI), the Satisfaction with Life Index (SLI), 
the Gallup World Poll (GWP), the World Values Survey (WVS), the Euro-
pean Values Survey (EVS), and the European Social Survey (ESS).
1 This scepticism has been the norm in Western Europe and North America, while explicit notions of 
happiness have continued to play a decidedly political function in East Asian as well as South East 
Asian politics. 
2 Costanza, Robert et al. (2007) ‘Quality of Life: An Approach Integrating Opportunities, Human 
Needs, and Subjective Well-Being’. Ecological Economics, Vol. 61, Issues 2–3, 267–276.
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The enthusiastic media reception of these new rankings and their eager 
appropriation by governments as well as intergovernmental and international 
non-governmental organizations around the world warrants the growing in-
terest and global importance of non-economic and immaterial factors for hu-
man well-being, in advanced welfare states as well as in developing countries.
Partly, this renewed attention follows from advances in scientific re-
search, not only in psychology and psychiatry, where the commonsensical 
inverse of happiness, depression, has long been the object of concern, but 
also in the natural sciences and the social sciences more broadly. Partly, it 
has been promoted by a long-standing commercial interest in ‘life coaching’, 
‘self-help’, and psychotherapy. In both these aspects, it primarily addresses 
the preconditions for individual happiness and well-being.
Certainly, images and notions of individual happiness have long been 
employed for advertising purposes, at least since the emergence of mass 
consumption from the late nineteenth century and onwards. The fulfilment 
of desires, needs, and wants through the consumption of various products 
and services have fused into a cultural mix of social norms, signifiers, and 
symbols of pleasure, satisfaction, and personal success that the individual 
may subscribe to or resist at different points in life.3 
Recent research appears to confirm the importance of consumption and 
‘shopping’ for satisfaction with life.4 Yet, this commercial appropriation of 
happiness has been criticized for reproducing ‘false needs’ by generating a 
kind of ‘treadmill syndrome’, whereby consumers are conditioned to crave 
for the next experience, product, or service but rarely achieving the desired 
satisfaction. This may generate economic growth, critics assert, but does not 
necessarily lead to societal progress, personal development, or, for that mat-
ter, individual happiness.5
3 Kellner, Douglas (1983) ‘Critical Theory, Commodities, and the Consumer Society’. Theory, Culture, 
and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3, 66–84.
4 Roos, John Magnus (ed.) (2012) Konsumtionsrapporten 2012. Göteborg: Centrum för konsumtions-
vetenskap, Handelshögskolan vid Göteborgs universitet.
5 Slater, Don (1997) ‘Consumer Culture and the Politics of Need’. In Nava, Mica, Blake, Andrew, 
MacRury, Iain & Richards, Barry (eds) Buy This Book: Contemporary Issues in Advertising and 
Consumption. London: Routledge; Bruni, Luigino & Porta, Pier Luigi (eds) (2007) Handbook on the 
Economics of Happiness Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Dahlén, Micael (2008) Nextopia – Livet, lyckan 
och pengarna i förväntningssamhället. Stockholm: Volante förlag.
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In the early 1970s, Richard Easterlin, American economist and happi-
ness research pioneer, pinpointed the subjective and relative character of the 
income–happiness nexus, claiming that:
“[i]n all societies, more money for the individual typically means 
more individual happiness. However, raising the incomes of all does 
not increase the happiness of all. [...] The resolution of this para-
dox lies in the relative nature of welfare judgments. Individuals as-
sess their material well-being, not in terms of the absolute amount 
of goods they have, but relative to a social norm of what goods they 
ought to have.”6
The attention upon individual happiness as distinct from societal hap-
piness has also been criticized for supporting a materialistic and market-
oriented approach towards life, which may primarily serve commercial in-
terests and hence support ‘neoliberal’ biopolitics.7 More recent critics have 
also claimed that the commercialization of the moral imperative for the 
individual to achieve happiness, however defined, underpins the existing 
socio-economic order, channelling the proverbial ‘pursuit of happiness’ into 
competition between atomized individuals, rather than promoting collec-
tive effort towards solving common problems and pursuing common values 
in society at large.8
6 Easterlin, Richard (1973) ‘Does Money Buy Happiness?’ The Public Interest, Vol. 30, 4; see also 
Easterlin, Richard (1974) ‘Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?’ In David, Paul A. & 
Reder, Melvin Warren (eds) Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses 
Abramovitz. New York: Academic Press, 89–125.
7 Lasch, Christoper (1978) The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expecta-
tions. New York: Norton; Rimke, Heidi Marie (2000) ‘Governing Citizens Through Self-Help Litera-
ture’. Cultural Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 61–78; Moskowitz, Eva S. (2001) In Therapy We Trust: America’s 
Obsessions with Self-Fulfilment. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press; Hazelden, Rebecca (2003) 
‘Love Yourself: The Relationship of the Self with Itself in Popular Self-Help Texts’. Journal of Sociol-
ogy, Vol. 39, No. 4, 413–428; McGee, Micki (2005) Self-Help, Inc. Makeover Culture in American Life. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Rose, Nikolas (1989) Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private 
Self. London: Routledge; Rose, Nikolas (1996) Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power and Person-
hood. New York: Cambridge University Press; Foucault, Michel (2004) Security, Territory, Population. 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
8 Ahmed, Sara (2010) The Promise of Happiness. Chapel Hill: Duke University Press; Ehrenreich, 
Barbara (2009) Bright-Sided: How the Relentless Promotion of Positive Thinking Has Undermined 
America. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt & Company.
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According to this critique, the booming market for self-help literature, 
life coaching, and the subsequent commodification of psychology and 
psychotherapy reinforces the image of self-governing and self-regulating 
‘rational economic man’ as the ideal human being. This personality type 
supposedly copes individually with adverse circumstances either through 
adaptation, competition, or therapy, rather than through voicing protest or 
political engagement. Thereby, critics assert, the ideal type of rational eco-
nomic man may serve to marginalize or even replace the ideal of the socially 
embedded and politically active citizen. The rise of ‘the happiness agenda’ or 
‘the happiness industry’ has thus been interpreted as a commercial-cultural 
symptom of the neoliberal economic order.9
But the renewed interest in happiness has also followed from a possibly 
more ‘progressive’ (as distinct from neoliberal) interest in alternative ways 
of assessing policy outcomes as well as providing a more fair ground for the 
comparison of different societies than the straitjacket of GDP and the mono-
dimensional focus upon economic growth as the primary goal.10 Here, the 
concern with SWB is rather connected with socio-economic equality, life 
chances, social integration, and ecological and social sustainability.11
The emerging field of happiness economics has served as a channel of 
communication between the distinct academic fields of social statistics and 
happiness research as it seeks to quantify and measure subjective well-being 
while analyzing its relationship to measures of competitiveness, growth, and 
prosperity.12 This concern has become more acute in the wake of the recent 
recession, as financially strapped governments point to ‘austerity policies’ 
9 Ahmed 2010; Burnett, Simon (2011) The Happiness Agenda: A Modern Obsession. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
10 Gandelman, Néstor & Hernández-Murillo, Rubén (2009) ‘The Impact of Inflation and Unemploy-
ment on Subjective Personal and Country Evaluations’. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol. 
91, No. 3, 107−126.
11 Sen, Amartya (1993) ‘Capability and Well-being’. In Nussbaum, Martha & Sen, Amartya (eds) The 
Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 30−53; Dahrendorf, Ralf (1979) Life Chances: Approaches to 
Social and Political Theory. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
12 Ahmed 2010; Abdallah, Saamah, Thompson, Sam & Marks, Nic (2008) ‘Estimating Worldwide Life 
Satisfaction’. Ecological Economics, Vol. 65, No. 1, 35–47; Oswald, Andrew (1999) ‘A Non-Technical 
Introduction to the Economics of Happiness’. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www2.warwick.
ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/oswald/intro.pdf> (accessed October 2012); Powdthavee, 
Nattavudh (2007) ‘Economics of Happiness: A Review of Literature and Applications’. Chulalongkorn 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 51–73.
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and ‘sufficiency economy’ as a way of coping with weaker economic growth, 
rather than questioning the focus upon economic growth.
As of yet, the findings of happiness economics remain inconclusive. Some 
studies suggest real GDP at purchase power parity (PPP) per capita affect 
happiness positively.13 Other studies show little or no correlation between 
absolute and relative income levels and SWB, positing the existence of a ‘sa-
tiation point’ in the range between USD 15 000–20 000 GDP (PPP), beyond 
which wealthier countries register no further increase in SWB.14 Recently, 
for example, Angus Deaton has used Gallup polls to show that the current 
financial crisis has had little verifiable impact upon the SWB of Americans, 
despite widespread public perceptions to the contrary.15 In a related vein, it 
has been suggested that SWB is rather determined by personality traits than 
by external circumstances. According to some observers, this would seem 
to indicate that there is an individual ‘happiness set point’ to which people 
tend to return to after both positive and negative experiences.16
These divergent results of happiness research render eventual policy im-
plications of this emerging discipline difficult to assess. Some members of 
the research community have been reluctant to make policy recommenda-
tions before the complex links between income, wealth, leisure, freedom of 
choice, and welfare policies and their impact upon SWB have been more 
fully explored. American lawyer Derek Bok has recently questioned wheth-
er the research results could warrant a new politics of happiness, claiming 
13 Discussing the link between income and well-being, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers argue 
that ‘several interesting variants of the question could be asked—such as whether it is GDP, broader 
measures of economic development, or alternatively, changes in output or in productivity that drive 
happiness’, but note that ‘[u]nfortunately, we lack the statistical power to resolve these questions’. 
Hence, they concentrate their study on the GDP–SWB relationship. See Stevenson, Betsey & Wolf-
ers, Justin (2008) ‘Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox’. 
NBER Working Paper No. 14282. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14282.
pdf?new_window=1> (accessed October 2012)
14 For recent discussions, see Layard, Richard (2005) Happiness: Lessons From A New Science. London: 
Penguin; Layard, Richard (2012) ‘Mental Health: The New Frontier for the Welfare State’. Online. 
Available HTTP: <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/textonly/_new/staff/layard/pdf/LAYARD6-March-lecture.
pdf> (accessed October 2012); Layard, Richard, Mayraz, Guy & Nickell, Stephen John (2008) ‘The 
Marginal Utility of Income’. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 92, Issues 8–9, 1846–1857; Stevenson & 
Wolfers 2008.
15 Deaton, Angus (2011) ‘The Financial Crisis and the Well-being of Americans’. Oxford Economic 
Papers, Vol. 64, No. 1, 1–26.
16 Bruni & Porta 2007.
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that the welfare state shows a low impact upon SWB.17 Nevertheless, Bok 
supports an expansion of welfare state commitments in the USA with a view 
of improving quality of life and SWB. Other researchers have more explicitly 
supported the government policy of maximizing SWB with regard to spe-
cific policy areas, such as employment policies and psychological therapy, 
as well as public policy more generally. In a typical statement, one of the 
most vocal proponents for a new politics of happiness, British economist 
Richard Layard, has argued that a government’s role should be to increase 
happiness and reduce misery and that ‘well-being and mental health need to 
be the new frontier for the welfare state’.18 Given the inconclusiveness of the 
research, however, it remains uncertain exactly what kind of policies would 
constitute such a ‘new frontier’.
Happiness, well-being, and the (Nordic) welfare state
So far, the Nordic countries have scored well in comparative statistics on 
SWB. The Danes, for example, were ranked first on happiness according to 
the Gallup World Poll 2005–2011, followed by the Finns, the Norwegians, 
and the Dutch.19 Similarly, in the OECD’s Better Life Index of 2012 Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark came out among the top five.20 
While the rankings in themselves do not explain the underlying causes, 
the Nordic model of welfare, with its focus upon collective and universal 
social security, has typically been seen as a key factor for these favourable 
results. This notion has a tradition, too, as the Nordic countries have for a 
long time been presented as utopian ‘happy democracies’ where freedom 
and welfare have been successfully combined.21 
17 Bok, Derek (2010) The Politics of Happiness: What Government Can Learn from the New Research on 
Well-Being. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
18 Layard 2012.
19 For a discussion of earlier scores, see Greve, Bent (ed.) (2010) Happiness and Social Policy in Europe. 
Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar; Helliwell, John F., Layard, Richard & Sachs, Jeffrey D. (eds) (2012) World 
Happiness Report. New York: The Earth Institute, Columbia University.
20 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012) ‘Better Life Index’. 
Online. Available HTTP: <www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org> (accessed October 2012)
21 See for example Tingsten, Herbert (1966) Från idéer till idyll: Den lyckliga demokratien. Stockholm: 
Bokförlaget PAN/Norstedts.
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As the global financial crisis has forced national governments to adopt 
austerity policies and cut public spending, welfare state supporters across 
the world point to the success of Nordic countries in these rankings, un-
derlining the role of social policies in promoting growth and stability in 
the midst of recession.22 Admittedly, the Nordic score in terms of SWB may 
simply reflect performance on a number of traditional parameters – such as 
GDP per capita, growth, competitiveness, market freedom, productivity, as 
well as social equality (Gini), healthcare, safety, and public trust – which are 
usually also taken into account in various rankings of SWB. Yet, it is becom-
ing more widely acknowledged that social policy may have a direct positive 
influence on SWB, not only through providing for economic growth and 
creativity, but also through ensuring redistribution, social security, and so-
cial equality.23 In short, the welfare state may be a decisive factor for ‘Nordic 
happiness’.24 
Yet, all is not necessarily well in the Nordic welfare states – at least not 
for all, and certainly not all of the time. For example, mental disorders are 
reportedly on the rise in all Nordic societies.25 The increasing prevalence of 
stress symptoms and mental illness stands in a complex relation to recent 
shifts in the scope and means of social benefits and social security more 
generally, in the Nordic countries as well as elsewhere.26 International stud-
ies have shown that mental distress has become a more common reason for 
early retirement since the early 1980s and onwards, especially among young 
adults.27 At the same time, socio-economic gaps are also reported as widen-
ing in the Nordic welfare states.
22 Marklund, Carl (forthcoming 2013) ‘A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? Image Politics During 
the Cold War’. In Jonas Harvard & Peter Stadius (eds) Communicating the North: Media Structures 
and Images in the Making of the Nordic Region. Farnham: Ashgate.
23 Saari, Juho (2012) Onnellisuuspolitiikka – Kohti sosiaalisesti kestävää Suomea. Helsinki: Kalevi Sorsa 
Säätiö; Wilkinson, Richard G. & Pickett, Kate (2009) The Spirit Level – Why More Equal Societies 
Almost Always Do Better. London: Penguin. 
24 Greve 2010; Saari 2012.
25 Olofsson, Jonas & Östh, John (2011) Förtidspensionering av unga. En fråga om utsortering efter 
utbildningsnivå och socioekonomisk bakgrund? Underlagsrapport till den parlamentariska socialförsäk-
ringsutredningen. Stockholm: Parlamentariska socialförsäkringsutredningen.
26 See for example OECD (2011) Sick on the Job? Myths and Realities about Mental Health and Work. 
Paris: OECD Publishing; OECD (2013) Mental Health and Work: Sweden. Paris: OECD Publishing.
27 Olofsson & Östh 2011.
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Traditionally, universalist welfare policies do not only provide a basic so-
cial security for all. They also seek to help people through transitory periods 
of difficulty in life. But what happens in the trade-off between the needs of 
those with transitory problems and the needs of those who risk permanent 
problems?
In response to this query, this book brings together social scientists and 
historians in a discussion of how these emerging trends interrelate with one 
another. The volume is based on some of the contributions presented at the 
conference ‘All well in the welfare state? Mental well-being and the politics 
of happiness’ at the Department of Economic and Political Studies at the 
University of Helsinki in the autumn of 2011, which was a part of the ac-
tivities of the Nordic Centre of Excellence: The Nordic Welfare State – His-
torical Foundations and Future Challenges, NordWel. The conference was 
organized by one of its theme groups: ‘The Normative Charges of Work: The 
Labour Market and the Welfare State’.
The contributions focus upon two different aspects of the relationship 
between SWB on the one hand and welfare on the other hand. If a given soci-
ety’s ‘quality’ can be assessed by its attitude towards and the assistance it pro-
vides its most sensitive members, it first becomes of interest to ask what the 
recent attention to SWB may mean for those who are the least likely to pos-
sess the economical and social means that are ‘normally’ expected to enhance 
either OWB or SWB. It is by no means self-evident who may, at times, belong 
to these groups. But given the demonstrably unequal access to life chances, 
likely groups may include the physically ill and the mentally disabled as well 
as substance abusers. Also children, elderly, immigrants, and the unemployed 
may face similar challenges. The question is whether the SWB of these groups 
is strengthened or obscured by the new interest in the happiness of society as 
a whole, with its concomitant focus upon the needs of the majority, e.g. the 
gainfully employed and economically more secure members of society.
Second, the contributions also address the relationship between eco-
nomic and non-economic factors, between OWB and SWB, and between 
welfare and well-being for perceived life satisfaction. The links between in-
come, wealth, and work on the one hand and social relations, stress, and 
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safety on the other hand, as well as physical health and mental health, are not 
only complex in their own right. Post-materialist and progressive discourses 
on happiness are increasingly merging with neoliberal discourses on liberty 
and self-actualization, posing new and complex challenges to welfare states, 
not only in the Nordic countries, but in other welfare states as well.
Overview of the book
As Varda Soskolne shows in her chapter, advances in medicine and social 
policy have led to major improvements in health and to extended life ex-
pectancy globally, affecting SWB positively. But Soskolne asks whether this 
occurs in all sections of society. In Israel, health inequalities have widened 
since the 1990s, in parallel with an increase in income inequalities and a shift 
from welfare state policies to more neoliberal policies, including the priva-
tization of the healthcare sector and the transfer of more health and welfare 
services to NGOs and private companies. Soskolne shows that socioeco-
nomic status (SES) correlates with rising inequalities in health, probing the 
extent to which the psychosocial environment may explain these inequali-
ties. Soskolne notes that the interventions and policies aimed at ‘closing the 
gap’ between different socio-economic groups is not yet fully covered in the 
scientific literature, confirming the notion that the relationship between 
happiness research and welfare state policies remains uncertain. 
In her chapter, Katarina Piuva shows how ‘normality’ has become an 
expected precondition for health and happiness in Sweden: While the men-
tally ill are supposed to be integrated into society at large, they are also to be 
viewed as if they paradoxically did not have any specific needs. Normality, 
in its turn, is closely connected with performance in various social activities, 
including work. As ‘health’ is increasingly defined as ability to work through 
the concept of ‘employability’, Piuva concludes that implicit understandings 
of normality may serve as an obstacle to the social integration of the severely 
mentally ill. In other words, the principles of normality that have become 
the ideology of social integration may turn out to be a demand on the in-
dividual to live a life just like ‘everybody else’ – a demand which may have 
been the cause of the discomfort to begin with.
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The dehospitalization movement exemplifies an attempt to close the gap 
between the well-being of the mentally ill and the majority population. In 
their chapter, Anna Alanko and Carl Marklund show how mental health 
care planning in Finland has adapted to the international trend towards de-
hospitalization, partly in the interest of increased cost-efficiency, but also 
with the SWB of the mentally ill in mind. However, as the categories of 
mental illness continue to expand, so does the demand for inpatient treat-
ment rise in parallel with the demands for more outpatient treatment. Ris-
ing mental problems, especially among the young, can be interpreted as a 
sign of decreasing SWB and higher stress in society, running the risk of 
putting further strain on the already limited resources available for those in 
the most need of special care. 
While some groups in society may thus require protection from the de-
mands of ‘normal’ life in order to achieve SWB, other groups may instead 
increase their well-being as a result of being exposed to precisely these chal-
lenges and rewards. In her contribution, Margrét Einarsdóttir looks at the 
relationship between part-time work and SWB among teenagers in Iceland. 
In particular, she tracks the sensitive balance between the independence and 
autonomy that follows from being gainfully employed and the risks and de-
mands being posed by work. Einarsdóttir notes that monetary reasons are 
not necessarily the determining cause for teenagers’ work in Iceland, but 
that work ethics, independence, autonomy, socialization, and enjoyment 
play key roles, too. Her findings underline that teenagers, even in a welfare 
state under considerable economic strain, typically enter the job market pri-
marily to enact a consumer identity, which in its turn affects teenage percep-
tions of the relationship between work, income, and happiness.
Einarsdóttir’s study deals with part-time work, but points to the rela-
tionship between permanent (un)employment and SWB. Most studies 
show that involuntary unemployment is as strongly related to negative 
SWB as leisure is linked to positive SWB. Nordic welfare states have re-
cently been grappling with the problem of rising unemployment in par-
ticular groups whose social inclusion and protection is sometimes seen as 
an onerous cost, in what amounts to a criticism of the welfare state and its 
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ability to provide not only jobs but also well-being for all. According to 
this criticism, governmental policies should singularly focus on creating 
jobs rather than social protection. In his chapter, Olli Kangas compares 
the well-being of immigrants in different European countries, noting that 
immigrants report the highest levels of SWB in the countries which have 
the most generous welfare policies, thus challenging the arguments of the 
welfare-state critics.
In their chapter, Pekka Sulkunen and Trygve Ugland address the rela-
tionship between substance abuse, abuse control, and SWB by comparing 
French and Nordic policies against the backdrop of emerging common EU 
policy goals. While alcohol policy aims to improve not only public health 
and reduce health care spending, but also to further the well-being of the 
population in general, there is also a tension between the duty to further 
the well-being of those who are the least likely to conform to societal norms 
about happiness without infringing upon the independence and identity of 
the individual person. If welfare policies then may then have direct implica-
tions for individual as well as societal well-being, it also becomes impor-
tant to consider under what conditions well-being and happiness should or 
should not be made the target of political agency.
In the closing chapter, Carl Marklund looks at the emerging rankings of 
different societies with regard to SWB. Noting that the generation of scien-
tific knowledge often constitutes the first step towards the establishment of 
a new policy field, the chapter discusses how these new rankings may affect 
welfare-state policy making. However, the inclusion of these categories into 
global rankings appears to play a soothing rather than spurring function, 
confirming that the rising interest in happiness has not, at least not just yet, 
been explicitly politicized.
Yet, given the way in which the discussions on happiness activate criti-
cal tensions in contemporary society, of material welfare versus subjective 
well-being, prosperity versus sustainability, and state responsibility versus 
individual responsibility, the public discourse on happiness may well de-
velop into a critical site of political contest in the near future. Due to the in-
conclusive status of happiness research, however, the political consequences 
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of this possible ‘new frontier’ in welfare state policies can just as well serve 
to expand the responsibility of the welfare state as it may further limit the 
reach of politics, pointing to the responsibility of the individual for his/her 
own happiness.
Conclusions
The high score of the Nordic welfare states in the rankings of happiness 
could possibly indicate that the welfare state – originally concerned with the 
universal provision of basic social benefits while providing additional social 
support to those most in need – already makes a substantial contribution to 
SWB. Is all well in the welfare state, then?
The contributions to this book point in two possibly diverging directions 
when addressing this question. On the one hand, acknowledging the risks 
posed by mental as well as material sources of stress, a continued commit-
ment to welfare state universalism could take on responsibility for the over-
all happiness and well-being of the population, representing a kind of ‘poli-
tics of happiness’ reaching beyond the concerns of material welfare. SWB 
could thereby become another public good, alongside the more customary 
objectives of welfare policy.
On the other hand, several tendencies in contemporary society point 
towards the greater medicalization of various social conditions, while stress 
and discomfort are reportedly on the rise due to the high demands of work 
and pressures in social life, potentially expanding the number of people who 
report dissatisfaction and low SWB as well as mental ill health. Here, the 
renewed attention to SWB could possibly signal the advent of a negative 
‘politics against unhappiness’ – as distinct from a positive politics of happi-
ness which would be more concerned with the need for individual therapy 
than the reduction of collective risk.
Either way, the arrival of SWB on the political agenda activates the dual 
duty of the welfare state to not only answer to the basic social demands of 
the population at large, even when these expand beyond basic provisions 
and social services, but to continue to extend assistance and care to those in 
the most need.
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Social inequalities in health and well-being  
– A review of research and the case of Israel
varda soskolne
Introduction
The issue of health inequalities has become a central topic for research, 
practice, and policy at regional, national and global levels. A substantial 
and rapidly growing literature has in recent decades provided consistent 
evidence that although the advances in medicine and improvements in 
standard of living have contributed to overall better health and extended 
life expectancy, significant differences in health exist between social groups. 
The Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) states that inequalities in health arise because 
of inequalities in society – in the conditions in which people are born, grow, 
live, work, and age.1 The most important determinants of health inequalities 
are those that produce stratification within society, namely the structural 
determinants such as the distribution of wealth and income, or gender or 
ethnic discrimination rooted in the context of the society.
Another issue that has attracted attention from health and social sci-
entists in diverse fields in recent decades is the concept of well-being. The 
changing demography and ageing of the population in many countries has 
brought to the fore a focus on quality of life and subjective well-being. The 
WHO defines health very broadly as a multidimensional construct, ‘a state of 
complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence 
1 Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) (2008) Closing the Gap in a Generation: 
Health Equity through Action on the Social Determinants of Health. Final report. Geneva: World 
Health Organization.
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of disease or infirmity’.2 The approach to measuring health, beyond that of 
the traditional morbidity and mortality data, has thus been broadened, but 
the measurements of well-being are contested, because the concept remains 
ambiguous and ill-defined.3 Researchers often use a multiplicity of terms 
that sometimes seem to be synonymous and at other times rather differ-
ent, such as positive emotions, subjective well-being, life satisfaction, hap-
piness, and quality of life. The most commonly used conceptualization of 
well-being focuses only on psychological aspects and differentiates between 
global judgments of life satisfaction and feelings.4 Based on evidence of 
the association of well-being with health, this conceptualization elucidates 
the convergence of health and well-being in the scientific literature and in 
health policy.5 In addition, well-being is relevant to the health inequalities 
agenda, because recognition that well-being is an appropriate measure of 
what people value in life, makes it a popular topic for public health policies 
and interventions aimed at reducing health inequalities. A more detailed 
definition of well-being and evidence of inequalities in well-being together 
with a focus on health inequalities are necessary for a fuller understanding 
of the complex causes of inequalities at global or local levels.6
This chapter aims to expand this understanding by reviewing the defini-
tions and the scope of social inequalities in physical health and well-being, 
and the major underlying explanatory mechanisms of these inequalities. 
Rooted in the social determinants of health framework, this chapter focuses 
mainly on socioeconomic status (SES), defined mainly by income, educa-
tion or occupation, as a major social feature of health and well-being in-
equalities. People with a higher socioeconomic position in society have a 
greater array of life chances and more opportunities to lead a flourishing life 
2 World Health Organization (WHO) (1946) Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization as adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 19–22 June, 1946. Online. 
Available HTTP: <http://www.who.int/suggestions/faq/en> (accessed September 2011)
3 Carlisle, Sandra & Hanlon, Phil (2008) ‘“Well-being” as a Focus for Public Health? A Critique and 
Defence’. Critical Public Health, Vol. 18, 263–270.
4 Diener, Ed (2000) ‘Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National 
Index’. American Psychologist, Vol. 55, Issue 1, 34–43.
5 Diener, Ed & Chan, Micaela Y. (2011) ‘Happy People Live Longer: Subjective Well-Being Contrib-
utes to Health and Longevity’. Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 1–43.
6 Carlisle & Hanlon 2008.
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and have better health. Furthermore, these topics are elaborated by a review 
of the Israeli context in order to demonstrate how they are expressed at a 
specific local level, yet representing the broader issues of health inequalities 
and the well-being agenda and their relationship to the welfare state. In the 
last decades, the universal/citizenship-based policy of Israel’s welfare system 
was trimmed, and a more explicitly neoliberal and non-universal welfare 
approach took effect.7 Although one cannot ignore the problems unique to 
Israel, above all the political conflict with the Arab world and the substan-
tial national security expenditures, the retrenching welfare state is subject to 
many of the same pressures and discontents as are other societies in Europe 
and North America. The welfare policy shifts and the subsequent increase in 
social inequality are relevant when we seek to study the way in which SES af-
fect health and well-being. Finally, the chapter suggests several implications 
of this review for further research while analysing policies that contribute to 
and are necessary for tackling health inequalities.
Israel: General background and social inequalities
Israel, established in 1948, has a population of 7.7 million: 76 per cent are 
Jews, 20 per cent Arabs (86 per cent of whom are Muslims), and the rest 
are Druze and other groups.8 The immigration of Jews is central to Israel’s 
development, with major waves arriving in the 1950s and 1960s. A more 
recent large wave of close to one million immigrants arrived in the 1990s 
from the former Soviet Union. By now, 28 per cent of the Jewish popula-
tion is foreign-born.9 These figures represent the multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural characteristics of Israeli society and its major social divisions. The 
major and most salient rift is between Jews and Arabs, constantly affected 
by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli Arabs, who are native-born, 
became a minority in 1948 and found themselves in a subordinate posi-
7 Gamliel-Yehoshua, Haya & Vanhuysse, Pieter (2010) ‘The Pro-Elderly Bias of Social Policies in 
Israel: A Historical-Institutional Account’. Social Policy & Administration, Vol. 44, No. 6, 708–726.
8 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2011a) Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010. Jerusalem: Central 
Bureau of Statistics. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnatonenew.htm> 
(accessed July 2012)
9 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2011a.
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tion to the Jewish population, politically, socially and economically. They 
have lower education, income, occupational and standard-of-living levels 
than their fellow Jewish citizens. The Jewish population is also characterized 
by an ethnic cleavage between those of European or American (Ashkenazi) 
origin and those originating from North African or Middle Eastern/Asian 
countries (Sephardi origin). The latter group has been subordinate to the 
former in many socio-economic indicators – education, income and occu-
pational status.10
Israel, as one of the Mediterranean group of welfare states, was origi-
nally influenced by the Beveridgean legacy in which social protection pro-
grammes are funded through general tax revenues, including, for example, 
the introduction of residual safety-net programmes for the poor in 1980.11 
Since the mid-1990s, however, the welfare regime characterized by uni-
versalism and comprehensive risk coverage has shifted towards a market-
oriented economy.12 Policies aimed at retrenching the welfare state became 
more apparent with the significant reduction of most benefits, in conjunc-
tion with cutbacks or spending freezes on many programmes, in keeping 
with the stated aim of reducing government expenditure. This more explic-
itly neoliberal and non-universal welfare approach took effect particularly 
after Benjamin Netanyahu first became a prime minister in 1996 and when 
he became finance minister in 2002, and has left an indelible mark on wel-
fare in the country.13 A further non-progressive policy of reducing tax rates 
was introduced, the benefits of which have accrued to those in the highest 
income deciles.14 Thus, the direct effect of government policy on the levels 
of poverty and inequality through social welfare allowances and direct taxes 
10 Semyonov, Moshe & Lewin-Epstein, Noah (2011) ‘Wealth Inequality: Ethnic Disparities in Israeli 
Society’. Social Forces, Vol. 99, 935–959.
11 Gal, John (2010) ‘Is There an Extended Family of Mediterranean Welfare States?’ Journal of European 
Social Policy, Vol. 20, Issue 1, 283–300.
12 Zambon, Alessio, Boyce, Will, Cois, Ester,  Currie, Candace,  Lemma, Patrizia, Dalmasso, Paola, 
Borraccino, Alberto & Cavallo, Franco (2006) ‘Do Welfare Regimes Mediate the Effect of Socio-
economic Position on Health in Adolescence? A Cross-National Comparison in Europe, North 
America, and Israel’. International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 36, Issue 2, 309–329.
13 Gamliel-Yehoshua & Vanhuysse (2010).
14 Bank of Israel (2011) Bank of Israel, Annual Report, 2011. Chapter 8: Welfare Policy Issues. Online. 
Available HTTP: <http://www.boi.org.il/en/NewsAndPublications/RegularPublications/Documents/
Doch2011/pe_8.pdf> (accessed July 2012)
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has weakened. In the past decade, the incidence of poverty in individuals 
increased from 21.1 per cent in 2002 to 24.4 per cent in 2010, and the in-
come gap (the average gap between the poverty line and the income of poor 
persons) increased from 29.7 per cent to 35.8 per cent during these years.15 
Poverty rates parallel ethnic and social division in the population, with rates 
reaching close to 57 per cent among Israeli Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews, 
populations that are characterized by large families, low educational level 
and low employment rates.16 The above mentioned policy changes in Israel 
are reflected in the increase in inequality levels measured by the Gini coef-
ficient (a standard measure of income inequality that ranges from zero to 
one, the higher the coefficient the greater the inequality): from 0.32 in the 
1980s to 0.38 in the late 2000s, ranking third in inequality among OECD 
countries.17 The ratio of the average income of the richest 10 per cent of the 
population to that of the poorest 10 per cent is 9 to 1 in the OECD countries; 
it is much lower in the Nordic countries, but reaches 14 to 1 in Israel.18
One of the effects of these growing social inequalities in Israeli society 
is reflected in health status inequalities and in utilization of health services, 
despite the fact that the right to health is fundamental in Israel. The Israeli 
health system has traditionally offered universal health care administered 
by four health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that were initially set 
up by the country’s labour unions before the establishment of the state in 
1948. However, persons not in the workforce were usually uninsured. Since 
January 1995, under the provisions of the National Health Insurance Law, 
all permanent residents are insured and are entitled to health services in 
accordance with the principles of justice, equality, and mutual support. 
However, the Israeli health system is far from being able to adhere to these 
principles. Although a basic basket of medical services is provided under the 
Law, health inequalities persist between the major social divisions in Israeli 
15 Bank of Israel 2011.
16 Bank of Israel 2011.
17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011a) Growing Income In-
equality in OECD Countries: What Drives It and How Can Policy Tackle It? Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/20/47723414.pdf> (accessed October 2011)
18 OECD 2011a.
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society, between those with high and low SES levels, between central and 
peripheral areas, and between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority.19 
In order to fully understand these differences in the Israeli context, the fol-
lowing sections review the general evidence of the definition and scope of 
inequalities in health and well-being globally and their explanatory vari-
ables, followed by the evidence in Israel.
Socioeconomic inequalities in health
Health inequalities refer to the difference in health status between social 
groups that is not only unnecessary and avoidable, but is also considered 
unfair and unjust.20 Although the term health inequities has been used in 
recent years to emphasize the injustice of the difference in health status, I 
use the term health inequalities, which emphasizes the unequal distribution 
of health, and is often used interchangeably with the term health disparities 
in the American literature. SES inequalities are most commonly measured 
as differences in income, education, occupation or household assets at the 
individual level, and as per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at com-
munity, regional or national levels.
The importance of poverty has been recognized as a major social factor 
of health since the 19th century when it was recognized as a determinant 
of infectious disease – e.g. Rudolf Virchow’s conclusion that poor sanita-
tion, ignorance of basic hygiene, lack of education, and near starvation were 
the root problems of a typhus epidemic.21 The more recent awareness of the 
effects of these factors on non-communicable diseases, on general health 
status and on mortality, has generated compelling evidence that lower SES 
19 Chernichovsky, Dov (2011) ‘The Healthcare System’. In Ben-David, Dan (ed.) State of the Nation Re-
port – Society, Economy and Policy 2010. Jerusalem: Taub Center for Social Policy Studies. [Hebrew]
20 Adler, Nancy E. & Stewart, Judith (2010) ‘Health Disparities across the Lifespan: Meaning, Methods, 
and Mechanisms’. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 1186, 5–23.
21 Reese, David M. (1998) ‘Fundamentals – Rudolf Virchow and Modern Medicine’. Western Journal of 
Medicine, Vol. 169, 105–108.
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is associated with higher mortality rates and poorer health.22 Typically, the 
age-adjusted risk of death for those at the lowest socioeconomic level is two 
or three times as high as that of the highest level.23 The magnitude of the 
inequalities is stronger for mortality than for morbidity and varies between 
countries. For example, among European countries, relative inequalities in 
mortality between men with the lowest and the highest level of education 
were just under two in Sweden and in England and Wales, and were four or 
higher in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland; on the other hand, the 
relative inequalities in the prevalence of poor self-assessed health were 1.2 
in Germany and about 1.7 in Portugal.24 It is important to note that these 
trends have been observed not only for the general population but also 
within age sub-populations. The rate of reporting their children as being 
in fair/poor health was almost twice as high among families in the bottom 
25th income percentile compared with those in the 75th income percen-
tile.25 Similarly, health inequalities persist even among the oldest-old (85 
years of age or older) but the evidence is less consistent and is confounded 
by significant methodological issues.26
Differences are found not only between those in the extreme SES catego-
ries. Consistent evidence from various countries shows that there is a social 
gradient of mortality and morbidity: each step one moves up the social lad-
22 Lantz, Paula M., House, James S., Mero, Richard P. & Williams, David R. (2005) ‘Stress, Life Events, 
and Socioeconomic Disparities In Health: Results from the Americans’ Changing Life Study’. Journal 
of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 46, Issue 3, 274–288; Mackenbach, Johan P., Stirbu, Irina, Ros-
kam, Albert-Jan R., Schaap, Maartje M., Menvielle, Gwen, Leinsalu, Mall & Kunst, Anton E. (2008) 
‘Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health in 22 European Countries’. New England Journal of Medicine, 
Vol. 358, Issue 23, 2468–2481; van Oort, Floor V. A., van Lenthe, Frank J. & Mackenbach, Johan P. 
(2005) ‘Material, Psychosocial, and Behavioural Factors in the Explanation of Educational Inequali-
ties in Mortality in the Netherlands’. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, Vol. 59, 214–220.
23 Phelan, Jo C., Link, Bruce G. & Teranifer, Parisa (2010) ‘Social Conditions as Fundamental Causes of 
Health Inequalities: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications’. Journal of Health and Social Behav-
ior, Vol. 51, Suppl., S28–S40.
24 Mackenbach et al. 2008.
25 Chen, Edith, Martin, Andrew D & Matthews, Karen A (2004) ‘Why Socioeconomic Status Affects 
The Health Of Children: A Psychosocial Perspective’. Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 
13, 112–115.
26 Guilley, Edith, Bopp, Matthias, Faeh, David & Paccaud, Fred (2010) ‘Socioeconomic Gradients in 
Mortality in the Oldest old: A Review’. Archive of Gerontology and Geriatrics, Vol. 51, Issue 3, e37–
e40.
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der, the better one’s health.27 Moreover, an important issue is the evidence 
that socioeconomic inequalities in health in various Western countries per-
sist or have widened despite various programmes aimed at reducing them.28 
However, the mechanisms responsible for these health inequalities are still 
being debated.
SES inequalities in health in Israel
Significant differences in health between the major social divisions in the 
population have been consistently reported. For instance, differences in life 
expectancy at birth between Jews and Arabs persist. Among men, life ex-
pectancy was 80.4 and 76.8 years for Jews and Arabs respectively, and 83.7 
and 81.0 years among women, respectively.29 Infant mortality rates, which 
declined to 4 per 1000 live births in 2010, have declined more steeply among 
Arabs during the last decades, but are still double the rate among Jews.30 
General measures of morbidity, for example self-rated health (SRH), are 
poorer and the rate of disabilities higher among Arabs than among Jews.31 It 
is important to note, however, that a comparison between Arab and Jewish 
residents found no differences in health status between the two populations 
in localities with a low socio-economic standing, although they persisted in 
middle and higher status localities.32 Similarly, differences in mortality were 
found between sub-groups of the Jewish population, e.g. higher mortality 
rates among those of North-African origin, but the difference disappeared 
27 Siegrist, Johannes & Marmot, Michael (2004) ‘Health Inequalities and the Psychosocial Environ-
ment – Two Scientific Challenges’. Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 58, 1463–1473.
28 Davey-Smith, George, Dorling, Danny, Mitchell, Richard & Shaw, Mary (2002) ‘Health Inequalities 
in Britain: Continuing Increases Up to the End of the 20th Century’. Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, Vol. 56, Issue 6, 434–435; Mackenbach, Johan P., Bos, Vivian, Andersen, Otto, 
Cardano, Mario, Costa, Giuseppe, Harding, Seeromanie, Reid Alison, Hemström, Örjan, Valkonen, 
Tapani & Kunst, Anton E., (2003) ‘Widening Socioeconomic Inequalities in Mortality in Six Western 
European Countries’. International Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 32, Issue 5, 830–837.
29 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2011a.
30 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2011a.
31 Israel Ministry of Health (2010a) Tackling Health Inequality. Jerusalem: Ministry of Health. [He-
brew]
32 Shemesh, Annarosa A., Nacamulli Levi, Diana, Horowitz, Pamela & Averbuch, Emma (2011) Health 
Gaps and Social Periphery. Jerusalem: Ministry of Health. [Hebrew]
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completely when SES measures were taken into account.33 These findings 
suggest that health differences between Jews and Arabs or by ethnic origin 
within the Jewish population are confounded by SES (see details above in 
the introduction). In line with the focus of this chapter on SES inequali-
ties in health, evidence is provided of the SES inequalities in health within 
the Arab or the Jewish population, using data from national representative 
samples.
Within the Jewish population, significant SES inequalities presenting a 
clear social gradient from those at the lowest to those at higher levels were 
found in adult mortality rates,34 as well as in infant mortality as measured 
by the mother’s educational level or by the socioeconomic community score 
of the place of residence.35 Likewise, inequalities were observed in regard 
to morbidity, measured by SRH or limiting longstanding illness (LLI). For 
example, the odds for those with low vs. high education (age and gender 
adjusted) were more than four for fair/poor SRH, and about two for LLI 
in the Jewish population.36 Similar findings were observed within the Arab 
population: the respective odds ratios were close to four for fair/poor SRH, 
and about 2.5 for LLI.37
There is also evidence that health inequalities have widened in the past 
two decades. One example is a study comparing adult mortality rates in two 
cohorts (early 1980s and mid-1990s) within the Jewish population. Special 
attention was given to avoiding biases due to distributional changes across 
33 Jaffe, Dena, H, Neumark, Yehuday, D, Eisenbach, Zvi & Manor, Orly (2008) ‘Educational Inequalities 
in Mortality Among Israeli Jews: Changes over Time in a Dynamic Population’. Health and Place, 
Vol. 14, 287–298.
34 Manor, Orly, Eisenbach, Zvi, Peritz, Eric & Friedlander, Yehiel (1999) ‘Mortality Differentials Among 
Israeli Men’. American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 89, 1807–1813; Manor, Orly, Eisenbach, Zvi, 
Israeli, Avraham & Friedlander, Yehiel (2000) ‘Mortality Differentials Among Israeli Women: The 
Israel Longitudinal Mortality Study’. Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 51, 1175–1188.
35 Israel Ministry of Health 2010a.
36 Soskolne, Varda & Manor, Orly (2010) ‘Health Inequalities in Israel: Explanatory Factors of Socio-
economic Inequalities in Self-Rated Health and Limiting Longstanding Illness’. Health & Place, Vol. 
16, 242–251.
37 Daoud, Nihaya, Soskolne, Varda & Manor, Orly (2009a) ‘Educational Inequalities in Self-Rated 
Health within the Arab Minority in Israel: Explanatory Factors’. European Journal of Public Health, 
Vol. 19, Issue 5, 477–483; Daoud, Nihaya, Soskolne, Varda & Manor, Orly (2009b) ‘Examining Cul-
tural, Psychosocial, Community and Behavioral Factors in Relationship to Socioeconomic Inequali-
ties in Limiting Longstanding Illness Among the Arab Minority in Israel’. Journal of Epidemiology 
and Community Health, Vol. 63, 351–358.
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socioeconomic groupings, and transformations within social structures that 
occur over time (such as mass immigration from the former Soviet Union 
to Israel in the early 1990s). Using a composite household amenities variable 
as a measure of asset-based wealth to represent the social hierarchy unique 
to each cohort, and dividing the second cohort into stable residents and re-
cent immigrants, widening inequalities were observed in overall mortality: 
odds ratios for overall mortality for those at the lower level compared with 
those at the highest level of wealth among stable residents grew from 1.34 
to 1.44 among men and from 1.30 to 1.42 among women.38 In an additional 
analysis, the risk of mortality from cardiovascular disease among women 
with low vs. high levels of education increased from two to five times over 
these two study periods.39 Other data show that disparities in infant mortal-
ity between those born to mothers with lowest vs. highest educational level 
increased from a relative risk of 3.5 in 1993–1996 to 4.6 in 2000–2002.40
Explanatory models of SES inequalities in health
Several approaches to revealing the underlying mechanisms and the ex-
planatory factors of SES inequalities in health have been proposed over 
the years.41 The material factors approach suggests that individual income 
and material living conditions have a direct influence on health. The health 
behaviours approach views differences in life-style behaviours, such as in 
smoking, dietary habits, physical activity or alcohol consumption as major 
factors of differences in health. The life-course approach argues that early-
life SES effects, such as poverty and limited environmental resources affect 
the health in childhood and are carried into adulthood along with cumu-
lative SES inequalities in health. The psychosocial environment approach 
suggests that material factors or health behaviours alone are insufficient for 
explaining SES inequalities in health; individual psychosocial factors (for 
38 Jaffe, Dena H. & Manor, Orly (2009) ‘Assessing Changes in Mortality Inequalities in Israel Using a 
Period-Specific Measure of Socioeconomic Position, 1983–92 and 1995–2004’. European Journal of 
Public Health, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 175–177.
39 Jaffe et al. 2008.
40 Israel Ministry of Health (2005) Health in Israel, 2005. Jerusalem: Ministry of Health.
41 Bartley, Mel (2004) Health Inequality. An Introduction to Theories, Concepts and Methods. Cam-
bridge: Polity.
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example, life events, lack of social support, working conditions) or com-
munity factors such as neighbourhood characteristics, community socio-
economic level, and social capital are mediating pathways that link SES to 
health-related behaviours and biological response.42 While there may be dis-
agreement about the specific approach, there is consensus that social posi-
tion is linked to health via complex multilevel (individual and macro-level) 
pathways of diverse factors.43 The explanatory power of the factors refers to 
their statistical power in mediating the association between SES and health, 
or in other words, in reducing the SES inequalities in health.
Individual-level explanatory variables
The factors and their power in explaining health inequalities may differ ac-
cording to the health outcome selected. For example, material variables are 
the most significant explanatory variables when mortality rates are used as 
an outcome measure.44 In contrast, psychosocial factors45 or physical work-
ing conditions46 are significant explanatory factors of SES inequalities in 
health when self-rated health (SRH) is used as the outcome measure. These 
examples should not be taken as contradictory, but rather as an indication 
of the complexity of the underlying mechanisms of the SES inequalities in 
health. This understanding as well as the persistence of SES inequalities in 
overall health in recent decades47 provide evidence to the theory of funda-
mental causes of the SES association with health,48 which states that a) SES is 
42 Kawachi, Ichiro, Kennedy, Bruce P., Lochner, Kimberly & Protow-Stith, Deborah (1997) ‘Social 
Capital, Income Inequality, and Mortality’. American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 87, 1492–1498; 
Marmot, Michael & Wilkinson, Richard G. (2001) ‘Psychosocial and Material Pathways in the 
Relation Between Income and Health: A Response to Lynch et al’. British Medical Journal, Vol. 322, 
1233–1236.
43 Singh-Manoux, A., Macleod, J. & Davey, S. (2003) ‘Psychosocial Factors and Public Health’. Journal 
of Epidemiology and Community Health, Vol. 57, No. 8, 553–556. 
44 van Oort et al. 2005.
45 Molarius, Anu, Berglund, Kenneth, Eriksson, Charli, Lambe, Mats, Nordström, Eva, Eriksson, Hans 
G. & Feldman, Inna (2007) ‘Socioeconomic Conditions, Lifestyle Factors, and Self-Rated Health 
Among Men and Women in Sweden’. European Journal of Public Health, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 125–133.
46 Kaikkonen, Risto, Rahkonen, Ossi, Lallukka, Tea & Lahelma, Eero (2009) ‘Physical and Psychoso-
cial Working Conditions as Explanations for Occupational Class Inequalities in Self-Rated Health’. 
European Journal of Public Health, Vol. 19, Issue 5, 458–463.
47 Phelan, Link & Teranifer 2010.
48 Link, Bruce G. & Phelan, Jo C. (1995) ‘Social Conditions as Fundamental Causes of Disease’. Journal 
of Health and Social Behavior, Special No., 80–94.
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related to multiple disease outcomes via multiple psychosocial, behavioural 
and biological risk factors, and b) that the deployment of resources plays 
a critical role in the association between SES and health (thus supporting 
the combination of the above mentioned explanatory models). However, 
they also argue that c) SES maintains an association with disease over time 
even when intervening mechanisms change, because the risk factors are re-
placed by new ones. For example, behavioural risk factors such as smoking 
replaced old ones such as poor sanitary conditions. This argument suggests 
that when new knowledge is produced or new technologies developed, 
those at a higher SES level adopt it in ways that benefit their health, thus 
maintaining their health advantage over those at lower SES levels.
In Israel, two studies have shown the contribution of individual mate-
rial and psychosocial variables as explanatory factors of SES inequalities in 
health. Adjusting for various individual and community psychosocial vari-
ables and health behaviours, the educational inequalities in SRH and in LLI 
were substantially reduced and became non-significant in the Arab popula-
tion.49 In the Jewish population these intervening variables fully explained 
the educational inequalities in LLI but only partially in SRH, suggesting that 
other variables mediate this association.50
Societal-level explanatory variables
Additional approaches suggest that beyond the above mentioned individu-
al-level characteristics, macro-level societal factors are significant explana-
tory variables of health inequalities. Richard G. Wilkinson claims that the 
more unequal a society’s rate of inequality, the worse its health, and that 
socioeconomic inequality affects psychosocial factors such as social rela-
tions, low social status, family functioning, and stress, thereby impacting on 
health.51 For every 0.05 increase in the Gini coefficient, mortality increased 
by 7.8 per cent, with an estimated 1.5 million excess deaths each year in 30 
49 Daoud, Soskolne & Manor 2009a; Daoud, Soskolne & Manor 2009b.
50 Soskolne & Manor 2010.
51 Wilkinson, Richard G. (2005) The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies Healthier. New 
York: The New Press.
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OECD countries.52 The evidence in Israel does not, as yet, support this as-
sociation; although Israel ranks third highest in the rate of social inequality 
(Gini coefficient) among OECD countries, life expectancy is higher than the 
average for OECD countries.53 This could be the result of the presence of a 
retrenched, yet high quality public health-care system in Israel.
Another societal measure is welfare state regime. Based on evidence 
that morbidity and mortality rates in Scandinavian countries (welfare state 
regime types that offer universalism, comparatively generous replacement 
rates, and extensive welfare services) were lower than in other welfare state 
regimes, the expectation was that health inequalities would also be the 
smallest; yet, the findings showed otherwise.54 Bismarckian and Southern 
regimes fairly consistently exhibited smaller educational inequalities in 
health than Scandinavian regimes across most age groups.
In Israel, the evidence of widening gaps in health could partially reflect 
the changes in welfare policy in Israel since the late 1990s. Although Israel 
enjoys high-quality medicine, the health-care system suffers from major 
funding and organizational problems. While all Israelis are required to reg-
ister with one of the HMOs to be entitled to a basic government-funded 
health-care package, the National Health Insurance Law permitted HMOs 
to create supplementary medical insurance that Israelis could purchase, al-
lowing them greater access to affordable private care. Some 80 per cent of 
Israelis now hold supplementary medical insurance (of which only 55 per 
cent is via the HMOs and the rest is commercial) that covers a portion of 
private care. Furthermore, the government pays for 59 per cent of Israeli 
health-care expenditures, the lowest share among developed countries that 
provide universal health care, and a sharp decrease from close to 70 per cent 
in the mid-1990s.55 National expenditure on health as a percentage of the 
52 Pickett, Kate E. & Wilkinson, Richard G. (2009) ‘Greater Equality and Better Health’. British Medical 
Journal, Vol. 339, 1154–1155.
53 OECD 2011a.
54 Bambra, Clare, Netuveli, Gopalakrishnan & Eikemo, Terje A. (2010) ‘Welfare State Regime Life 
Courses: The Development of Western European Welfare State Regimes and Age-Related Patterns 
of Educational Inequalities in Self-Reported Health’. International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 40, 
Issue 3, 399–420.
55 Chernichovsky 2011.
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gross national product (GDP) in 2009 was 7.6 per cent in Israel compared 
with 10 per cent in Sweden, 9.8 per cent in the UK, and 8.7 per cent in Aus-
tralia.56
This situation has created a shift towards private medicine, which fewer 
people can afford, while the public hospitals (almost all the hospitals in Is-
rael) and community health-care services suffer from shrinking budgets. 
Indeed, inequality in access to health services has been increasing. People at 
lower income levels report greater difficulties in obtaining access to medical 
care than those at a higher income level.57 These findings at the individual 
level were further supported by evidence at the community level. The avail-
ability of specialty care physicians is 5–10 times lower, and the hospital beds 
ratio per 1000 residents is about two times lower in localities of low SES 
status or in the periphery.58 These conditions led to a five-month doctors’ 
strike in Israel in 2011, the demands being not only an increase in wages and 
a decrease in working hours, but also a substantial shift in budget allocations 
in order to rescue the public medical system. During the strike, a prominent 
Israeli journalist described the situation:
“Suddenly, people are realising that without a strong public sector 
there is no strong economy. Health care is an instructive example...
The Finance Ministry did not appreciate the rare Israeli achievement 
of the health-care system. Its officials wanted America. So they re-
duced expenses, lowered costs and encouraged privatization. They 
subjected the health system to market forces. The treasury’s privatis-
ers ignored the fact that the basic conditions that enable and justify 
a market economy do not exist in the health system. The result has 
been devastating.”59
56 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2011b) CBS Statistical Abstract of Israel 2011. National Expen-
diture on Health, International Comparisons. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.cbs.gov.il/
shnaton62/st28_02.pdf> (accessed March 2012)
57 Gross, Revital, Bramli-Greenberg, Shuly & Waitzberg, Ruth (2009) Public Opinion on the Level of 
Service and Performance of the Healthcare System in 2007 and in Comparison With Previous Years. 
Jerusalem: Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute.
58 Israel Ministry of Health 2010a.
59 Shavit, A. (2011) ‘Health Care in the Privatized Lane’. Haaretz, 10 March 2011. Online. Avail-
able HTTP: <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/health-care-in-the-privatized-
lane-1.348255> (accessed October 2011)
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The central role of the state in widening SES inequalities in health is 
regarded as destroying the fundamental right to health. The Association for 
Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) claims that consecutive Israeli governments 
have shirked their social and economic responsibilities, and the deteriora-
tion in the scale and quality of services provided by the health system has 
actually resulted in two health systems that differ substantially in quality – 
one for the rich and the other for the poor.60
Well-being and health 
In the following sections a more detailed definition of well-being and evi-
dence of SES inequalities in well-being is elaborated in order to arrive at a 
better informed use of well-being targets in the health inequalities agenda.
The conceptualization of well-being is broad and without a single, ac-
cepted definition. In health and epidemiological studies, well-being focuses 
on assets in functioning, including positive emotions and psychological re-
sources, the absence of negative emotions, and satisfaction with life, fulfil-
ment and positive functioning.61 However, the other common measure, that 
of health-related quality of life (HRQOL), includes some of these compo-
nents in its definition as ‘an individual’s or group’s perceived physical and 
mental health over time’, yet it generally focuses on deficits in functioning, 
e.g. pain, negative affect.62
The ambiguity of the concept is thus often based on the differences be-
tween measures that include physical health as one of the components of 
well-being, and those that view well-being as more a subjective psychologi-
cal concept, separate from health. The Gallup Well-being Index is an average 
of six sub-indexes of life evaluation, physical health, emotional health, work 
environment, health behaviours and access to basic necessities.63 In contrast, 
60 ACRI (Association for Civil Rights in Israel) (2011) The Right to Health. Association for Civil Rights 
in Israel. Online. Available HTPP: <http://www.acri.org.il/en/?p=2658> (accessed August 2011)
61 CDC (Centers for Disease Control) (2001) Well-being Concepts. Online. Available HTTP: <http://
www.cdc.gov/hrqol/well-being.htm> (accessed March 2012)
62 CDC (Centers for Disease Control) (2000) Measuring Healthy Days: Population Assessment of 
Health-Related Quality of Life. CDC Monographs. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion.
63 Gallup-Healthways (2011) The Gallup – Healthways Index of Well-being. Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.well-beingindex.com> (accessed August 2011)
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the most commonly used conceptualization of well-being focuses only on 
the psychological aspects and makes the distinction of defining it as global 
judgments of life satisfaction and of feelings, ranging from depression to 
joy.64 Subjective well-being should, therefore, differentiate between two con-
cepts that are often confounded: emotional well-being, which refers to the 
emotional quality of an individual’s everyday experience, the frequency and 
intensity of experiences of joy, stress, sadness, anger, and affection; and life 
evaluation, which refers to the thoughts people have about their life when 
they think about it.65 Studies have confirmed the validity of this division 
between the affective and the cognitive dimension dimensions of subjective 
well-being, concluding that well-being is not an unidimensional construct.66
Findings from prospective studies demonstrate the influence of subjec-
tive well-being, especially in the form of positive affect, on health and lon-
gevity in healthy populations, as well as in some samples of patients living 
with a chronic disease.67 Cross-sectional studies show that life satisfaction 
and positive and negative affectivity is significantly related to perceived 
health.68 However, this association may be bi-directional: health status is 
strongly linked to life satisfaction.69 Less is known about the scope of SES 
inequalities in well-being, as well as whether well-being plays an important 
role as a potential explanatory variable of SES inequalities in physical health.
64 Diener 2000.
65 Kahneman, Daniel & Deaton, Angus (2010) ‘High Income Improves Evaluation of Life But 
Not Emotional Well-Being’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 107, Issue 38, 
16489–16493.
66 Kahneman, Daniel & Krueger, Alan, B. (2006) ‘Developments in the Measurement of Subjective 
Well-Being’. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 20, Issue 1, 3–24; Watson, Dorothy, Pichler, Flo-
rian & Wallace, Clare (2010) Second European Quality of Life Survey: Subjective Well-Being in Europe. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
67 Diener & Chan 2011.
68 Cloninger, C. Robert & Zohar, Ada, D. (2011) ‘Personality and the Perception of Health and Happi-
ness’. Journal of Affective Disorders, Vol. 128, 24–32.
69 OECD (2011b) How’s Life? Measuring Well-being. Chapter 12. Subjective Well-being.  Online. Avail-
able HTTP: <http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/economics/how-s-life/
subjective-well-being_9789264121164-14-en> (accessed July 2012)
varda soskolne
42
SES inequalities in well-being
Although few studies have examined SES inequalities in well-being, their 
findings show a similar pattern to that of SES inequalities in health. Yet, the 
association of SES (measure by income) with well-being was found to vary 
by the nature of the well-being dimension: the slope was much steeper for 
life evaluation than for measures of feeling (positive affect and [no] nega-
tive feelings), suggesting milder income inequalities for the emotional di-
mensions of well-being than for the (cognitive) life evaluation.70 Similar, but 
more specific results among American respondents showed that people’s life 
evaluations rise steadily with income, but that the emotional dimensions of 
well-being are fully satiated at an annual income of about $75 000; above this 
level there was no improvement whatsoever in any of the three measures 
of emotional well-being. Moreover, the association differs within the emo-
tional dimension: the strength of the association of income is greater with 
negative measures (‘not blue’ affect, and stress free) than for positive affect.71
Similarly, satiation points were found in educational inequalities in life 
satisfaction, happiness and emotional well-being in the European Quality 
of Life Survey. People with low levels of education had significantly lower 
levels of subjective well-being than those who had completed secondary-
level education. There was, however, no additional benefit to subjective 
well-being from education beyond secondary level when income and living 
standard are controlled.72
Data on mediating factors that may explain the SES inequalities in well-
being are relatively limited. One study found different mediators of the as-
sociation between income and the life evaluation and emotional dimensions 
of well-being. The strongest mediation between income and life evaluation 
was satisfaction with a material factor (standard of living), while social 
psychological prosperity was a more significant mediator for feelings.73 A 
70 Diener, Ed, Ng, Weiting, Harter, James & Arora, Raksha (2010) ‘Wealth and Happiness Across the 
World: Material Prosperity Predicts Life Evaluation, Whereas Psychosocial Prosperity Predicts Posi-
tive Feeling’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 99, 52–61.
71 Kahneman & Deaton 2010.
72 Watson, Pichler & Wallace 2010.
73 Diener, Ng, Harter & Arora 2010.
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community-level study demonstrated that the negative association between 
societal income inequality and individual-level happiness was explained by 
perceived fairness and general trust.74 Additionally, while the income in-
equalities in the positive measure of emotional well-being were fully ex-
plained by the inclusion of explanatory variables, the association of income 
with negative feelings remained significant.75 Others have also demonstrat-
ed that in addition to income level, explanatory factors of positive affect dif-
fer from those of negative affect and are usually weaker or non-significant,76 
echoing Leo Tolstoy’s famous quote: ‘Happy families are all alike; every un-
happy family is unhappy in its own way.’77
Although this chapter adopts the convergence of health and well-being, 
one may still question whether subjective well-being is an explanatory fac-
tor of SES inequalities in physical health. The evidence is sparse. One direc-
tion rests on the indication that positive affect may have distinctive biologi-
cal correlates that can benefit health, and that positive affect is associated 
with protective psychosocial factors, thus suggesting that positive affect may 
be part of a broader profile of psychosocial resilience that reduces the risk of 
adverse physical health outcomes.78 In fact, positive and negative states pro-
duce independent effects on health when controlling for the other.79 Other 
evidence from a meta-analysis showed that negative measures slightly more 
strongly predicted short-term health outcomes, whereas positive well-being 
slightly more strongly predicted long-term health outcomes.80 These find-
ings may indicate the potential role of well-being in explaining physical 
health inequalities.
74 Oishi, Shigehiro, Kesebir, Selin & Diener, Ed (2011) ‘Income Inequality and Happiness’. Psychological 
Science, Vol. 22, Issue 9, 1095–1100.
75 Diener, Ng, Harter & Arora 2010. 
76 Katz, Ruth (2009) ‘Intergenerational Family Relations and Subjective Well-Being in Old Age: A 
Cross-National Study’. European Journal of Ageing, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 79–90.
77 Tolstoy, Leo (2000 [1873]) Anna Karenina. London: Allen Lane/Penguin.
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SES inequalities in well-being in Israel
In the OECD survey of well-being, Israelis rate life satisfaction at 7.4 (on 
a scale from 0 to 10), which is higher than the OECD average of 6.7, thus 
ranking Israel eighth out of 36 countries.81 This result is surprising as it stood 
in contrast to the grading of Israel’s positive affect balance which was much 
lower than the OECD average. While in most OECD countries, people re-
ported experiencing more positive than negative affect, reaching an average 
of eighty per cent for all OECD countries but only 69 per cent in Israel.82 
The contradiction between the levels of the two dimensions of well-being in 
Israel can be explained by the fact that they are influenced in different ways 
by social indicators. Whereas positive affect is only weakly associated with 
income, life satisfaction is strongly influenced by income: the bottom 20 per 
cent of the Israeli population has a level of 6.6 in life satisfaction, while this 
score reaches 8.0 for the top 20 per cent.83 Additional data supports these 
findings showing that income is significantly associated with the cognitive 
dimensions of well-being (quality of life and life satisfaction), but not with 
the affective dimension (depression).84
These inequalities in life satisfaction provide additional evidence for the 
consequences of the societal changes and the situation of the health-care 
system in Israel as described above. They shed additional light on the cir-
cumstances of the growing social inequalities, the increasing proportion of 
economically deprived people, and the feeling among many working people 
that their earnings do not enable them to afford basic necessities. In fact, 
these factors were fertile ground and a major catalyst for the outbreak of the 
nation-wide social protests in Israel that continued throughout the summer 
months of 2011. The protests were initiated by mainly middle-class people 
against the significant rise in the cost of living, unaffordable public housing, 
rising food, fuel and basic amenity prices, as well as increasing privatization 
of the public education system and health services. Thousands of people 
81 OECD 2011b.
82 OECD 2011b.
83 OECD 2011b.
84 Amit, Karin & Litwin, Howard (2010) ‘The Subjective Well-Being of Immigrants Aged 50 and Older 
in Israel’. Social Indicators Research, Vol. 98, 89–104.
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camped in the country’s squares, and hundreds of thousands from all social 
strata took to the streets clamouring ‘the people demand social justice’. After 
weeks of demonstrations, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appointed 
a committee to pinpoint the grievances and propose solutions to Israel’s 
socioeconomic problems (Trajtenberg Committee). The Committee’s rec-
ommendations were submitted to the government within two months and 
were perceived to be beneficial for the ‘hard-working middle classes’, but 
faced strong political opposition inside the government; instead of adopt-
ing all the recommendations, an approach of gradual implementation was 
eventually adopted and only one recommendation has been implemented. 
By winter the movement seemed to be dead, but protests resumed in June 
2012 because nothing happened, and prices increased.85 Thus one may ex-
pect even lower levels of positive affect than those detailed above.
Two recent studies highlight the role of well-being as an explanatory fac-
tor of SES inequalities in health in Israel. One study demonstrated that when 
vigour, a dimension of emotional well-being (positive affect) was included 
in the final regression analysis, educational inequalities in overall mortality 
became non-significant.86 Similarly, another study showed that the associa-
tion between education and SRH among middle-aged people becomes non-
significant when life satisfaction and negative feeling (depression) measures 
are included in the final step of the hierarchical regression analysis.87 These 
are important contributions to advancing scientific knowledge on the role of 
well-being in explaining SES inequalities in health.
85 For more details see Alimi, Eitan Y. (2012) ‘“Occupy Israel:” A Tale of Startling Success and Hopeful 
Failure’. Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest, Vol. 3–4, No. 11, 
1–6.
86 Shirom, Arie, Toker, Sharon, Jacobson, Orit & Balicer, Ran D. (2010) ‘Feeling Vigorous and the 
Risks of All-Cause Mortality, Ischemic Heart Disease, and Diabetes: A 20-year Follow-Up of Healthy 
Employees’. Psychosomatic Medicine, Vol. 72, 727–733.
87 Iecovitch, Esther & Cwikel, Julie (2010) ‘The Relationship between Well-Being and Self-Rated 
Health among Middle-Aged and Older Women in Israel’. Clinical Gerontologist, Vol. 33, Issue 4, 
255–269.
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Conclusions and implications
The evidence of SES inequalities in physical health outcomes is highly con-
sistent and convincing. It is generally understood that a complex, multi-
level array of material, psychosocial, behavioural, societal and policy fac-
tors, as well as biological mechanisms, intervene in mediate the association 
between SES and health. Yet, further research is necessary to elucidate these 
explanatory pathways, in particular, the way biological mechanisms interact 
with psychosocial and behavioural factors.
This review also shows that the increasing interest in well-being has pro-
duced important information, clarifying the concept and validating its two 
dimensions. Furthermore, the evidence of SES inequalities in well-being, 
although in need of further research, has produced clear indication that SES 
inequalities in life evaluations differ from those in the emotional dimen-
sion of well-being. In particular, the preliminary evidence regarding SES 
inequalities in positive vs. negative measures of emotional well-being di-
mension call for further research directed at disentangling those that ex-
plain inequalities in negative as against positive measures. Such an approach 
may lead to understanding of mediating protective factors that contribute 
to positive emotions rather than mainly risk factors for negative emotions 
and may redirect future interventions aimed at reducing inequalities in 
well-being to focus on these positive factors. Additionally, regarding the 
role of well-being as an explanatory variable of SES inequalities in health, 
this review shows that the evidence is still limited. Prospective studies of life 
course approaches are necessary in order to assess whether well-being di-
mensions are determinants, and if so in what way, of the SES inequalities in 
physical health and mortality. Yet, the preliminary data is sufficient to show 
the relevance of well-being for the health inequalities agenda as it elucidates 
different approaches to interventions aimed at reducing SES inequalities in 
health.
The Israeli case study highlights not only the widening SES inequali-
ties in health, similar to those in several other countries, but also the com-
plexity of the multilevel explanatory factors of SES inequalities in health. 
Supporting the social determinants of health approach, research findings 
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indicate that individual-level psychosocial factors are explanatory factors of 
SES inequalities in health. In addition, the Israeli case demonstrates the role 
of societal-level factors for health inequalities. Welfare policy changes and 
growing social inequality in recent decades have exerted their influence on 
SES inequalities in health, beyond the effects of individual-level differences. 
At the same time, evidence on life satisfaction and emotional dimensions 
of well-being is sparse and somewhat contradictory, and no long-term in-
formation on changes over time or assessments of the underlying macro- 
and micro-level explanatory mechanisms of SES inequalities in well-being. 
Greater effort is required in order to better understand what well-being 
means for Israelis and, as in other societies, its potential role as an explana-
tory factor of SES inequalities in physical health. Additionally, the Israeli 
data showed that the explanatory power of psychosocial and behavioural 
factors of the SES inequalities in health within the Jewish or the Arab popu-
lations differs. No data on ethnic differences in well-being, or differences in 
SES inequalities in well-being and changes over time with the retrenching 
welfare state are available. This evidence is essential for Israel and implies 
that research on SES inequalities in health and well-being within different 
cultural, ethnic or racial sub-populations, as well as comparative studies of 
different welfare regimes is a priority in order to provide a basis for evi-
dence-based interventions for many societies.
Implications for practice and policy 
The complexity of the mechanisms explaining SES inequalities in health 
and well-being, and the evidence that the underlying explanatory factors 
are often replaced by new ones, may lead professionals and policy makers to 
abandon all hope that health inequalities can be reduced. This, of course, is 
not the case. Efforts can be made to address the underlying causes, the risk 
factors, so that the core causes of fundamental factors are tackled.88 This re-
quires concerted efforts at all levels: local, regional, and governmental. Data 
on SES inequalities in well-being as well as the potential role of well-being in 
88 Phelan, Link & Teranifer 2010.
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explaining health inequalities may subsequently adopt a different approach 
to interventions by addressing mediating protective factors, rather than only 
risk factors. For example, interventions aimed at enhancing life satisfaction 
and positive affect among socio-economically deprived sub-populations 
may lead to reduction of inequalities in physical health.
It should also be clear that changes are not the sole responsibility of 
health-care professionals and health policy makers, but rather of many sec-
tors of society. It is evident that reducing economic, educational or occupa-
tional inequalities will ultimately affect inequalities in health. Nevertheless, 
several implications for practice within the health-care system arise from 
this review. Above all, in all settings, health-care workers should be aware 
of the magnitude of SES inequalities in health and the factors explaining 
them, so that they routinely inquire about them and make decisions about 
appropriate care. Health promotion programmes, whether for primary or 
secondary prevention, should be creative in not only tackling the underly-
ing factors of health inequalities, but also include interventions to enhance 
subjective well-being.
Whatever interventions are planned, they will not be successful without 
political will. The reduction of these inequalities demands coherent policy 
responses across sectors and across countries, and a firm political commit-
ment by all parties. This idea requires ‘governance for health’, namely, the 
pursuit of health as integral to well-being through both a ‘whole of govern-
ment’ and a ‘whole of society’ approach.89 Clearly defined goals of reducing 
SES inequalities in health and well-being need to be defined and routinely 
monitored. This means that specific measures of subjective well-being, if not 
already in use, should be incorporated into on-going surveys. Additionally, 
evaluation research of interventions and of policy changes is imperative.
The efforts aimed at reducing health inequalities are still in their infancy 
in Israel. Only recently, in 2010, the Ministry of Health responded to the 
accumulation of research findings regarding the scope of health inequalities 
in Israel, and to reports and recommendations issued by the Israel Medical 
89 WHO (World Health Organization) (2011) Governance for Health in the 21st Century: A Study 
Conducted for the WHO Regional Office for Europe. Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe.
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Association,90 and decided to include the reduction of health inequalities 
as one of the Ministry’s major multi-year goals.91 It was the culmination 
of pressures from prominent Israeli public health professionals, as well as 
the impact of the WHO CSDH report. Although this does reflect political 
will, the initial activities of a special unit in the Ministry have been limited, 
mainly directed at reducing co-payments by economically deprived popu-
lations.92 The consistent social gradient in health suggests that although it is 
tempting to focus limited resources on those most in need, everyone should 
be targeted. The social protests in Israel have highlighted the plight of the 
middle class in many life domains, including health. Thus, if the focus is on 
the worst-off, what would happen to those just above the bottom, or at the 
median, who have worse health than those above them?
In consequence, a far greater effort to reduce inequalities is required, 
not a separate health agenda, but action across the whole of society. This is 
likely to work only if a more integrated approach is adopted, one that links 
closely to wider social inequalities in the society in order to avert the con-
tinued consequences of the neoliberal policy in health care. Despite other 
enormous problems being faced by Israeli society, above all political and 
security issues, the health of the nation needs to be more equally distributed. 
At a national policy level, this requires recognition by the government that 
reducing health inequalities is a national priority, to be achieved by coordi-
nated actions of health, education, labour, housing and welfare ministries. 
Better understanding of the explanatory factors of inequalities in health 
and in well-being is needed as a basis for designing evidence-informed pro-
grammes at national and local levels either by universalist welfare policies or 
by particularist ones, such as progressive payment programmes. In Israel’s 
ethnically and culturally highly diverse society, the explanatory factors of 
SES inequalities in health may be different across population groups and 
over the lifecycle. Policies aimed at reducing the SES inequalities in health 
90 Israel Medical Association (2008) Inequality in Health in Israel. Ramat-Gan: Israel Medical Associa-
tion.
91 Israel Ministry of Health (2010b) Health Policy Main Goals 2011–2014. Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.health.gov.il/PublicationsFiles/moh2011.pdf> (accessed March 2012)  [Hebrew]
92 Israel Ministry of Health 2010a.
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may therefore easily be ineffective in some populations. Therefore, involve-
ment of stakeholders and sub-populations in each locality will assure that 
‘bottom-up’ together with ‘top-down’ planning of programmes may find ef-
fective ways to help distributing health more equally. This is particularly rel-
evant now. The Israeli social protest of 2011 has not (yet?) resulted in policy 
changes but has propelled an important shift in public and media discourse, 
forcing the government to take the public voice into consideration more 
seriously than before.
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Happy without reason? Mental illness and the 
‘right’ to happiness in Sweden
katarina piuva
Introduction
The question ‘All well in the welfare state?’ points at the emerging trends 
about happiness in Western societies. In the field of social research about 
mental illness and mental disability, happiness – or rather the absence of 
happiness – is a well-known theme. In view of this fact, it may appear sur-
prising that mental health issues have until recently only rarely been seen 
on the international political agenda. In 2007, a document published by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) stated that:
Mental health may be the most neglected public health issue. In 
much of Europe it remains a taboo to discuss the challenges that 
mental health raises for governments, societies, and particularly for 
people with mental health problems themselves.1
Mental health is seldom in the focus of political discourses on health. 
Yet, happiness cannot be measured without an idea about unhappiness at 
the other end of the scale, as its hidden opposite. Knowledge about happi-
ness and health is always a concern for the political administration. Health 
and happiness is a tempting goal that concerns both the individual and the 
whole of society; a goal which can be traced through modern public health 
history. The recently formulated concept of happiness is in some respects 
1 Klein, Judith (2007) ‘Foreword’. In Knapp, Martin, Mc Daid, David, Mossialos, Elias & Thornicroft, 
Graham (eds) Mental Health Policy and Practice across Europe: The Future Direction of Mental Health 
Care. Maidenhead: Open University Press, xxii.
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very similar to earlier articulations of positive mental health.2 It is the same 
mix of psychology, politics and social science, characteristic for the welfare 
society guided by the ideals of reason. In the post-war period from 1945 un-
til the early 1970s, the Human Relations School and the concept of ‘mental 
hygiene’ carried the message of happiness, relying on ‘mental health’ and 
especially ‘positive mental health’ as the main concepts.3
Public health policies regarding mental health can be split into two as-
pects: first, to prevent mental illness in the population; and second, to man-
age the care of the severely mentally ill. The concept that combines those 
two aspects is ‘normality’. Prevention is about keeping the population in 
good health in order to promote ‘normal’ mental health. The care of the 
mentally ill is about taking care of people who are considered as deviant in 
that respect.
Normality, however, is a difficult concept to grasp; it is seldom explic-
itly described, yet it is often implicitly assumed as the opposite to deviant 
behaviour.4 Furthermore, it is almost impossible to distinguish definitions 
of mental health from definitions of normality. When normality is defined, 
the three following meanings are expressed: the statistical meaning, e.g. the 
most common, ‘like everybody else’, the ideal meaning or moral notions 
about how it should be, and the medical meaning, which implies no health 
problems, e.g. no deviations from an expected state of health.5
The general understanding of normality usually consists of a mix of the 
three aspects. Of course, the common understanding of normality trans-
2 For a recent conceptualization of happiness, see Pacek, Alexander & Radcliff, Benjamin (2008) ‘As-
sessing the Welfare State: The Politics of Happiness‘. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 267–277; 
for positive mental health, see Jahoda, Marie (1958) Current Concepts of Mental Health. New York: 
Basic Books.
3 Mayo, Elton (1943) The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization. Boston: Harward Business 
School; Mindus, Erland (1969) Arbete och mental hälsa. Stockholm: Folksam/Tiden; Thomson, 
Mathew (1995) ‘Mental Hygiene as an International Movement’. In Weindling, Peter (ed.) Interna-
tional Health Organizations and Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4 Hacking, Ian (1991) The Taming of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Tengland, 
Per-Anders (2001) Mental Health. A Philosophical Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers; Piuva, Katarina (2005) Normalitetens gränser. En studie av den mentalhygieniska rörelsen under 
1900-talet. Stockholm: Stockholm University.
5 Jahoda’s division of the normality concept is twofold as she distinguishes between the statistical and 
the normative ideal. Tideman, Magnus (2000) Normalisering och kategorisering: Om handikappide-
ologi och välfärdspolitik i teori och praktik för personer med utvecklingsstörning. Lund: Studentlittera-
tur; Piuva 2005, 56–60; Jahoda 1958, 18–21. 
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forms over time, as demands of health and quality of life expectations change. 
What is considered normal is the result of cultural and political negotia-
tions. Over time, various values, such as autonomy and integrity, have been 
added to the understanding of normality. These values are also connected 
to the ethics of welfare. Furthermore, these values work in two directions; 
as a top-down demand on self-reliant citizens, citizens’ and as bottom-up 
expectations of individual freedom and a minimum of governance by state 
authorities. The mentally ill, especially those with severe mental illness, of-
ten end up with long-term inability to work and to maintain economical 
self-support. This also entails a lifelong dependency on medical and social 
services, thereby jeopardizing the contract of autonomy between the welfare 
state and the individual.
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the problems surrounding the con-
cept of happiness in relation to mental illness. It explores how different un-
derstandings of normality affect expectations of happiness. First, the chap-
ter turns to the two main official investigations about mental health care in 
Sweden during the second half of the twentieth century. The exploration is 
undertaken with a focus on how mental illness is connected to the health 
and happiness of the whole population. Second, mental health policy is dis-
cussed in terms of practical social work. How are happiness and normal life 
conditions rendered by the social service administration and how do social 
interventions affect the autonomy and integrity of the severely mentally ill 
and their families? Finally, the chapter reflects on the social integration of 
the severely mentally ill.
The politics of mental illness, normality and happiness 
Institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill
Mental care as we understand it in the history of welfare in Western Europe 
can be briefly summarized as consisting of two periods. The first period of 
institutionalization refers to the expansion of in-hospital care from the early 
nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth. The second period covers the clos-
ing of the mental hospitals starting from the end of the Second World War 
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and the policy of integrating people with severe mental illness. The period 
of institutionalization resulted in a professionalization of care in more orga-
nized settings.6 The former care of the mentally ill undertaken by the local 
communities was often inferior to the standards of health care, a condition 
that repeatedly caused severe criticism from official inspections and inves-
tigations.7 Historical sources describe the community-based care that the 
mentally ill had to endure in Scandinavia during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century as being terrible.8 Patients were described as work house 
or poor house inmates.9 The period of deinstitutionalization after the Sec-
ond World War is closely connected to the development of the welfare states 
in Europe. The development of medical care and the political concerns 
about public health contributed to the integration of the severely mentally ill 
in national social security plans. However, this was merely an organizational 
and administrative integration, despite the 1950s and 1960s being an era of 
institutional growth. Most European countries, with the notable exception 
of the UK and Ireland, increased the number of hospital beds in mental care 
during these two decades.
During the 1970s, the deinstitutionalization process aimed for the social 
integration of the mentally ill. This period of on-going integration is charac-
terized by the expansion of community-care systems. State mental hospitals 
were replaced by smaller nursing homes and housing facilities in commu-
nity settings. Official statistics reflect a decline of beds in state psychiatric 
hospitals from the end of the 1970s. In Sweden, for example, the number of 
state hospital beds in psychiatric care declined from 75 per cent of all psy-
6 Qvarsell, Roger (1982) Ordning och behandling. Psykiatri och sinnessjukvård i Sverige under 1800-ta-
lets första hälft. Umeå: University of Umeå.
7 Piuva, Katarina (2010) ‘The Meaning of Normality. The Controversy About the Mental Health 
Campaign in Sweden 1969’. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 35, Issue 2, 198–216.
8 Community-based services concerning the severely mentally ill in the cities meant poor houses and 
mad houses. In rural areas the poor, including the handicapped and severely mentally ill without 
economical resources, were adapted to the system of rotehjon, a kind of ambulating care between 
estates and farms. According to official investigations, the mentally ill considered as being dangerous 
or otherwise unruly were locked up in wooden cages or chained in stalls. 
9 Berge, Anders (2007) Sjukvårdens underklass: Sjukvården i den kommunala fattigvården 1910–1950. 
Umeå: Borea; Shorter, Edward (2007) ‘The Historical Development of Mental Health Services in 
Europe’. In Knapp, Martin, McDaid, David, Mossialos, Elias & Thornicroft, Graham (eds) Mental 
Health Services and Practices Across Europe. Future Directions of Mental Health Care. Maidenhead: 
Open University Press.  
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chiatric beds to 0 per cent between the years 1972 and 2001.10
However, statistics of this kind do not present an entirely clear picture 
of the actual development of mental health care during this time. Taking 
Sweden as an example, the decline in the number of hospital beds repre-
sents the closing down of old-fashioned state hospitals. In-hospital care was 
still conducted by municipalities, community-based nursing homes and by 
an increasing number of private entrepreneurs to this day. Therefore, it is 
worth noting that the widespread periodization of mental health care as two 
‘eras’, as presented above, is rather rough and simplified. In addition, re-
search about the social integration of the mentally ill shows a recent trend 
of ‘reinstitutionalization’.11 Nevertheless, institutionalization and deinstitu-
tionalization were the two common public policies in the West European 
countries, even if the reality always turned out to be more complex. De-
spite the general tendency of successive political decisions, confinement, 
community-oriented care and family-oriented care have always co-existed 
as parallel systems.
The official investigations on the development of the mental-health pol-
icy in Sweden reveal the same patterns of deinstitutionalization, followed by 
a policy of integration, as in all the European welfare states, although the ex-
pansion of state managed in-hospital care in Sweden was late in comparison 
to Europe. This period of expansion during the first decades of the twentieth 
century was rapid, just as the deinstitutionalization during the last 20 years 
of the same century has been swift.12
10 Shorter 2007, 24–25.
11 Priebe, Stefan, Badesconyi, Alli, Fioritti, Angelo, Hansson, Lars, Kilian, Reinhold, Torres-Gonzales, 
Fransisco, Turner, Trevor & Wiersma, Durk (2005) ‘Reinstitutionalization in Mental Health Care: 
Comparison of Data on Service Provision from Six European Countries’. British Medical Journal, 
Vol. 330, 123–126.
12 Piuva 2010, 200.
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In between two regimes of mental health care: The ‘caring state’ versus  
the ‘autonomous citizen’
The two most important official investigations about mental health care in 
Sweden were written in 1958 and in 1992, respectively.13 As historical docu-
ments, they are of great interest as time-bound indicators of how mental ill-
ness, mental health and normality have been related to the happiness of the 
population during the two periods of welfare state policies. The titles of the 
investigations display two different purposes, adjusted to the welfare agen-
das of the time. Irrespective of the time they were written, however, both 
these official texts about mental care and social services struggle to integrate 
the target group into the welfare society.
When reading SOU 1958:38, it becomes clear that the intentions with 
regard to mental health care were to expand, modernize, and reorganize 
the treatment of the mentally ill in an ‘up-to-date fashion’. The concept of 
mental hygiene, representing the latest trends of preventive care and the 
development of out-hospital care in Western Europe and the US, was ad-
justed to in-hospital care in the Swedish context. The investigation made a 
considerable effort in describing how the physical surroundings should be 
shaped in order to look as normal as possible. According to the plans for the 
new mental hospitals, there would be libraries, hair-dressers, and shops in 
addition to the traditional wards. Attention was also paid to the out-door 
surroundings. The plans also outlined large recreation grounds as well as ar-
eas for sport and other activities. As the severely mentally ill were excluded 
from normal social conditions during the period of welfare reforms that 
characterized Swedish social policy during the post-war period until the 
middle of the 1970s, the ambition was to ‘normalize’ the inner milieu at the 
institutions. It might be said that patients were included into the welfare 
program by this modernization of care but still physically excluded from the 
‘normal’ society.
This rapid expansion of in-hospital care, which continued until the 
early 1960s, belonged to the welfare reform programme of Sweden. The di-
13 SOU 1958:38. Mentalsjukvården – Planering och organisation. Stockholm: Fritzes; SOU 1992:73. 
Välfärd och valfrihet. Stockholm: Fritzes. 
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mension of inclusion in the excluded sphere implied that the mentally ill 
also had their share of material welfare. Although the expansion of mental 
health care during the 1950s and 1960s belonged to the Swedish welfare 
programme, little is known about whether the expansion improved the life 
conditions for the mentally ill. It is certain, however, that the expansion led 
to a large increase in the number of psy-professionals being trained, who 
later became involved in the modernization of mental health care.
The political decisions in the Western societies about deinstitutionaliza-
tion have been made for a range of reasons, mostly related to the well-being 
of service recipients and concerns about the quality of care. A number of 
factors coincided and became an advantage for the shift:
1. The use of new drugs which enabled independent living for a large 
number of the mentally ill.
2. A transformation of costs from the governmental state level to the 
local political level.
3. Claims from user organizations together with an increasing public 
criticism about the quality of care at the large mental hospitals.
Economic and humanitarian motives coincided in the claims for a de-
institutionalization of mental health care. This political consensus on both 
the left and the right facilitated the process of deinstitutionalization.14 After 
the deinstitutionalization at the close of the twentieth century, a new situ-
ation emerged. In the 1990s, the welfare politics in Sweden began to waver 
between two welfare regimes. The state’s responsibility for the welfare of the 
population as a collective was reduced in favour of a more liberal agenda 
founded on the individual’s position in society. The titling of SOU 1992:73 
– Välfärd och valfrihet [Welfare and Freedom of Choice] – signals the com-
mittee’s attempt to mediate between the ethos of the traditional welfare state 
and the ethos of freedom of choice, as two key concepts of modern welfare 
policy. The psychiatric care and the social services to the severely mentally 
ill became, through the Psychiatric Health Care Reform in 1995, integrated 
14 Krieg, Randall (2001) ‘An Interdisciplinary Look at the Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill’. The 
Social Science Journal, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 367–380. 
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within the concept of a new public health policy, individual freedom of 
choice and risk minimization.15 The ambition was to increase the patients’ 
influence and to promote out-hospital care. The coordination of care and 
service became the responsibility of the social service administration as a 
step in the direction of realizing these ambitions. The Psychiatric Health 
Care Reform sought to enrol the mentally ill into the new regime of the or-
ganization of the welfare state: the regime of the ‘autonomous citizen’.
The normalization of living conditions and the goal of a ‘better life’ were 
formulated in similar ways both in 1958 and in 1992. A difference, however, 
can be found in how normality was interpreted in the texts. Normal living 
conditions for the severely mentally ill in the 1950s implied an institution-
alized high standard of mental care at the same level as somatic care. In 
1992, normal living conditions for the severely mentally ill instead implied 
personal autonomy and integrity, in short, in a normal life outside the walls 
of the institutions. In the former investigation, happiness was connected to 
normal conditions for any patient in medical care. The latter investigation 
emphasized happiness in terms of equal living conditions to any person in 
society at large. A normal life is equal to have the same life conditions as 
everybody else.16 This shift of meaning is essential, as it marks the political 
ambition to include the mentally ill in the disability discourse, a policy that 
is emphasizing the individual rights to be included into the society.
In between normality and deviance
Who is normal, then, and who is not? The following part of this chapter 
is an effort to describe how the investigations handled definitions of men-
tal illness, mental health and normality. These definitions were central for 
the implementations of the reforms and for the living conditions and hence 
the happiness and the well-being of the severely mentally ill. Estimating the 
15 The proposals of  SOU 1992:73 were transformed to a suggestion of implementation in the Govern-
mental Proposition 1993/94:128. Psykiskt stördas villkor; see also Petersen, Alan & Lupton, Deborah 
(1996) The New Public Health. Self and Health in the Age of Risk. London: Sage; Rose, Nicholas 
(1999) Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16 Brusén, Peter & Hydén, Lars-Christer (2000) Ett liv som andra: Livsvillkor för personer med funktion-
shinder. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
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number of severely mentally ill people in the population has been a govern-
mental activity in Sweden since 1901.17 In the early years, an investigation 
came to the result that there were 17 300 individuals needing in-hospital 
mental care, i.e. 0.34 per cent of the Swedish population. The calculations 
continued during the twentieth century, chiefly with the aim of calculating 
the need of beds, doctors and staff in the mental hospitals.
The investigation of 1958 calculated the need of hospital beds to 0.05 
per cent of the population.18 In only a few years, the number of patients had 
risen to 0.45 per cent of the population.19 In fact, the official investigation 
in the 1950s had proposed deinstitutionalization as a solution. Yet, this pro-
posal to minimize the in-hospital care was not realized; instead Sweden held 
the top-position in Europe, regarding the number of patients in mental care, 
for at least ten years. The number of beds within mental hospitals peaked in 
1962 when Sweden had the highest number of patients in mental hospitals 
in Europe.20
Both the investigation of 1958 and the investigation of 1992 struggled to 
define the target group in a way that would make mental illness and normali-
ty concordant with the suggested changes. Both investigations presented cal-
culations about the prevalence of mental illness in the whole population. In 
addition, the investigation of 1958 made estimations of hospital beds, while 
the investigation of 1992 calculated how many of the mentally ill persons suf-
fered from long-term illness equal to a disability (handicap). In 1958 the cal-
culations were made in order to motivate the expansion of preventive mental 
health and the education of staff in out-hospital care, while the calculations 
in 1992 aimed to estimate how many individuals that would have legal rights 
to special social services. In both cases, severe mental illness (schizophrenia) 
is presented in relation to milder ill-health. Due to the lack of exact data, 
the calculations were based on earlier investigations, research articles, and 
statistics compiled from case records and the use of hospital beds.
17 Medicinalstyrelsen [Swedish Royal Medical Board] (1903) Medicinalstyrelsens underdåniga berättelse 
angående sinnessjukvården i riket för år 1901. Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner.
18 SOU 1958:38. 
19 Sjöström, Bengt (1992) Kliniken tar över dårskapen. Göteborg: Daidalos.
20 33 752 patients in hospital care, e.g. 487,3 per 100 000 inhabitants. Sjöström 1992, 14. 
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The calculations of the prevalence of schizophrenia are quite similar at 
the different points in time. In the calculation of hospital beds, the investiga-
tion from 1958 did not propose an increase; on the contrary, only 0.05 per 
cent of the population was expected to need in-hospital care. The proposal 
concerning in-hospital care in 1958 was about replacing the old mental hos-
pitals with more modern clinical care in close connection to somatic health 
care, a proposal that contributed to a normalization of mental health care. 
In reality, however, the old mental hospital remained for a rather long time 
alongside the new clinics and the newly-built psychiatric hospitals.
The most striking difference between the calculations in 1958 and 1992 
is the assumption about the prevalence of milder forms of mental ill-health. 
The investigation from 1958 came to the conclusion that as much as 40 per 
cent of the total population suffered from milder psychiatric illness. The 
corresponding estimation of milder mental ill-health went down to 13 per 
cent in 1992. The reason behind this is probably that the aspect of preven-
tion was no longer an issue of high priority in 1992. In 1958 though, the 
mental hygiene doctrine permeated the scientific field of psychiatry. The 
official investigation of 1958 argued that milder mental ill-health was very 
common and an expansion of out-door psychiatric care would decrease the 
need of in-hospital care. This argument is also the reason for the proposal 
of the investigation to increase the education of psychiatrists, psychologists, 
mental hospital nurses and psychiatric social workers. The task of the inves-
tigation in 1992 was more limited; to define and describe the needs of the 
severely mentally ill entitled to special services from the community.
The investigation of 1958 presented the spectrum of mental illness as 
a continuum with milder ill-health at one end and severe mental illness 
(schizophrenia) at the other. In 1958 the concept of mental hygiene included 
the whole population and, as such, the resources of mental health care ex-
panded with the aim of preventing an increase of severe mental illness. With 
reference to the WHO, the argument was that preventive mental health will 
‘take the health of all citizens to the highest possible level’.21 In the conclud-
21 WHO (World Health Organization) (1951) Mental Health: Report on the Second Session of the Expert 
Committee. Geneva: World Health Organization.
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ing chapter of the investigation – programmatically entitled The View of 
Mental Hygiene Must Permeate the Whole Society – a declaration is made:
“…so must Mental Hygiene clean up the mental environment, e.g. 
reveal and revise prejudices and delusions that enable generation af-
ter generation to continue to create unhappy and inhibited individu-
als, which generates social disorder.”22
This statement is directed to the health of the whole population. As such, 
it is far from the principles about normality and autonomy of the investiga-
tion of 1992. It also represents the ethics of the former ‘caring state’, a wel-
fare policy against unhappiness in society at large distinct from the present 
politics of happiness where the right to autonomy and self-management is 
emphasized.
Between illness and disability
The issue in 1992 was, by contrast, to add severe mental illness to the disabil-
ity concept, which meant that people with disabilities should have the right 
to normal living conditions concerning accommodation, economy and ac-
cess to social activities. This would require special care and individual solu-
22 SOU 1958:38.
Table 1.  Calculations of prevalence and need of care within the adult 
population in Sweden (in per cent)
Calculations 1958 Calculations 1992
Milder ill-health 30–40 13.0
Schizophrenia 0.72 0.5
In need of in-hospital care 1958 0.05 --
Long-term illness/Handicap 1992 -- 0.6
Source: SOU 1958:38; SOU 1992:73.
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tions according to different needs. Therefore the investigation had to distin-
guish between individuals in need of special care and individuals without 
the need of special care. It was not about the health of the whole population, 
but about finding a definition for the group within the group of severe men-
tal illness who were entitled to special support from social services, a social 
status that can serve as a ticket to autonomy and integrity. Medical reasons 
are still present in the categorization, but the group-specific problems of so-
cial autonomy are underlined. The following excerpts are examples from the 
investigation that illustrate how the authors struggled with the definitions of 
the new social status of the ex-patient:
1. Long-term illness that has caused impairment.
2. Residual symptoms from psychosis or schizophrenia.
3. Brain injury caused by psychosis.
4. Problems of daily life equal to a handicap.
The idea of normalization in the 1990s was a two-step operation; first, 
through identity within the disability concept, and second, through entitle-
ment to the legislative right to normal living conditions. In conclusion, the 
policy of the Psychiatric Health Care Reform in 1995 which followed upon 
the investigation of 1992 was to match the living conditions of those with 
a severe mental illness with the living conditions of people with learning 
disabilities, in order to include the target group into the disability discourse.
The idea of severe mental illness as a handicap or a disability can be con-
sidered either as a language modernization, as an attempt to come around 
the rhetoric of ‘chronic illnesses’ or – at its best – as a change of citizenship 
status, from being a long-term patient, lacking any possibilities of social in-
clusion, to a position of autonomy. In the investigation of 1992, the situation 
of the former patient status is painted in dark colours, as well as the life 
at institutions which is singularly described in negative terms. Underlining 
this critical impression, the report reprinted a picture of how a building that 
belonged to Säter Hospital was torn down with dynamite. The message is 
clear; away from institutions and forward to social inclusion.
As the policy turned away from concerns surrounding the mental health 
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of the whole population, severe mental illness no longer remained the worst 
scenario on a continuum, but something quite distinct from ‘normality’. 
However, the problems of applying the generalized definitions of disability 
to individual people remained for practitioners to solve. Where should the 
line drawn; who suffers from severe mental illness, and who fits into the def-
inition that includes impairment? What happens if a person recovers from 
mental illness? Does that person still have the special social rights that a dis-
abled person is entitled to? What about conditions that are fluctuating over 
time? According to the evaluations of the Psychiatric Health Care reform of 
1995 it seems difficult to grasp the meaning of psychiatric impairment and 
thus the meaning of disability. According to the evaluations of the reform, 
only 10 per cent of the estimated number of people (2600 out of estimated 
20 000–40 000 individuals) have been assessed as being disabled in accor-
dance with the intentions of the reform.23 The debate about the reform as a 
failure has continued over the years, although there is no consensus about 
the causes behind the problems.24 In conclusion, the benevolent aim of the 
investigation in 1992 has turned into an obstacle for the implementation of 
the reform as the social services to the severely mentally ill have become 
stuck between the concepts of illness and disability.
A normal and happy life?
Assessing the needs, happiness and well-being of the mentally ill
For the severely mentally ill, happiness has become a question about needs 
and how those needs are met by social services and medical care. The politi-
cal goal of a normalization of living conditions has called for some kind of 
agreement upon the understanding of the requirements for a normal life. 
23 Socialstyrelsen [National Board of Health and Welfare] (1998) Reformens första tusen dagar. Årsrap-
port för psykiatrireformen. Rapp.1998:4; Socialstyrelsen [National Board of Health and Welfare] 
(1999) Välfärd och valfrihet? Slutrapport från utvärderingen av 1995 års psykiatrireform. Socialsty-
relsen följer upp och utvärderar 1999:1; Socialstyrelsen [National Board of Health and Welfare] 
& Länsstyrelserna [County Administrative Boards of Sweden] (2005) Kommunernas insatser för 
personer med psykiska funktionshinder. Slutrapport från en nationell tillsyn 2002–2004. Vällingby: 
Elanders Gotab. 
24 Dencker, Jonas & Wåhlinder, Jan (2004) ‘Psykiatrireformen ett misslyckande för en stor grupp 
vårdsökande’. Läkartidningen, Vol. 101, Issue 5, 398.
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In order to determining who has the right to special care and special social 
interventions, experts and scientists have developed an array of instruments 
to assess the needs of the severely mentally ill.25 These tools for assessment 
emanate from standards of care (what the social services and psychiatric 
care is supposed to deliver) and from standards of needs (what the target 
group is supposed to need). International research and follow-ups of the 
deinstitutionalization of psychiatric care show that the social inclusion of 
the severely mentally ill is problematic and there are also variations among 
countries concerning care standards and how needs are met with social ser-
vices.26 Naturally, a wide variety of results are obtained depending on the 
research questions, on the diverse issues of the different fields of research 
and on which persons are included in the study. Also, the increasing devel-
opment of assessment tools belongs to the evidence-based practice (EBP). 
It offers an opportunity to measure happiness as a kind of objective well-
being, grounded on the presumption that met needs of social services and 
medical care are required to gain happiness. Considering the mentally ill, 
the needs being measured are connected to what a disabled person is sup-
posed to need in order to live a normal life.
On the basis of the problems discussed above, a survey was carried out 
in a region near Stockholm between the years 2008 to 2010.27 The aim was to 
investigate the extent that the needs of the mentally ill were met by medical 
and social services in the region. The construction of the survey, a tool for 
needs assessment, was based on the expectations of the quality of care and 
social support that was formulated in the Psychiatric Health Care reform 
of 1995 with respect to the aim of the normalization of living conditions of 
25 Including for example the Camberwell Assessment of Needs (CAN), Need of Social Service Ques-
tionnaire (NSSQ), Bangor Assessment of Need Profile (BANP). Recently, a number of assessment 
tools in the Swedish language, concordant to the Swedish Social Law legislation, have also been 
launched. 
26 Kovess-Masféty, Vivianne, Wiersma, Durk, Xavier, Miguel, de Almeida, José Mel Caldas, Carta, 
Mauro G., Dubuis, Jacques, Lacalmontie, Elisabeth, Pellet, Jacques, Roelandt, Jean Luc, Torres- 
Gonzalez, Francisco, Kustner, Berta Moreno & Walsh, Dermont (2006) ‘Needs for Care Among 
Patients with Schizophrenia in Six European Countries’. Clinical Practice and Epidemiology in 
Mental Health, Vol. 2, Issue 22. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.cpementalhealth.com/ 
content/2/1/22> (accessed July 2012) 
27 Åberg, Martin & Piuva, Katarina (2010) Kartläggning av behov och insatser för personer med psykiska 
funktionsnedsättningar inom Nordvästkommunerna. Sollentuna: FoU – Nordväst.
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people with severe mental illness, e.g. needs met concerning housing, op-
portunities to work and study, economical resources and access to medical 
care and social services. The survey was distributed to social service staff and 
user organizations. Unsurprisingly, the results showed major gaps between 
needs and needs met. Briefly, the younger group in the survey (18–29 years) 
was underrepresented in the investigation. In addition, very few within the 
younger population received disability pension or other benefits from the 
social insurance system. Instead, social allowance, the minimum standard of 
economic support distributed by the social services, was a common source 
of income among the youngest. For some reason, the middle-aged persons 
(40–65 years) were overrepresented in the material. Furthermore, social in-
terventions were not directed to people with drug- and alcohol dependency. 
Irrespective of age, severe mental illness meant exclusion from the labour 
market. Lastly, the needs of elderly people with mental disabilities were not 
well-known by the social services.
What information about the fulfilment of the political goal of the Psy-
chiatric Health Care Reform do we get from this information? How does it 
conform to the political ambition of a ‘life like everybody else’? This goal of 
normalization was to be implemented by the tools of the disability politics, 
i.e. to give compensation for the impairment and the social services admin-
istration was given the responsibility to define the target group, to explore 
their needs and thereafter decide on the interventions that would lead to the 
political goal of normalization (a life like everybody else). Concerning the 
youngest, the results indicated major problems to even identify the entitled 
individuals. Consequently, there are major problems concerning the task to 
decide on which social services that would increase the possibilities to live 
a normal life. Besides young age, persons with drug- and alcohol problems 
were at high risk of not having access to services that supports normal liv-
ing conditions. The oldest group could not be identified at all by the social 
services, which meant that the knowledge about their disabilities and needs 
of medical care and social services was highly limited. However, the persons 
between 40 and 65 years seemed to have received adequate services in rela-
tion to the politics of normalization. The results were discussed in several 
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settings with professionals from the social services and members from user 
organizations, as the researchers wanted well-informed reflections on the 
outcome.
When the reform was implemented in 1995, all identified patients in 
psychiatric care were transferred from psychiatric care to the social services, 
where they still remain. This can explain the overrepresentation of people 
aged 40–65 years. Day centres for the long-term mentally ill were also trans-
ferred directly to the municipalities. Over the years, with a few exceptions, 
little has changed within those day centres. Younger people, regardless of 
illness or disability, have different demands for activities. Their claims are 
about the possibilities to study and possibilities to find job placements. Ad-
ditionally, the dismantling of preventive activities, both regarding psychiat-
ric care and social services, leads to a situation in which younger people do 
not receive adequate and timely help. Both professionals and members of 
the user organizations agreed on the lack of coordination between psychiat-
ric care, drug- and alcohol treatment and the social services. Improvements 
have been made as a result of the engagement of case managers, but there 
are still claims for an expansion of case managers. Almost all cases of the el-
derly with severe mental illness were reported from the psychiatric care. The 
lack of knowledge about elderly people with mental illness within the social 
services was explained by the internal organization of the community care. 
Usually, the sections of elderly care in the municipalities did not cooperate 
with the sections responsible for social psychiatry.
To conclude, the assessment of needs and decisions on social rights 
made by the social administration are so complex and the requirement of 
‘proving’ one’s disability are so high, that the important ten years after entry 
into adult life passes by before the person eventually qualifies for the special 
interventions directed to persons with disabilities. A possible consequence 
of this could be that the number of adult people with severe social problems 
and disabilities caused by mental illness may expand in the future.
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A normal and happy family
The second study, on which this discussion about the implementation of 
mental health policies and its relation to the happiness and well-being of 
the mentally ill is based, focuses on a pilot study comprizing 16 interviews 
with mothers to adult children with severe mental illness.28 The interview-
ees were accessed through the user organizations, Riksförbundet för Social 
och Mental Hälsa [The National Association for Social and Mental Health, 
RSMH] and Schizofreniförbundet [The Schizophrenia Association]. These 
interviews present perspectives on happiness and normality as narrated by 
individuals with close experience of mental illness and mental health care. 
Including these perspectives in research is novel as the lifelong responsi-
bility and caring experiences of the family members have generally been 
neglected in Swedish welfare policy and research.29 Traditionally, research 
on mental illness and its consequences for family members has tended to 
focus on the increasing care burden. As a consequence, mental illness has 
been studied as a phenomenon causing major stress in the family, finally 
resulting in dysfunctional family relations. Moreover, previous research has 
commonly regarded the cause of mental illness as likely to be found in fam-
ily life in general and in the relationship between the mother and the child 
in particular.30 This pathological understanding of families and mothers of 
children suffering from mental illnesses has come under critical assessment 
in more recent studies. Most families endure whatever stress that might fol-
low with a child suffering from mental illness. Also, most families adapt 
successfully to the situation and become important actors in processes of 
recovery.31
28 Piuva, Katarina & Brodin, Helene (forthcoming) ‘En familj som alla andra? Mödrar till vuxna barn 
med psykiska funktionsnedsättningar berättar om sina erfarenheter’. In Karlsson, Lis-Bodil, Ran-
takeisu, Ulla & Kuusela, Kirsti (eds) Marginalisering i socialt arbete. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
29 Jeppsson Grassman, Eva, Whitaker, Anna & Taghizadeh Larsson, Annika (2009) ‘Family as Failure. 
The Role of Informal Help Givers to Disabled People in Sweden’. Scandinavian Journal of Disability 
Research, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 35–49.
30 Syrén, Susanne (2010)  Det outsagda och ohörsammade lidandet. Tillvaron för personer med långvarig 
psykossjukdom och deras närstående. Växjö: Växjö University.
31 Schön, Ulla-Karin, Denhov, Anne  & Topor, Alain (2009) ‘Social Relationship as a Decisive Factor 
in Recovering From Severe Mental Illness’. International Journal of Social Psychiatry, Vol. 55, Issue 4, 
336–347.
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The method of research was adapted to the life-story perspective, as we 
wanted to encourage personal narratives. The main findings from the in-
terviews were the overall theme of resistance to social exclusion in the life 
stories. The oldest mothers, through lifelong relations to professional care-
givers, had experiences from both regimes of welfare politics in Sweden, e.g. 
the period of in-hospital mental care that was practised until the late 1970s, 
as well as the process of deinstitutionalization during the end of the century. 
In many respects, the narratives illustrated the problems connected to the 
politics of happiness and normalization, not the least with regard to the or-
ganization of everyday life and economy, both being important for how you 
experience personal autonomy and integrity.
The normal everyday life
Regarding the quality of care and social service, all of the interviewees agreed 
that much has improved since the 1960s and 1970s, when the experiences 
of families and relatives were systematically rejected. The present commu-
nity-based services, including housing, contact persons and case managers 
were seen as positive resources. However, the experiences of the policies of 
normalization also contained some lessons. Having access to an apartment 
connected to social services might also include a set of principles of normal 
life, such as standards of ‘normal furnishing’, expectations of normal hob-
bies and normal destinations for one’s travels. Normalization was also about 
social rules, for instance that adult persons normally visit their parents on 
Sundays, not anytime they like. This ‘regime of reason’ made the parents 
feel incapacitated and their adult children feel underage. The principle of 
normality that guides the social services implies that people with functional 
disabilities due to severe mental illness should have the opportunity to live 
as other citizens, but this positive aim is sometimes applied as a template 
according to which disabled people should live their lives. Thus, in reality, 
the ‘principle of normalcy’ might come out as forced moral values based on 
what the social services and the social workers think constitutes a good life.
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Autonomy and economy
Although reports repeatedly point to the fact that mental illness and func-
tional disabilities due to severe mental illness generate poverty and economic 
marginalization,32 the financial situation for adults with mental issues seems 
to be a non-issue, judging from the interviews. Mental illness is one of the 
most common reasons for a disability pension in Sweden and many of the 
recipients, as most have not been gainfully employed, are only entitled to the 
lowest levels of benefits from the Swedish social insurance. The mothers be-
ing interviewed confirmed this situation. The families and the mothers had 
often had to help their adult children with money. In addition, the mothers 
have assisted by sorting out the jungle of bureaucratic rules, certificates and 
paperwork that are needed in order for their children to receive the benefits 
they are entitled to. The mothers also described how their children had been 
living for years on end at the lowest levels of social allowance as they have 
been unable to approach the psychiatrists and clinics they needed to visit in 
order to receive benefits from the National Insurance System.
The overall conclusion of this pilot study was that – contrary to the 
norms of able-bodiness, which frames mental illness as “abnormal” and as a 
reason for lifelong unhappiness – the mothers described how they and their 
adult children had managed to integrate mental illness in their ordinary life. 
The neglected economy of the severely mentally ill was rather surprising. 
Help from the social services meant that the mentally ill children were en-
titled to resources in natura so to speak. Their incomes, either as social al-
lowances or benefits from the Social Insurance System were so low that they 
never had enough money to make plans for the nearest future or to pay for 
something ‘extra’ beyond covering the most minimal expenditure. In the 
long run, insolvency also had consequences for the family financial situa-
tion. That long term mental illness causes economic concerns or even pov-
32 Bülow, Per (2004) After the Mental Hospital – A Study in the Wake of the Deinstitutionalization of 
Psychiatric Care. Linköping University; Riksförsäkringsverket [Swedish National Social Insurance 
Board] (2004) Sjukdomar som orsakat pensionering. Rapport 2004:3; Statistiska centralbyån [Statis-
tics Sweden] (2003) Levnadsförhållanden för personer med funktionshinder 1988−1999. Stockholm: 
Statistiska centralbyån; SOU 2006:100. Ambition och ansvar. Stockholm: Fritzes.
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erty is a well-known fact.33 The narratives of the mothers added the experi-
ences of the consequences of poverty in a lifelong perspective, pinpointing 
also how poverty may influence family relations and, hence, the well-being 
and happiness of the mentally ill.
Happy without reason?
The issue of this chapter was to discuss the problems surrounding the con-
cept of happiness in relation to mental illness, a discussion that necessarily 
has to relate to the concept of normality and its time bound and vacillat-
ing meaning. The two most important official investigations about mental 
health care in the after war period in Sweden were initially the focus of this 
investigation. The first official investigation mirrored the policies of the ‘car-
ing state’ as the welfare policies concerning mental health in the 1950s and 
1960s, was to reduce the genesis of the illness and mental hygiene was the 
route. At the end of the twentieth century, when the second investigation 
was undertaken, normal living conditions were presented as the solution 
that would increase the quality of life for the severely mentally ill. The latter 
investigation struggled to integrate the severe mentally ill into an ethos of 
welfare which emphasized individual autonomy. To be normal, e.g. to have 
the “right to ‘normal’ living conditions” include individual autonomy, integ-
rity and opportunities to make one’s own choices in life. In a broad meaning, 
these are the same values that are connected to the concept of happiness, 
which are highly ranked values in our age of reason. The same values turn 
out to be almost everything that is regarded as the opposite to mental illness.
Despite the broad consensus about the problems of the concepts of nor-
mality, mental health and positive mental health, they are often implicitly 
rendered as simply the absence of mental ill-health, thus indicating a state 
of normality. In 1958, Marie Jahoda, for example devised a list of character-
istics which were present in the majority of people who were regarded as 
mentally healthy, though she notes that is an inherent problem that the ideal 
norm of normality is similar to positive mental health. These characteristics 
33 SOU 2006:100.
happy without reason? mental illness and the ‘right’ to happiness in sweden
75
include high self-esteem, personal growth, the ability to cope with stress, 
autonomy in the sense of self-regulation, a sense of reality orientation, the 
ability of empathy and the ability to environmental mastery.34   After 1958, 
critical investigations about the concept of ‘mental illness’ have been in fo-
cus within the social sciences. Per-Anders Tengland’s reflections on the con-
cept of ‘mental health’ in 2001 represents a return to a discussion that have 
been absent for quite a long time.
The problems that we have to deal with when discussing happiness and 
mental illness are strongly connected to the three-dimensional meaning 
of normality: the statistical, the ideal and the medical meaning.  ‘Positive 
mental health’ and thus the ideal meaning of normality is very close to the 
values of happiness, but not close to the concept of normality that permeates 
the Swedish Psychiatric Health Care Reform, which relies on the statistical 
meaning of normality as being the most typical life circumstances.35 To fol-
low this line of argument would lead to the conclusion that the mentally ill 
have the right to expect the same amount of happiness as the average citizen 
(but not more?). In addition, the moral dimension of this kind of normality 
can cause frustration. Family members, in this case the mothers, tells us that 
the ideals of ‘a normal life’ can be converted into demands. If following the 
medical dimension of the normality concept, mental illness (deviant from 
mental health) means among other things, loss of self-control, loss of ability 
to master the environment and loss of reality orientation, just the opposite 
qualities to mental health and normality presented by Jahoda in 1958. Para-
doxically, the social practice of normality, concerning the mentally ill, has 
turned out to be a requirement that the presumptive patient has lost control, 
otherwise the individual is not entitled to the social rights that come with 
the definitions of disability.
Irrespective of time and rhetoric, a borderline between expectations of 
happiness for normal citizens as distinct from people suffering from long-
term mental illness, is being drawn. Implementing this practice of separation 
34 Jahoda 1958, 22–64; Tengland 2001, 35–49; Nordenfeldt, Lennart (1997) ‘The Stoic Conception of 
Mental Disorder: The Case of Cicero’. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, Vol. 4, Issue 4, 285–291.
35 Tideman 2000; Piuva 2005, 56–58.
katarina piuva
76
when it comes down to administration, more precisely the administration of 
social rights, is problematic. Again, the crucial concepts of normality, illness 
and disability are dependent on cultural values and hence difficult to measure. 
This may be one reason why the concept of ‘needs’ has returned together with 
the evidence-based practice (EBP) within social work. This is ‘safe territory’ as 
we can rely on knowledge about social problems and on the traditional goals 
of welfare policies, assuming that the increase of welfare is of crucial impor-
tance for subjective well-being, e.g. that happiness is a function of welfare.36
From the survey about needs and unmet needs and the interviews dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter, we can conclude that the severe mentally ill are 
unfavoured concerning economy, access to medical care and social services. 
This is merely the same conclusion as evaluations of the Psychiatric Health 
Care Reform have told us before. The present discussion adds the conceptu-
al dimension. Several inherent paradoxes are active and generate sometimes 
unintended and frequently counter-productive consequences. There are 
considerable problems connected to the administration of welfare (needs 
met) when the categorization of the individuals is ambiguous. In addition, 
the practice of categorization is also connected to ethical problems. For ex-
ample, if a person is unemployed as many of the mentally ill are, the contract 
between the autonomous individual and the state is severed. Autonomy is 
strongly connected to access to work and money of one’s own – something 
which the severely mentally ill rarely have. It is the work (the employment) 
that generates the possibilities to normality and happiness.
In the recent World Happiness Report mental health is identified as ‘the 
biggest single factor affecting happiness in any country’.37 At the same time, 
however, the report tells us that the opportunities for treatment are limited 
in the advanced societies and even more limited in poorer countries. This 
‘happiness paradox’ is also true regarding social policy of mental health. The 
36 For this discussion, see Sumner, Leonard Wayne (1996) Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Oxford: Clar-
endon Press; Frey, Bruno & Stutzer, Alois (2002) ‘Happiness, Economy and Institutions’. Economic 
Journal, Vol. 110, Issue 466, 918–938.
37 Helliwell, John, Layard, Richard & Sachs, Jeffrey (2012) World Happiness Report. New York: Earth 
Institute, Columbia University. Online. Available HTTP: <http://issuu.com/earthinstitute/docs/
world-happiness-report> (accessed July 2012)
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universal state did not solve the problem of mental illness by addressing the 
whole population. In all probability, it is not likely that the neoliberal welfare 
state will solve it either. The idea of solving problems belongs to the utopian 
dimension. The more pragmatic questions deal with what kind of problems 
follows from different policies of mental health. The problems that emerged 
from the universal welfare policy – the caring state – can roughly be sum-
marized as an ‘isolation-trap’. The intentions to include the mentally ill into 
the social community by strengthening their position as patients with access 
to high quality mental care, turned out to exclude them from ‘normal’ soci-
ety. The neoliberal ethos of the responsible citizen – the autonomous indi-
vidual – will cause another kind of problems concerning mental health care. 
The question: who has the right to treatment (in order to be normal and thus 
happy?) will of course generate new problems. Where is the line to be drawn 
between the mentally ill that are entitled to get help and those that are not?
Several contributions to this volume describe happiness as a returning 
phenomenon in the social sciences and social policy. The ‘return’ can also 
be applied to the field of mental health. Today when the care of the severely 
mentally ill is a task for social science and social work, there is reason to 
believe that the question of happiness and mental health will be expressed 
more explicitly. Happiness with the meaning of ‘positive mental health’ has 
so far dwelled within the fields of social psychology and social medicine 
during the post-war period. Instead, mental illness and abnormal social be-
havior, with the qualities of being social problems, have been issues of social 
research for quite a long time.
The top-down scientific interpretations of happy citizens is becoming 
increasingly challenged by a bottom-up interpretation of subjective well-be-
ing. In the field of mental health, this concerns taking into account the men-
tal health service users’ own perceptions of the services provided and their 
effects upon their well-being. Happiness, as it is used in the social sciences 
today,38 is often understood as a kind of evaluation of welfare policies, a 
measure of how content the citizens are concerning the state’s ability to pro-
38 See for example Rothstein, Bo (2010) ‘Happiness and the Welfare State’. Social Research, Vol. 77, 
Issue 2, 1–28.
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vide safety, freedom, democracy and possibilities of pleasure. Is this bottom-
up perspective true for the severely mentally ill? Do we expect happiness 
and well-being on the same conditions as other citizens when it concerns 
people with severe mental illness? Do we ask people with severe mental ill-
ness (schizophrenia, bipolar illness, personality disorders and other severe 
conditions of ill-health) if they are healthy and happy? When the doctor or 
the social worker asks ‘Is everything all right, do you feel well?’ the implicit 
meaning is often ‘Are you free from symptoms, do the voices disturb you? 
Are you satisfied with your medicine dose?’ It is more unlikely (though pos-
sible) that professional agents ask if the person is satisfied with his or her life 
circumstances, if he or she is able to cope with illness/disability, or perhaps 
does not mind the illness at all.
Certainly, this chapter provides no solution to this landscape of para-
doxical questions. But it is hoped that it can contribute to problematize 
the underlying cultural assumptions about citizenship, happiness and so-
cial conditions for individuals with severe mental illness. The discourses of 
health and happiness can be considered as aspects of ‘the broken dialogue’ 
with mental illness, or the broken dialogue with deviance from what we 
consider as normal.39 When we talk about ‘populations’ and ‘expectations’, 
the severely mentally ill are often being disregarded – owing to their status 
of being abnormal, unusual and therefore not representative. The challeng-
ing questions for the future are about the ability to foresee obstacles and to 
present the uncomfortable questions. Are all individual choices the same as 
good choices? Will it be possible to ask for help without proving a personal 
incapability to understand that help is needed? In conclusion, the discussion 
presented here has sought to show that the singular focus upon individual 
freedom may, in the context of well-being of the mentally ill, run the risk of 
turning into new forms of social exclusion, instead of the social inclusion all 
contemporary mental health policy strives for.
39 Foucault, Michael (2006 [1964]) Madness and Civilization. A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. 
London: Routledge.
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Who needs mental health services? Mental 
health care planning and the image of the 
service user in Finland 
anna alanko & carl marklund
Introduction
Internationally, mental health policy has undergone important changes in 
the last decades, just as welfare policies in general.1 A central element in 
mental health care planning has been the ambition to reduce or to avoid 
psychiatric hospital care through so-called psychiatric dehospitalization.2 
The criticism of the potentially negative effects of psychiatric hospital treat-
ment – not only with regard to patients’ recovery, but also for patients’ indi-
vidual well-being and sense of self-determination while in treatment – dates 
back to the late nineteenth century. As a broader international movement 
towards policy change, however, dehospitalization only became influential 
after the Second World War.3 
1 By ‘mental health policy’ we refer to both the society’s efforts in mental health promotion and in the 
prevention and treatment of mental health problems. In addition, we distinguish between ‘mental 
health care’, which encompasses all activities in the field and ‘mental health services’, which we use to 
refer to service provision. Cf. Pilgrim, David (2009) Key Concepts in Mental Health. London: Sage. 
2 The term ‘deinstutitionalization’ can also be used in the same meaning, even though it may be criti-
cized for neglecting the institutions that remain in mental health care. See for example Helén, Ilpo, 
Hämäläinen, Pertti & Metteri, Anna (2011) ‘Komplekseja ja katkoksia – psykiatrian hajaantuminen 
suomalaiseen sosiaalivointivaltioon’. In Helén, Ilpo (ed) (2011) Reformin pirstaleet. Mielenterveys-
politiikka hyvinvointivaltion jälkeen. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
3 Castel, Robert, Castel, Françoise & Lovell, Anne (eds) (1982) The Psychiatric Society. New York: 
Columbia University Press; Barham, Peter (1997) Closing the Asylum: The Mental Patient in Modern 
Society. London: Penguin; Grob, Gerald (1991) From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in 
Modern America. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Scull, Andrew (1984) Decarceration. Com-
munity Treatment and the Deviant – A Radical View. Cambridge: Polity Press.
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Dehospitalization has been seen as a result of several different phenom-
ena.4 Some scholars have stressed the effect of the advances in psychiatry, es-
pecially in pharmacological treatment and the development of antipsychotic 
chlorpromazine in the early 1950s.5 Others have argued that the harmful 
effects of psychiatric hospital treatment as presented by proponents of criti-
cal psychiatry and social psychiatry have played a decisive role.6 It has also 
been suggested that economic factors may have worked in favour of dehos-
pitalization in different ways.7 Lastly, it has been observed that ‘psychiatriza-
tion’ – the spreading of psychiatry beyond the confines of the hospital and 
into everyday life – has contributed to dehospitalization by making mental 
health matters a normal aspect of life for many people.8
As in most industrialized countries, dehospitalization has influenced 
Finnish mental health policy. However, Finland was a latecomer: While de-
hospitalization had elsewhere already started after the Second World War, 
in Finland the psychiatric hospital capacity was still perceived as insufficient 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Opposition against institutional treatment and 
related civil rights violations was voiced in Finland from the 1960s and on-
wards.9 Yet, the number of psychiatric hospital beds continued to grow until 
the late 1970s, when dehospitalization took off.10 Finnish dehospitalization 
4 The classification of different histories presented here is influenced by the work of Enric Novella, but 
his classification is not followed as such. Novella, Enric J. (2008) ‘Theoretical Accounts on Deinstitu-
tionalization and the Reform of Mental Health Services: A Critical Review’. Medicine, Healthcare and 
Philosophy, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 303–314. 
5 Shorter, Edward (1997) A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac. New 
York: John Wiley; Grob 1991.
6 Salo, Markku (1996) Sietämisestä solidaarisuuteen. Mielisairaalareformit Suomessa ja Italiassa. Tam-
pere: Vastapaino.
7 Scull 1984; Novella 2008.
8 Rose, Nikolas (2006) ‘Disorders Without Borders? The Expanding Scope of Psychiatric Practice’. 
BioSocieties, Vol. 1, Issue 4, 465–484; Hautamäki, Lotta, Helén, Ilpo & Kanula, Saara (2011) ‘Mie-
lenterveyden hoidon lääkkeellistyminen Suomessa’. In Helén, Ilpo (ed.) (2011) Reformin pirstaleet. 
Mielenterveyspolitiikka hyvinvointivaltion jälkeen. Tampere: Vastapaino; Castel, Castel & Lovell 1982; 
Helén, Hämäläinen & Metteri 2011. 
9 The so-called ‘November movement’ was founded in 1967, partly inspired by the works of sociolo-
gist Erving Goffman and his analysis of the negative effects of hospital treatment. Niemelä, Anna 
(2003) Laitoksista hallittuun vapauteen: Marraskuun liikkeen poikkeava, sosiaalinen kansalaisuus 
ja hallintarationaalisuus. Unpublished master’s thesis. Helsinki: University of Helsinki; Honkala, 
Kaisa (2011) ‘YK:n ihmisoikeudet vankiloihin!’: Marraskuun liikkeen suomalaisen kontrollipolitiikan 
kritiikki 1967–1972. Unpublished master’s thesis. Helsinki: University of Helsinki; Salo 1996.
10 Hyvönen, Juha (2008) Suomen psykiatrinen hoitojärjestelmä 1990-luvulla historian jatkumon 
näkökulmasta. Kuopio: Kuopio University Publications; Eskola, Jarkko (2007) ‘Mielenterveystyö 
ja yhteiskunnan muutos’. In Eskola, Jarkko & Karila, Antti (eds) Mielekäs Suomi. Näkökulmia mie-
lenterveystyöhön. Helsinki: Edita, 14–44; Tiitta, Allan (2009) Collegium Medicum. Lääkintöhallitus 
1878–1991. Helsinki: National Institute for Welfare and Health. 
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policy primarily emerged from within the health administration rather than 
from advocacy groups and ‘radicals’ as in for example Italy.11 Dehospitaliza-
tion in Finland was also rapid and dramatic. During the period discussed in 
this chapter, from the late 1970s until the late 2000s, the number of psychiat-
ric hospital beds in relation to the population can be estimated to have fallen 
by approximately four fifths.12 
This shift has generated considerable criticism over the years, and is has 
often been argued that the reduction of the psychiatric hospital beds has not 
been compensated with a sufficient amount of outpatient care.13 Most of the 
criticism has emphasized the difficulties of implementing the dehospitaliza-
tion reform under the economic and social crisis in the 1990s.14 The Finnish 
welfare system has changed remarkably during the period and the shift has 
been conceptualized as a move from an expansive to post-expansive welfare 
state.15 Previous studies on diverse social and health care fields have pointed 
out that the emphasis and demand for the citizen’s autonomy have increased 
along with these changes.16 
11 Salo 1996.
12 The highest number recorded in Finnish official statistics is 19 866 beds in 1976. While the exact 
number of annual hospital beds has not been recorded since 1995, the official statistics are using 
an estimate based on the number of annual treatment days in psychiatric hospitals divided by the 
amount of days in a certain year. This figure was 4272 in 2009. Koskinen, Riitta (1994) Tervey-
denhuolto: katsaus väestön terveyteen, terveyspalvelujen käyttöön ja resursseihin. Helsinki: Stakes; 
Forsström, Jari & Pelanteri, Simo (2011) Psykiatrian erikoisalan laitoshoito. Helsinki: National 
Institute for Welfare and Health. 
13 Helén, Hämäläinen & Metteri 2011; Karlsson, Nina & Wahlbeck, Kristian (2011) ‘Finland. Från 
reformintention till praxis. Mentalvårdens utveckling i Finland efter år 1990’. In Lindqvist, Rafael, 
Bengtsson, Steen, Fredén, Lars, Larsen, Frode, Rosenberg, David, Ruud, Torleif & Wahlbeck, Kris-
tian (2011) Från reformintention till praxis. Hur reformer inom psykiatri och socialtjänst översatts till 
konkret stöd i Norden. Gothenburg: The Nordic School of Public Health, 65–100.   
14 Öhman, Kaisa (2003) Mielenterveystyön reformi ja mielenterveyspotilaan sosiaalinen kansalaisuus. 
Unpublished master’s thesis. Helsinki: University of Helsinki; Eskola 2007; Hyvönen 2008; Helén, 
Hämäläinen & Metteri 2011.
15 Julkunen, Raija (2001) Suunnanmuutos. 1990-luvun sosiaalipoliittinen reformi Suomessa. Tampere: 
Vastapaino.
16 Helén, Ilpo (2011) ‘Asiakaslähtöisyys: eli miten mielenterveystyön ajatus epäpolitisoitui’. In Helén, 
Ilpo (ed.) (2011) Reformin pirstaleet. Mielenterveyspolitiikka hyvinvointivaltion jälkeen. Tampere: 
Vastapaino, 153–181; Helén, Ilpo & Jauho, Mikko (2003) ‘Terveyskansalaisuus ja elämän politiikka’. 
In Helén, Ilpo & Jauho, Mikko (eds) Kansalaisuus ja kansanterveys. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 13–32; 
Leppo, Anna & Perälä, Riikka (2009) ‘User Involvement in Finland: The Hybrid of Control and 
Emancipation’. Journal of Health Organization and Management, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 359–371; Kananen, 
Johannes (2013) ‘The Procedural Openness of Nordic Welfare State Restructuring’. In Götz, Norbert 
& Marklund, Carl (eds) The Promise of Openness. Leiden: Brill; Outinen, Sami (2012) ‘Labour Mar-
ket Activation in Finland in the 1990s: Workfare Reforms and Labour Market Flexibilisation’. Local 
Economy, Vol. 27, Issue 5–6, 629–636; Ollila, Eeva & Koivusalo, Meri (2009) ‘Hyvinvointipalvelusta 
liiketoiminnaksi – terveydenhuollon parantamisen tärkeät valinnat’. In Koivusalo, Meri, Alanko, 
Anna & Ollila, Eeva (eds) Kansalaisesta kuluttajaksi. Markkinat ja muutos terveydenhuollossa. Hel-
sinki: Gaudeamus, 21–47.
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While it has been shown that the shortcomings of the Finnish mental 
health care cannot be explained with the cost cuts during the economic cri-
sis of the 1990s, a puzzle has only partly been solved. Simultaneously with 
the dehospitalization, the supply of outpatient mental health care has mul-
tiplied, but Finnish mental health care is still often considered inadequate.17 
Why does it seem that the overall demand for mental health services has 
expanded – rather than been satisfied – with the increasing supply of outpa-
tient mental health services? 
This chapter aims to find out to what degree Finnish mental health care 
planning has contributed to this ambiguity. The research questions are two-
fold: First, what have been the key aims and proposals of Finnish mental 
health care planning between 1977 and 2009? Second, what is the image of 
the service user and which abilities and responsibilities have been assigned 
to the service users in the plans?
The chapter focusses on the planning of mental health policy during the 
period of the policy of dehospitalization starting from the late 1970s and 
continuing until 2009. The chapter analyses the most important planning 
documents published between 1977 and 2009 that discuss Finnish mental 
health care on a general level, without focusing on a specific problem, diag-
nosis, or patient group. While the plans also relate to the mental health care 
of children and elderly people, the present analysis concentrates upon the 
discussions about the mental health care of those in working age. The anal-
ysed plans are altogether seven. They have been produced by four different 
projects that have been working under the auspices of the Finnish Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health (hereafter, MSAH).
While the earlier studies have emphasized a break between the planning 
of the dehospitalization during the 1970s and the 1980s, and the implemen-
tation of dehospitalization from the 1990s onwards, this chapter identifies a 
continuum. The analysis shows that during the whole period starting from 
the 1970s the plans contain what may be called revolving aims, i.e. objec-
tives that were repeated in all the plans. The expression of the revolving 
17 Helén, Hämäläinen & Metteri 2011.
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aim is inspired by the notion of the ‘revolving door patient’ to denote a per-
son who is repeatedly admitted to psychiatric hospital care.18 The revolving 
aims identified in the analysis range from reducing supposedly excessive 
psychiatric hospital or ‘inpatient’ treatment, to increasing the availability 
of outpatient treatment; from enhancing the possibilities of the afflicted in 
taking part in working life to ensuring mental health care service users an 
equal position with other citizens in need of care; and from following the ex-
ample of other countries that have been considered forerunners with regard 
to mental care to even surpassing international pioneers. In addition, all the 
plans discuss the need to define the target groups of mental health care and 
mental health policy. 
However, also a break within the planning is identified: the target group 
first expands in each of the plans. Second, the image of the ideal service user 
transforms in the documents, little by little, from a mentally ill or afflicted 
person in need of care to an autonomous individual with the ability to iden-
tify his or her own needs and to take care of him- or herself, and ensure his 
or her own well-being. The shifting target groups and changing images of 
the ideal service user as identified in this study are both likely to affect the 
scope of mental health care in various ways, even if the overall aims remain 
largely the same. The transition from ‘need’ of care to ‘autonomy’ does not 
only have an impact on the quantity and quality of services provided. It may 
also affect who is entitled to care and who is not. 
The National Board of Health working group
In 1977, a working group set up by the Finnish National Board of Health 
(hereafter, NBOH) published a planning document in which Finnish men-
tal health care planning was connected with the dehospitalization trend un-
derway internationally.19 The NBOH working group was chaired by Medical 
18 Shaw, Ian (2004) ‘Doctors, “Dirty Work” Patients, and “Revolving Doors”’. Qualitative Health Re-
search, Vol. 14, Issue 8, 1032–1045.
19 The plan was signed by 17 members, although five additional people were listed that had also taken 
part in its writing. The group reported having heard 11 experts and having sent hearing requests to 
70 professional or civic organizations, of which 50 responded. National Board of Health (NBOH) 
(1977) Psykiatrisen terveydenhuollon kehittäminen. Psykiatrisen terveydenhuollon kehittämisohjelma 
1977–1986. Helsinki: National Board of Health.
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Counsellor Raimo Miettinen, a psychiatrist by profession.20 The working 
group noted that Finland’s volume of psychiatric hospital treatment was 
high by international standards and that the number of psychiatric hospital 
beds was ‘among the highest in the world’.21 The NBOH working group con-
cluded that the risk of ‘hospitalism’, the undesirable effects of hospital care, 
called for the need to develop outpatient treatment as an alternative: 
“The possibility to receive psychiatric hospital treatment in recent 
years has been safeguarded for everyone who necessitates it. Along-
side the rapid development of hospital treatment, the development 
of outpatient treatment has been slower than hoped for. […] Far too 
little attention has been paid to the many disadvantages of long-term 
hospital treatment. Every hospital treatment separates and alien-
ates the afflicted person from his/her normal environment – family, 
friends, workplace – and gives an exceptional character to the illness. 
Especially long-term hospital treatment raises detrimental attitudes 
towards the mentally ill, increases the tendency to isolation and pro-
motes hospitalism.”22 
Outpatient care was proposed as a means of assisting the patients in 
getting ‘back to society’, thereby helping them to gain the same status as 
other citizens.23 Amending the Mental Illness Act of 1952 was suggested as 
a way of allowing for the establishment of boarding houses and ‘semi-open 
treatment’.24 The NBOH working group also highlighted the importance of 
employment. While rehabilitation to wage work was discussed, sheltered 
work was considered the most suitable form of rehabilitation. Noting that 
the then current legislation allowed for the treatment of ‘the mentally ill’ 
without their consent, unlike the physically ill, the working group suggest-
ed removing this difference from the legislation as a way of giving mental 
20 Miettinen was born in 1929. Huovinen, Pentti, et al. (1970) Kuka kukin on: henkilötietoja nykypolven 
suomalaisista. Helsinki: Otava. 
21 In 1977, the number of hospital beds, 19 853, was close to that of the peak year 1976. NBOH 1977, 
8–9.
22 NBOH 1977, 31–32.
23 NBOH 1977, 18. 
24 Mielisairaslaki [Mental Illness Act] 187/1952; NBOH 1977, 18.
anna alanko & carl marklund
88
health patients equal status with other citizens.25 The NBOH working group 
also justified its positions by pointing out that similar reforms had been un-
dertaken in Sweden and the UK. 
The NBOH working group also pointed out the need for mental illness 
prevention at large. According to the working group, ‘general social mental 
health work’ should be taken into account when planning the mental health 
care of the whole population.26 Yet, ‘psychiatric health care’ was still iden-
tified as a ‘specialist level psychiatric function within the public sector’.27 
A major problem here was that a significant group of patients which did 
‘not belong to psychiatric health care’ remained within the psychiatric care 
system.28 While the overall aim was to reduce psychiatric hospital care, the 
working group considered some of the ‘ill’ to be inevitably in need of hos-
pital treatment.29 In improving the field, a key measure would be to remove 
the patients that were considered not to ‘belong’ to psychiatric health care, 
including the elderly, the mentally disabled as well as the substance abus-
ers, from the psychiatric hospitals.30 The NBOH working group concluded 
that psychiatric health care would improve if the resources were focussed 
on those in the most need of psychiatric services, i.e. the mentally ill or af-
flicted. 
The Committee for Mental Health Work
The NBOH working group’s proposals contributed to the amendment of the 
Mental Illness Act in 1978. Partly as a result of legislative changes and the 
policy recommendations of the NBOH, the reducing of the psychiatric hos-
pital beds continued in the early 1980s.31 Also the revision of Finnish men-
tal health care continued. In 1984, the Committee for Mental Health Work 
25 This has been partly responded to in the amendments of the legislation but the possibility of 
using involuntary treatment has not been removed. Mäkelä, Jari (2008) Houruinhoitoasetuksesta 
mielenterveyslakiin. Mielisairaanhoidon ja erityisesti tahdosta riippumattoman hoidon lainsäädännön 
muutokset vuosina 1840–1991. Unpublished master’s thesis. Joensuu: University of Joensuu; NBOH 
1977, 18.
26 NBOH 1977, 5–7.
27 NBOH 1977, 7.
28 NBOH 1977, 41.
29 NBOH 1977, 35.
30 NBOH 1977, 41.
31 At the time of publishing the report in 1984, the amount was 17 534. Koskinen 1994.
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(hereafter, CMHW or the Committee) published a new plan for Finnish 
mental health work, as part of its report.32 Partly made up of the same indi-
viduals as the earlier NBOH working group, the CMHW was also chaired 
by a psychiatrist, Professor Yrjö Alanen.33 Like its predecessor, the CMHW 
saw a need for counteracting excessive hospital treatment, referring among 
other things to the results of the Finnish national schizophrenia project of 
1981–1987:34 
“Even if the annual accumulation of the long-term patients is slow, 
a small stream grows into a sea, because the exit is slow. Some of the 
patients have been in treatment more than half a century. [...] In a 
way, the hospital is ‘pregnant’ with future long-term patients.”35 
The CMHW argued that increasing the supply of outpatient treatment 
would make it possible to reduce the number of psychiatric hospital beds by 
half.36 The Committee also argued that at least five times more opportuni-
ties for sheltered work would be needed.37 At the same time, the CMHW 
reasoned that the resources in the mental health sector were lagging behind 
the rest of the economy. Given the economic growth and continuous expan-
sion of the welfare state during the 1980s, the CMHW considered it justifi-
able to increase the resources directed to mental health at the same rate as 
the annual growth of GNP, at least if the goal of achieving parity between 
mental health service users and other citizens should be met.38 Also this 
time, the need to reduce the number of psychiatric hospital beds was ratio-
32 There was some member turnover in the committee, but the document was finally signed by 24 
persons. The committee heard 157 experts in the process. Committee for Mental Health Work 
(CMHW) (1984a, b, c) Mielenterveystyön komitean mietintö. Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health. 
33 A supporter of the Social Democratic Party, Alanen was born in 1927. Tarkka, Jukka (1986) Kuka 
kukin on: henkilötietoja nykypolven suomalaisista. Helsinki: Otava. 
34 NBOH (1981) Skitsofrenian tutkimus-, hoito-, ja kuntoutustyön valtakunnallinen kehittämisohjelma. 
Helsinki: National Board of Health.
35 CMHW (1984a) Mielenterveystyön komitean mietintö I. Mielenterveystyön kehittämisen perustelut. 
Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 175.
36 The suggested reduction was reached already in 1991. CMHV (1984b) Mielenterveystyön komitean 
mietintö II. Mietinnön tiivistelmä ja komitean ehdotukset. Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health, 180; Koskinen 1994. 
37 CMHW 1984a, 154.
38 CMHW 1984b, 194; cf. Julkunen 2001.
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nalized with reference to international experiences. After having noted that 
only Ireland had more psychiatric hospital beds per capita, the Committee 
pointed to Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, the Soviet Union, the 
UK, and the US as examples of outpatient service-based systems.39 
Yet, not all of those countries provided good examples, the CMHW ob-
served. In the US, resources had been diverted from institutional treatment 
without establishing an alternative care system. As a consequence, patients 
had been ‘left without treatment and sometimes even abandoned’.40 How-
ever, the Committee expected that the welfare state would prevent such ad-
verse outcomes from dehospitalization in Finland.41 
Most importantly, the CMHW suggested that a new law should be draft-
ed using a new legislative nomenclature, pointing to ‘mental health’ rather 
than ‘mental illness’ as the target of policy reform. Despite some differences 
between the Committee’s initial suggestions and the Mental Health Act ad-
opted in 1991, the new legislation added a novel emphasis on the mental 
health of all citizens, and not only those suffering from or having a risk of 
mental health disorder.42 
As the CMHW sought to define the target population, it also noted that 
many patients in the hospitals could not be considered to be in need of psy-
chiatric hospital treatment.43 At the same time, and in contrast to the NBOH 
working group, the CMHW did not distinguish between psychiatric care 
and other mental health work and included general living circumstances in 
its analysis.44 
In response to this broader stance, the CMHW did not only focus on 
the work of psychiatrist specialists exclusively, but referred to many other 
health and social care professions as relevant to mental health care work, 
such as medical doctors, psychologists, nurses and social workers. Perhaps 
39 CMHW 1984a, 9, 325–364.
40 CMHW 1984a, 361.
41 CMHW 1984a, 364.
42 It was not the first time this nomenclature was suggested, but the previous proposal of a mental 
health act of a committee in 1964 had failed. Mielenterveyslaki [Mental Health Act] 1116/1990; 
Hyvönen 2008, 211. 
43 CMHW 1984b, 190–192.
44 Helén, Hämäläinen & Metteri 2011; Öhman 2003.
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as a result of this wider interpretation of the scope of mental health care 
professions, the Committee expressed the need to outline some restrictions, 
stating that ‘the work of lawyers and construction engineers is no longer 
professional mental health work’.45
Following this broader outlook, the CMHW considered mental health 
problems to be very frequent in the population at large, citing a report 
which stated that only ‘a third of the population were completely healthy’.46 
As a result, the Committee gave the slightly paradoxical recommendation 
that the number of hospital beds should be reduced, while at the same time 
claiming that the need for psychiatric services, including hospital services, 
was greater than the supply.47
In the end, the CMHW apparently expected that its suggestions for a 
shift from mental illness care to mental health work and a renewal of the 
legislation would guarantee the economic and social prerequisites for the 
enhanced mental wellbeing of the population at large. The patients were 
thought to be in need of support in order to be able to cope with the new 
freedom that would result from the prescribed dehospitalization. In the 
words of the Committee, ‘adding freedom demands adding more personnel. 
The locks should be replaced with human relationships.’48 
Meaningful Life(!) 
By the mid-1990s, the process of reducing the number of hospital beds had 
already been underway for two decades.49 However, by the time the Men-
tal Health Act of 1991 came into effect, Finland was facing deep recession. 
The subsequent administrative and budgetary restructuring of the Finnish 
welfare state during the early 1990s spelled trouble for mental health care, 
necessitating a renewed overview of policies.50 
45 CMHW 1984a, 44.
46 CMHW 1984a, 171.
47 CMHW 1984a, 199.
48 CMHW 1984a, 87.
49 In the beginning of the process leading to the establishment of the Meaningful Life!-project, the 
estimated number of hospital beds was 6232. Nenonen, Mikko, Pelanteri, Simo & Rasilainen, Jouni 
(2000) Mielenterveyden häiriöiden hoito Suomessa 1978–1998. Helsinki: Stakes.
50 For a discussion of broader reforms in the context of the 1990s recession in Finland, see for example 
Sulkunen, Pekka (2006) ‘Projektiyhteiskunta ja uusi yhteiskuntasopimus’. In Rantala, Kati & 
Sulkunen, Pekka (eds) Projektiyhteiskunnan kääntöpuolia. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 17–32; Julkunen 
2001; Eskola 2007; Hyvönen 2008; Öhman 2003.
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In 1996, the task of reviewing Finnish mental health care planning was 
given to Vappu Taipale’s one-person committee.51 Taipale’s work resulted in 
a memorandum entitled Meaningful Life.52 Taipale concluded that by 1996, 
Finnish dehospitalization had shifted from ‘controlled change to uncon-
trolled shutdown’.53 The reduction of the number of hospital beds had been 
even faster than planned, resulting in a situation where there were more 
patients than adequate spaces in the hospital wards.54 
Taipale’s work was later expanded into a broader project, also known 
as Meaningful Life, but distinguished from Taipale’s memorandum by the 
addition of an exclamation mark to the project name. The Meaningful Life!-
project delivered a number of reports which proposed further developing 
outpatient treatment as a way to remedy the negative effects of uncontrolled 
dehospitalization.55 While these suggestions turned against excessive hos-
pital treatment, just as the NBOH and the CMHW had done before, the 
Meaningful Life!-project took an even stronger interest in international 
comparisons than either of these projects, noting that similar problems re-
sulting from dehospitalization could be detected abroad.56 In her preceding 
memorandum, Taipale had even suggested that the challenges which con-
fronted mental health planners internationally could provide an opportuni-
ty for Finnish mental health care to establish itself as a pioneer in the field.57
51 Born in 1940, Vappu Taipale, MD, a supporter of the Social Democratic Party and a participant in 
the so-called November movement (cf. footnote 9 above) in the late 1960s and early 1970s, had been 
a member of the CMHW in 1981–1982 and Minister for Social Affairs and Health in 1982–1984. 
In 1996, she was Director General of the Finnish National Research and Development Centre for 
Welfare and Health (STAKES). Rantala, Risto (1998) Kuka kukin on: henkilötietoja nykypolven 
suomalaisista. Helsinki: Otava.
52 The memorandum was based on hearings of 100 mental health care experts and citizens who were not 
individualized in the document. Taipale, Vappu (1996) Mielekäs elämä. Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön 
työryhmämuistioita. Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
53 Taipale 1996, 16.
54 Taipale 1996, 17.
55 According to the final report of the project, 35 publications were published under the auspices 
of the project. Among them was so-called ‘grey literature’, polytechnic school theses, abstracts in 
conference proceedings, and public disseminations. In addition to Taipale’s report, three publica-
tions of the Meaningful Life!-project have been selected for analysis here: MSAH (1997) Mielekäs 
elämä! -ohjelman esisuunnitelma: työryhmän muistio. Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health; 
MSAH (2000) Mielekäs elämä: mielenterveyspalvelujen kehittämissuositukset. Helsinki: Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health; Immonen, Tuula, Kiikkala, Irma & Ahonen, Juha (eds) (2003) Mielekäs 
elämä! -ohjelman loppuraportti. Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 
56 Taipale 1996, 13.
57 Taipale 1996, 11–12.
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During the early 1990s, Finland experienced high unemployment rates 
due to recession, causing social exclusion and social problems as well as 
straining the resources of the welfare state. Paradoxically, the unemploy-
ment security policy during the crisis increasingly emphasized the individu-
al’s responsibility for making one’s living from wage work.58 In the beginning 
of the Meaningful Life!-project in 1996, the project still focused on develop-
ing employment for people suffering from mental health problems within 
sheltered work.59 Tellingly, by time the project came to an end in 2003, the 
emphasis had shifted towards wage work.60
From the very beginning, the Meaningful Life!-project openly acknowl-
edged the adverse social position of users of mental health care services 
compared to other citizens, noting that the shortcomings were ‘worse in 
mental health care than in any other sector’.61 A report published in 2000 
stated that ‘[t]he mental health patients have not been guaranteed the same 
rights to good treatment according to their needs as other patient groups’, 
despite all earlier efforts to ensure parity in this regard.62 The images of the 
service user ranged in the publications of the Meaningful Life!-project from 
‘mental health patients’ who should be protected from being abandoned 
in consequence of the dehospitalization policy to ‘rehabilitees’ who would 
mainly be responsible for their own rehabilitation.63 Yet, the need for sup-
port to the latter was still to be taken into account:
“In a patient-oriented operations model, the patients’ own responsi-
bility for care should be supported. This must not, however, lead to 
failing to treat the patients that are severely disturbed or lack initia-
tive; the treating professional must be active both in relation to the 
patient and the patient’s social network.”64 
58 Outinen 2012; Kananen 2013.
59 Taipale 1996, 22.
60 Immonen, Ahonen & Kiikkala 2003, 93.
61 Taipale 1996, 46.
62 MSAH 2000, 7.
63 Taipale 1996; MSAH 2000, 10.
64 MSAH 2000, 12.
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In line with the broadening of both the concept of mental health care 
as well as its intended target groups, the Meaningful Life!-project took an 
interest in ‘the meaningful life’ of all citizens, despite the fact that the project 
had originally started out from the need to focus on those suffering from 
severe mental disorders.65 At the close of the project, mental ‘health care’ in 
terms of ‘service provision’ played a minor role, while widening ‘the under-
standing of the wide nature of mental health care’ was seen as a core achieve-
ment of the project.66 
Mind 2009
In spring 2004 – only a year after the Meaningful Life!-project had deliv-
ered its final report – a motion suggesting a new national mental health 
programme was presented in the Finnish Parliament. Initiated by Kirsi 
Ojansuu, an MP representing the Finnish Green League, the motion won 
exceptionally broad support, being signed by 106 of the 200 Members of 
Parliament. While the motion did not refer to the work of the Meaningful 
Life!-project, it revoked many of the concerns which had served as a starting 
point for the project in 1996, in particular by emphasizing the shortcomings 
of mental health care and addressing the imperfect implementation of the 
dehospitalization policy during the 1990s recession.67 
In response to the broad political support for policy reform, the MSAH 
appointed the Mind 2009 working group in 2007, chaired by MSAH Assis-
tant Director of Department, Master of Laws (trained on the bench) Marja-
Liisa Partanen. The proposals of the Mind 2009 working group were pub-
lished in 2009.68 At the time of writing, the plan is still being implemented.69
65 Taipale 1996, 41–42.
66 Immonen, Ahonen & Kiikkala 2003, 85. 
67 Kansallinen mielenterveysohjelma [National Mental Health Programme] TPA 36/2004 vp. 
68 The Mind 2009 working group had 14 members and organized six hearing events. MSAH [Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health] (2009) Mielenterveys- ja päihdesuunnitelma. Mieli 2009 työryhmän 
ehdotuksen mielenterveys- ja päihdetyön kehittämiseksi vuoteen 2015. Helsinki: Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health.
69 For an investigation on the implementation of the plan, see Kuussaari, Kristiina & Partanen, Airi 
(2010) ‘Administrative Challenges in the Finnish Alcohol and Drug Treatment System’. Nordic 
Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, Vol. 27, Issue 6, 667–684; Stenius, Kerstin, Kekki, Tuula, Kuussaari, 
Kristiina & Partanen, Airi (2012) ‘Päihde- ja mielenterveyspalveluiden integraatio – kirjava käytäntö 
Suomen kunnissa’. Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, Vol. 77, Issue 2, 167–175.
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Again, the unequal position of mental health care service users was 
highlighted as a fundamental problem and the Mind 2009 working group 
argued in favour of treating the problems of mental health care service us-
ers and substance abusers with the same diligence as the health problems of 
any other patient group. The lack of parity in the treatment of these groups 
was presented as a cause for both discrimination and stigmatization. But it 
was also suggested that this problem could be tackled with the education of 
care providers and decision-makers as well as by integrating mental health 
care with other forms of health and social care, in particular substance abuse 
care. 
While the plan published by the Mind 2009 working group has mostly 
been discussed with regard to its proposal to co-ordinate mental health care 
and substance abuse care, many of its other suggestions were similar to earli-
er recommendations.70 For example, even though the number of psychiatric 
hospital beds had been considerably reduced in the preceding decades, the 
working group still regarded excessive hospital treatment as a major prob-
lem:
“The development of community care has played a secondary role, 
and there is a disproportionate focus on institutional treatment in 
mental health care and substance abuse care costs.”71 
In this context, the Mind 2009 working group also identified the com-
paratively high degree of involuntary psychiatric treatment in Finland as a 
specific problem. The high prevalence of involuntary treatment was seen 
as a specific problem by the Mind 2009 working group, which addressed 
those in need for mental health services in terms of ‘clients’ or ‘service us-
ers’.72 The Mind 2009 working group envisioned the ideal service users as ac-
tive clients, in need of strengthening their status, self-determination rights 
70 Kuussaari & Partanen 2010.
71 MSAH (2010) Plan for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Work. Proposals of the Mieli 2009 Work-
ing Group to Develop Mental Health and Substance Abuse Work Until 2015. Helsinki: Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health, 9.
72 The original word in the Finnish version is asiakas, usually translated as ‘client’ but in the official 
translation this is translated as ‘service user’. MSAH 2009; MSAH 2010.
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and communities as well as improving their livelihood, while putting pres-
sure on the mental health services to become more flexible. In so doing, 
the working group apparently expected clients or service users to primarily 
rely upon their ‘own resources’.73 The role of ‘peer support’ and ‘user ex-
perts’, was accentuated, and the opinion of the service user was to be taken 
into account even in the context of coercive measures.74 In line with this, 
the group also suggested a ‘psychiatric advance directive’ to be agreed upon 
when a person’s health status can be considered stable enough to allow for 
self-determination.75 
Like the earlier plans and policy reviews, the Mind 2009 working group 
placed strong emphasis on working ability. The growing numbers of peo-
ple who could not work due to mental health problems was seen as a main 
challenge.76 In response, the working group suggested that more attention 
should be paid to those in danger of losing their working capacity.77 This in 
turn lead the working group to emphasize the need for defining and, like 
both the CMHW and the Meaningful Life!-project, widening, the target 
population. The suggestion of the Mind 2009 working group was to integrate 
the problems to be addressed by mental health care and those to be taken 
care of through substance abuse care.78 The working group motivated this 
suggestion by pointing to the increase of simultaneous mental health and 
substance problems as well as the increased rate of alcohol-related deaths 
among the working-age population. Since the group with ‘dual diagnosis’ 
was growing, all the treatment in both sectors should ideally be planned and 
coordinated together.79 
It may seem self-evident that psychiatric care should be planned in order 
to ensure that those in need get the required treatment. In the parliamentary 
73 MSAH 2010, 10.
74 MSAH 2010, 18.
75 MSAH 2010, 19.
76 However, at the same time, another working group focussing on inability to work was created. 
MSAH (2011) MASTO-hankkeen (2008–2011) loppuraportti. Masennusperäisen työkyvyttömyyden 
vähentämiseen tähtäävän hankkeen toiminta ja ehdotukset. Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health.
77 MSAH 2010, 41–42.
78 For discussion on the implementation of this aim, see Partanen & Kuussaari 2010; Stenius, Kekki, 
Kuussaari & Partanen 2012.
79 MSAH 2010.
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motion of 2004, the central problem had been the lack of mental health ser-
vices for those in need. Yet, as the Mind 2009 working group worked away 
on this problem, the working group finally settled on the need to reduce 
psychiatric hospital care and to support the target group’s autonomy as the 
central problem. By the end of the early 2000s, then, the notion of a need of 
mental health services, especially psychiatric hospital services, had largely 
withered away from the discussions. 
Conclusion: Who needs mental health services? 
Six distinct aspirations or aims tend to reverberate in the planning of the 
Finnish mental health care throughout the period between 1977 and 2009. 
All the plans have called for the need to limit excessive hospital treatment; 
to increase outpatient care in different forms; to promote mental health ser-
vice users’ participation in working life; to ensure equality between mental 
health service users and other citizens; to provide mental health services in 
line with, or even surpassing, international standards; and to delineate the 
target group of the services. The recurrence of these aspirations has been so 
regular that they could well be considered revolving aims. 
If the other aims have then been remarkably stable over time, there was 
a more visible shift regarding the groups of persons that are to be included 
under the purview of mental health services. These vacillations expanded 
the scope of individuals and issues discussed within the planning of mental 
health discourse. The need to provide services for the ‘right’ target group has 
also activated conflicting aims in mental health planning. As the selection 
of target groups vary somewhat from plan to plan, the proposals may have 
had a certain impact upon the practice of mental health policy while the 
stated aims have remained largely the same over time. As the target group 
expanded, the plans may well have further fuelled the demand for more 
mental health services.80 
The question of the target group also activated the issue of how the abili-
ties, needs, and responsibilities of the service users were to be understood 
80 Helén, Hämäläinen & Metteri 2011; Vilhelmsson, Andreas, Svensson, Tommy & Meeuwisse, Anna 
(2011) ‘Mental Ill Health, Public Health and Medicalization’. Public Health Ethics, Vol. 4, Issue 3, 
207–217.
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and cared for. A gradual change took place from ensuring the care of those 
most in need in the late 1970s, via support to rehabilitation and the mental 
health of the broader population as a whole in the 1980s and the 1990s, to 
reinforcing the mental health of the autonomous citizen in the early 2000s.
Even though the widening of relevant target groups means that more 
and more citizens can be discussed within the sphere of mental health, the 
changing image from the ‘mentally ill’ person in need of mental care to 
the autonomous citizen requesting mental health services may add a new 
tangent to the context of planning mental health services as well as social 
services more generally; a decreasing emphasis on the need for services in 
favour of individual demands may also reflect a decrease in the public re-
sponsibility in providing for services.
This emphasis on autonomy may be connected with Pekka Sulkunen’s 
conceptualization of the conflict between autonomy and intimacy, ask-
ing whether this emphasis on autonomy is wholly beneficial if it leads to 
avoiding interventions and, in this case, the reduction of service provision. 
Sulkunen has argued that the emphasis on autonomy may lead to the pos-
sible loss of dignity and marginalization of those unable to practise their 
sovereignty in the expected ways.81 There may also be certain risks and 
counterproductive effects from expecting – or even demanding – ‘normal’ 
behaviour from those suffering from mental health problems, as noted by 
Katarina Piuva.82 In a similar vein, Ilpo Helén has identified the risk that 
the attention to autonomy may lose track of that which was bothering the 
patient to begin with: An individual’s mental health problems may exactly 
relate to the person’s difficulties in taking responsibility for his or her own 
well-being.83
To conclude, the results presented in this chapter may help to explain 
why Finnish mental health care has constantly been perceived as inadequate 
81 Sulkunen, Pekka (2009) The Saturated Society: Governing Risk and Lifestyles in Consumer Culture. 
London: Sage; Sulkunen, Pekka (2011) ‘Autonomy Against Intimacy: On the Problem of Governing 
Lifestyle-related Risks’. Telos, Vol. 156, 99–112.
82 Piuva, Katarina (2005) Normalitetens gränser. En studie av 1900-talets mentalhygieniska diskurser. 
Stockholm: Institute for Social Work.
83 Helén 2011.
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in recent decades. The reason is not only that the welfare state has changed, 
but also that the planning of mental health care has changed. Two new phe-
nomena emerged in the state-level mental health plans: psychiatrization, 
understood as the problematization of the mental health of a widening 
population, and an increased emphasis on autonomy. The concurrence of 
these two developments helps to explain why the demand for mental health 
services has grown simultaneously, but faster, than the supply of services. 
In other words, the state-level planning of mental health care seems to have 
contributed to the impossibility of fulfilling the demand for mental health 
services in today’s Finland. 
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Happy without money of their own? 
On the reasons for teenagers’ participation in 
paid work – The case of Iceland
margrét einarsdóttir
Introduction
In Western societies, children and teenagers are placed outside the economy 
and the sphere of production, but within the sphere of reproduction, i.e. the 
home and the school. This situation means that the age-group is supposed 
to passively receive economic resources from their adult guardians, and, 
hence, depend on them economically.1 Jens Qvortrup has argued that this 
arrangement is ahistorical and that in pre-industrial times children were 
placed within the economy and expected to do their part of the work from 
an early age.2 In the wake of industrialization, new ideas about the nature 
of children changed this expectation. Childhood was increasingly romanti-
cized and seen as a state of some kind of heavenly innocence, where work 
had no place. A proper and happy childhood came to be conceived of as 
almost the opposite of adulthood: ‘If adults were burdened with responsi-
bilities, children should be carefree. If adults worked, children should not 
work’.3 Emphasis was placed on all children being entitled to experience this 
1 James, Allison, Jenks, Chris & Prout, Alan (1998) Theorizing Childhood. Cambridge: Polity Press; 
Qvortrup, Jens (1995) ‘From Useful to Useful: The Historical Continuity of Children’s Constructive 
Participation’. Sociological Studies of Children, Vol. 7, 49–79; Qvortrup, Jens (2001) ‘School-work, 
Paid Work and the Changing Obligations of Childhood’. In Mizen, Phillip, Pole, Christopher & 
Bolton, Angela (eds) Hidden Hands: International Perspectives on Children’s Work and Labour. Lon-
don: RoutledgeFalmer, 91–107.
2 Qvortrup 1995.
3 Cunningham, Hugh (1995) Children & Childhood in Western Society Since 1500. London and New 
York: Longman, 160.
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kind of childhood, it was feared that if they had to work and toil, their child-
hood would be an unhappy one, and it was even argued that by working, 
children simply lost their childhood.4
It is in accordance with this romantic construction of childhood to argue 
that, instead of undertaking work, children should spend their time play-
ing and galloping around in nature. Nevertheless, the upsurge of bourgeois 
thinking and its domestic ideal during industrialization, as well as the de-
mand from the new industry for an educated labour force, soon associated 
children with the home and the school, where they should spend their time 
in education and be protected and provided for by adults.5
To begin with, these new ideas of how children should spend their time 
were not uncontroversial and elicited strong debate. In the long run, how-
ever, advocators of children spending their time at school instead of work 
gained the upper hand, and the placement of children within the sphere of 
reproduction was sanctified by legislation on child labour and compulsory 
education.6 Needless to say, child labour laws and laws on compulsory edu-
cation were passed all around the industrialized world, and are still in exis-
tence. Moreover, the placement of children within the sphere of reproduc-
tion has been further sanctified, and universalized, by the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) recognizing children’s 
special rights to education, protection and provision. Taken further, these 
special rights of children include the right not to work.7
4 Cunningham 1995; Hendrick, Harry (1997) ‘Constructions and Reconstructions of British Child-
hood: An Interpretative Survey, 1800 to the Present’. In James, Allison & Prout, Alan (eds) Con-
structing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood. 
London, Philadelphia: RoutledgeFalmer, 34–62.
5 Cunningham 1995.
6 Cunningham 1995; de Coninck-Smith, Ning (1997) ‘The Struggle for the Child’s Time – At All 
Times: School and Children’s Work in Town and Country in Denmark from 1900 to the 1960s’. In de 
Coninck-Smith, Ning, Sandin, Bengt & Schrumpf, Ellen (eds) Industrious Children: Work and Child-
hood in the Nordic Countries 1850–1990. Odense: Odense University Press, 129–159; Sandin, Bengt 
(1997) ‘“In the Large Factory Towns:” Child Labour Legislation, Child Labour and School Compul-
sion’. In de Coninck-Smith, Ning, Sandin, Bengt & Schrumpf, Ellen (eds) Industrious Children: Work 
and Childhood in the Nordic Contries 1850–1990. Odense: Odense University Press, 17–46.
7 Weston, Burns H. & Teerink, Mark B. (2005) Rethinking Child Labor: A Multidimensional Human 
Rights Problem. In Weston, Burns H. (ed.) Child Labor and Human Rights: Making Children Matter. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, xv–xxv.
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Indeed, it has been a general belief that the Western World – the Nordic 
welfare states included – has succeeded in its effort of securing children the 
right not to work, and, hence, nowadays child work is usually associated 
with ‘old days and distant skies’, as the Norwegian sociologist Anne Sol-
berg puts it.8 Also, their happiness and well-being is believed to be secured 
through the absence of work, and, hence, that their subjective well-being 
can be harmed by them undertaking any paid work.9 Employment of chil-
dren and teenagers of any kind has, therefore, been problematized whereas 
various kinds of unpaid activities of the age-group – such as play, education 
and organized leisure activities – are believed to enhance their subjective 
well-being.10
Recently, the construction of a work-free childhood, and its vision of 
children as passive receivers, whether in the social, political or economic 
sense, has been challenged, however. Partly, this challenge comes from in-
ternational law, as the UNCRC not only recognizes children’s special rights 
to education, protection and provision, but also their right to participation 
in society. It has been argued that children’s right of participation includes 
their right to work.11 Partly, this challenge is, however, academic. Within 
the disciplinary field of childhood studies it is, therefore, recognized that 
children are active social agents in the present, and the recognition reaches 
all spheres of society, including the political and the economic.12 The recog-
nition of children being economic agents in the present has not only yielded 
8 Solberg, Anne (1994) Negotiating Childhood: Empirical Investigations and Textual Representations of 
Children’s Work and Everyday Life. Stockholm: Nordic Institute for Studies in Urban and Regional 
Planning, 19; see also McKechnie, Jim & Hobbs, Sandy (1999) ‘Child Labour: The View from the 
North.’ Childhood, Vol. 6, No. 1, 89–100.
9 Mortimer, Jeylan T. (2003) Working and Growing Up in America. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Har-
vard University Press.
10 James, Jenks & Prout 1998.
11 Karl Hanson and Arne Vandaele point out that the right to work is twofold, as it includes both the 
right to employment and rights in work. The argument that the participation articles of the UNCRC 
involve the right to work has also been raised by Madeleine Leonard. See Hanson, Karl & Vandaele, 
Arne (2003) ‘Working Children and International Labour Law: A Critical Analysis’. The Interna-
tional Journal of Children’s Rights, Vol. 11, 73–146; Leonard, Madeleine (2004) ‘Children’s Views on 
Children’s Right to Work’. Childhood, Vol. 11, No. 1, 45–61.
12 James, Allison & Prout, Alan (eds) (1990) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary 
Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood. London: The Falmer Press; Qvortrup, Jens, Corsaro, 
William A. & Honing, Michael-Sebastian (eds) (2009) The Palgrave Handbood of Childhood Studies. 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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the argument that most children’s daily activities – including their educa-
tion – have some economic value, despite society usually not recognizing 
that value (at least not in the present),13 but also reveals that children under 
the age of 18 commonly undertake various kind of paid and unpaid work.14 
For example, findings from the UK,15 the US,16 as well as from the Nor-
dic countries,17 all show that it is not uncommon for the young generation 
in these countries to undertake paid work. As the vast majority of the age 
group goes to school, and are indeed obliged to do so until they reach 16, 
it should not come as a surprise, however, that the work is usually flexible 
part-time work and often informal.18
The recognition of children’s and young people’s participation within the 
sphere of production sheds a light on the tension that can exists in their 
live between the (material) well-being the participation provides and the 
(subjective) well-being that the absence for work might provide. A step 
toward understanding the tension is to explore why the young generation 
undertakes paid work. The aim of this chapter is to seek some answers to 
that question from the perspective of childhood studies which argues both 
for children being social agents and worthy of study in their own right.19 
Childhood studies have many Nordic advocators,20 but the question on the 
reasons behind child and teenage work is, nevertheless, under-researched in 
the Nordic contexts. In this chapter the question will be put in a Nordic con-
text, however, by presenting findings of a doctoral research on paid work of 
13–17-year-old Icelanders. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were 
13 Qvortrup 1995.
14 See for example Liebel, Manfred (2004) A Will of Their Own: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Working 
Children. London & New York: Zed Books; Mizen, Phillip, Pole, Christopher & Bolton, Angela (eds) 
(2001b) Hidden Hands: International Perspectives on Children’s Work and Labour. London: Rout-
ledgeFalmer; Mortimer 2003.
15 McKechnie & Hobbs 1999, 92.
16 Mortimer 2003.
17 Rafnsdóttir, Guðbjörg Linda (1999) Barn- och ungdomsarbete i Norden. Copenhagen: Nordic Coun-
cil of Ministers.
18 Einarsdóttir, Margrét (forthcoming) Paid Work of Icelandic Children and Teenagers: Emphasis on 
Protection from Work or Rights In Work? Unpublished doctoral thesis. Reykjavík: University of 
Iceland.
19 James & Prout 1990; Qvortrup, Corsaro & Honing 2009.
20 See for example the Norwegian and Finnish sociologists Anne Solberg and Leena Alanen cited 
elsewhere in this chapter. An example of Nordic childhood studies can also be found in Brembeck, 
Helene, Johansson, Barbro & Kampmann, Jan (eds) (2004) Beyond the Competent Child: Exploring 
Contemporary Childhoods in the Nordic Welfare Societies. Roskilde: Roskilde University Press.
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applied in the research and the teenagers were asked why they undertake 
paid work, how they spend their income, as well as how they evaluate that 
spending. In addition to the findings on those child-centred questions, find-
ings on the association between paid work of young Icelanders and eco-
nomic status of parents will be illustrated.
Child and teenage work and economic deprivation of parents
If viewed from the perspective of the construction of a work-free childhood, 
a reasonable answer to the question why children and teenagers in affluent 
societies undertake paid work could be that they only do so out of economic 
hardship, and hence, that the work is associated with economic deprivation 
of parents. This possibility has been addressed in some British and Ameri-
can research.21 Findings from those British and American studies indicate 
that participation in paid work is not restricted to children from poor fami-
lies.22 Thus, the research of Sue Middleton and Julia Loumidis has shown 
that British children in single parent families were less likely to hold a paid 
job than their counterparts living with two parents.23 Jeylan T.  Mortimer 
draws the conclusion from findings of American studies that most teenage 
workers in America are not poor.24 In fact, employed youth come dispropor-
tionately from middle class families.25 Nevertheless, there are indicators of 
children from economically disadvantaged families working longer hours 
than children from affluent families, and of the importance of the child’s in-
21 However, as far as I know, it has not yet been researched in the Nordic context.
22 Hobbs, Sandy & McKechnie, Jim (1997) Child Employment in Britain. Edinburgh: The Stationery 
Office; Middleton, Sue & Loumidis, Julia (2001) ‘Young People, Poverty and Part time Work’. In 
Mizen, Phillip, Pole, Christopher & Bolton, Angela (eds) Hidden Hands: International Perspectives 
on Chilren’s Work and Labour. London: Routledge Falmer Press, 24–36; Morrow, Virginia (1994) ‘Re-
sponsible Children? Aspects of Children’s Work and Employment Outside School in Contemporary 
UK’. In Mayall, Berry (ed.) Children’s Childhoods Observed and Experienced. London & Washington, 
D.C.: Falmer Press, 128 143; Mortimer 2003; Schoenhals, Mark, Tienda, Marta & Schneider, Barbara 
(1998) ‘The Educational and Personal Consequences of Adolescent Employment’. Social Forces, Vol. 
77, No. 2, 723–762. 
23 Middleton & Loumidis 2001.
24 Mortimer 2003.
25 Mortimer 2003, 115.
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come for poorer households.26 Thus, the research findings of Middleton and 
Loumidis revealed that the average earnings of children from disadvantage 
families were three times greater as a share of family income (6 per cent) 
than those of young people from better off families (2 per cent). The authors 
point out that ‘[t]hese differences are small in percentage terms but could be 
of great importance to the living standards of poorer families’.27
Commodified childhood and the social meaning of  
consumption
The empirical fact of child and teenage work not being restricted to children 
from poor families suggests that the work might be connected to  increasing 
materialism in Western societies and an upturn of the consumer society. 
Research that has looked into what child and teenage workers spend their 
income on corroborates the answer, at least at first sight. Thus, research find-
ings reveal that only a small minority of Western child and teenage work-
ers spend their money on things can be classified as absolute necessities, or 
contribute directly to their household.28 However, those findings also shed 
a light on how debatable the question of the boundaries between necessities 
and luxuries is. Thus, are fashion clothes – items young workers sometimes 
spend their earnings on – necessities because they are clothes, or luxuries 
because they are fashion? What about toiletries and savings for the future as 
well as another items young workers in some instances spend their income 
on?
26 Marsh, Herbert W. & Kleitman, Sabina (2005) ‘Consequences of Employment During High School: 
Character Building, Subversion of Academic Goals, or a Threshold?’ American Educational Research 
Journal, Vol. 42, No. 2, 331–369; Middleton & Loumidis 2001; Schoenhals, Tienda & Schneider 
1998.
27 Middleton & Loumidis 2001, 31.
28 Einarsdóttir, Margrét (2004) Bara eitthvað sem krakkar gera til þess að vinna sér inn pening: Sjónar-
horn blaðburðarbarna á vinnu sína sett í stærra sögulegt og félagslegt samhengi. Unpublished master’s 
thesis. Reykjavík: University of Iceland; Howieson, Cathy, McKechnie, Jim & Semple, Sheila (2006) 
The Nature and Implications of the Part-time Employment of Secondary Schools Pupils. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Executive Social Research, The Department of Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning; 
Ingenhorst, Heinz (2001) ‘Child Labour in the Federal Republic of Germany’. In Mizen, Phillip, Pole, 
Christopher & Bolton, Angela (eds) Hidden Hands: International Perspectives on Children’s Work and 
Labour. London: RoutledgeFalmer, 139–148; Mizen, Phillip, Pole, Christopher & Bolton, Angela 
(2001a) ‘Why Be a School Age Worker?’ In Mizen, Phillip, Pole, Christopher & Bolton, Angela (eds) 
Hidden Hands: International Perspectives on Children’s Work and Labour. London: RoutledgeFalmer, 
37–54; Mortimer 2003.
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An attempt is often made in political and academic discussion to define 
the line between necessities and luxuries in either relative or absolute terms, 
but ‘[a]ll in all, a standard of living, whether an absolute or a relative one, is 
always based on a subjective evaluation’.29 Such subjective evaluation of what 
is a necessity and what is not has been salient in academic discussion on the 
spending patterns of child and teenage workers. In their writing on part-
time work of American high school students in the 1980s, Ellen Greenberg-
er and Laurence D. Steinberg, for example, set their own absolute criteria 
for necessities when they argue that the work of students, whose work is not 
motivated by their parents’ economic hardship, is a ‘luxury youth employ-
ment’ as well as when they argue that the young workers’ spending on things 
like clothing, stereo equipment, music, movies, recreation, hobbies, and car 
expenses is ‘discretionary spending’.30 Phillip Mizen, Christopher Pole, and 
Angela Bolton, on the other hand, view similar spending of British school-
age workers as necessities in the consumer society they live in:31 
[T]he decision to work cannot be viewed as the simple choice to con-
sume but rather represents a necessary act on the part of many chil-
dren if they are to merely participate in many of the ‘normal’ routines 
of childhood. It is no longer the case that children’s and teenagers’ 
leisure activities are mostly free. On the contrary, their leisure has 
been reconstituted into new and increasingly commodified forms 
dictated by the market, whose only entry requirement is the pos-
session of money. For those children for whom money is something 
difficult to come by, the search for some sort of wage is one of the few 
viable alternatives.32
29 Sturluson, Jón Þór, Eydal, Guðný, & Ólafsson, Andrés Júlíus (2011) Íslensk neysluviðmið. Reykjavík: 
Velferðarráðuneyti, 5.
30 Greenberger, Ellen & Steinberg, Laurence D. (1986) When Teenagers Work: The Psycological and 
Social Costs of Adolesent Employment. New York: Basic Boooks, 74, 75.
31 Mizen, Phillip, Pole, Christopher & Bolton, Angela (1999) ‘School Age Workers: The Paid Employ-
ment of Children in Britain’. Work, Employment and Society, Vol. 13, No. 3, 423–438; Mizen, Pole & 
Bolton 2001a.
32 Mizen, Pole & Bolton 1999, 433.
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The argument of ‘commodified childhood’ brings up the theory of the 
social meaning of consumption; not only has it been theorized that con-
sumption of activities and goods is embedded in the social in general, but 
also that the consumption may be especially important in the social life of 
teenagers.33 Research that has looked into the social and symbolic meaning 
of teenagers’ consumption of goods like brand clothes and makeup confirm 
the theory.34 Moreover, Elin Olsson’s study shows that among Swedish teen-
agers (aged 10–18) economic resources, both in terms of the resources of 
the household and the teen’s own resources, are positively associated with 
social relations of peers.35 Nevertheless, in the research, the young people 
own economic resources were not directly linked to an income of their own, 
but simply defined as accessibility to cash.
The standpoint of children
The importance that consumption can have in the life of the young gen-
eration suggests the possibility of evaluating the spending from the view-
point of child and teenage workers themselves, as does the child-centred 
argument of childhood studies.36 Jeylan T. Mortimer heads in that direc-
tion when she points out that teenagers’ definitions of ‘discretionary spend-
ing’ may vary considerably from adults’ definitions of the concept. She puts 
her argument forward in the context of the question of car ownership and 
argues that: ‘whereas car ownership on the part of an adolescent may be 
considered, from an adult standpoint, as a discretionary item, the situation 
may be perceived quite differently by a teenager who needs the car to go to 
school, to attend various social activities, and to get to work’.37 In her writing 
33 Piacentini, Maria & Mailer, Greig (2004) ‘Symbolic Consumption in Teenagers’ Clothing Choices’. 
Journal of Consumer Behaviour, Vol. 3, No. 3, 251–262; Olsson, Elin (2007) ‘The Economic Side of 
Social Relations: Household Poverty, Adolescents’ Own Resources and Peer Relations’. European 
Sociological Review, Vol. 23, No. 4, 471–485.
34 Piacentini & Mailer 2004; Gentina, Elodie, Palan, Kay M. & Fosse-Gomez, Marie-Hélène (2012) 
‘The Practice of Using Makeup: A Consumption Ritual of Adolescent Girls’. Journal of Consumer 
Behaviour, Vol. 11, No. 2, 115–123. 
35 Olsson 2007. 
36 Alanen, Leena (1994) ‘Gender and Generation: Feminism and the “Child Question”’. In Qvortrup, 
Jens, Bardy, Marjatta, Sgritta, Giovanni & Witersberger, Helmut (eds), Childhood Matters: Social 
Theory, Practice and Politics. Aldershot: Avebury, 27–42; James & Prout 1990.
37 Mortimer 2003, 118.
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on part-time work of American high school students, however, Mortimer 
does not present any findings on how the young workers themselves evalu-
ate their spending, and it remains difficult to assess how Western child and 
teenage workers evaluate their spending.
Western child and teenage workers have, however, been questioned on 
why they undertake paid work (though, once again, the subject is under-re-
searched in the Nordic context, to my best knowledge). The findings indicate 
that the money the young workers earn is the main reason for the work.38 
These findings corroborate that there is some connection between child and 
teenage work and a ‘commodified childhood’, but, notably, these findings 
also reveal that the monetary reasons are not the only reasons children and 
teenagers give to explain why they participate in paid work.39 Thus, employ-
ment and career opportunities (including gaining work experience),40 so-
cializing and having fun,41 as well as independence,42 have been recognized 
as motivating children and teenagers to undertake paid work. It is worth 
noticing that research findings indicate interplay between the monetary 
reasons and the independence reasons; it being the independent income of 
paid work that enables the young workers to take a step towards their au-
tonomy.43 Thus, Mizen, Pole, and Bolton draw the conclusion from their re-
search among British school-age workers that earning money increased the 
young workers ‘spending power’ as the money enabled them to buy things 
their parents disapproved of, such as cigarettes, alcohol, and makeup, and 
that the power ‘brought with it a discernible shift in relations with parents 
and family’.44
38 Einarsdóttir 2004; Howieson, McKechnie & Semple 2006; Ingenhorst 2001; Mizen, Pole & Bolton 
2001a; Mortimer 2003.
39 Besen, Yasemin (2006) ‘Exploitation or Fun? The Lived Experience of Teenage Employment in 
Suburban America’. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, Vol. 35, No. 3, 319–340; Einarsdóttir 
2004; Howieson, McKechnie & Semple 2006; Hungerland, Beatrice, Liebel, Manfred, Liesecke, Anja 
& Wihstutz, Anna (2007) ‘Paths To Participatory Autonomy: The Meanings of Work for Children in 
Germany’. Childhood, Vol. 14, No. 2, 257–277; Mizen, Pole & Bolton 2001a.
40 Howieson, McKechnie & Semple 2006; Hungerland, Liebel, Liesecke & Wihstutz 2007; Mortimer 
2003.
41 Besen 2006; Hungerland, Liebel, Liesecke & Wihstutz 2007; Mizen, Pole & Bolton 2001a.
42 Einarsdóttir 2004; Howieson, McKechnie & Semple 2006; Hungerland, Liebel, Liesecke & Wihstutz 
2007; Mizen, Pole & Bolton 2001a.
43 Hungerland, Liebel, Liesecke & Wihstutz 2007; Mizen, Pole & Bolton 2001a.
44 Mizen, Pole & Bolton 2001a, 44–45.
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Methods
The aim of the research presented here is to analyze why children and teen-
agers undertake paid work despite their acknowledged right not to work 
in a Nordic context by exploring the reasons behind paid work of Icelan-
dic children and teenagers. Despite Iceland being one of the Nordic coun-
tries, the country deviates from the other Nordic countries in some aspects. 
The country had no compulsory school system until the beginning of the 
twentieth century and school summer holidays were relatively long.45 Ólöf 
Garðarsdóttir puts the long summer holidays in context with an annual 
need of the country’s main industry in the twentieth century, i.e. the fish in-
dustry, of a reserve army, and argues that this need fuelled a positive attitude 
towards child and teenage work in the country.46 Indeed, participation in 
summer work is exceptionally common in Iceland; the research of Guðbjörg 
Linda Rafnsdóttir’s research from the late 1990s has shown that 92 per cent 
of 13–17-year-old Icelanders undertook paid summer work compared to 70 
per cent of their Danish, 42 per cent of their Norwegian and Finnish, and 
35 per cent of their Swedish counterparts.47 On the other hand, the research 
also revealed that the prevalence of term-time work was not exceptional in 
Iceland, and indeed much lower than in Denmark (but on a par with Nor-
way and Finland). Also, term-time work of Icelandic students is commonly 
problematized.48 Therefore, I infer that child and teenage work in Iceland 
does not differ in essence to child and teenage work in the other Nordic 
countries.
The data presented in this chapter originates in my doctoral research 
on paid work of young Icelanders, aged 13–17. The research design and 
the conduct of the research were based on two methodological approaches, 
45 More than three months, but shortened to circa nine weeks in elementary school at the beginning of 
this century.
46 Garðarsdóttir, Ólöf (1997) ‘Working Children in Urban Iceland 1930–1990’. In de Coninck-Smith, 
Ning, Sandin, Bengt & Schrumpf, Ellen (eds) Industrious Children: Work and Childhood in the 
Nordic Countries 1850–1990. Odense: Odense University Press, 160–185.
47 Rafnsdóttir 1999.
48 Ólafsson, Hannes Í., Þorgeirsdóttir, Björk & Gíslason, Garðar (2006) Vinna framhaldsskólanema með 
námi: Könnun gerð í þremur framhaldsskólum á höfðuðborgarsvæðinu vorið 2005. Online. Available 
HTTP: <http://www.ismennt.is/not/gardarg/Vinna.doc> (accessed August 2012); Sigurðardóttir, 
Guðríður & Karlsson, Þorlákur (1991) Göfgar vinna með námi? Niðurstöður rannsóknar á þáttum 
tengdum vetrarvinnu framhaldsskólanema. Reykjavík: Rannsóknarstofnun uppeldis- og menntamála.
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firstly, the approach of research with children, and secondly, the approach 
of mixed methods research. The approach of research with children is the 
methodological counterpart of childhood studies, and in addition to the 
premises of children and young people holding social agency, its frames of 
reference include the involvement (participation) of young people in the 
research; the suitability of the research methods; as well as an awareness 
of ethical issues within child research.49 The approach of mixed methods 
research is, on the other hand, based on the pragmatic stance of the research 
questions determining the methods, not vice versa.50 As the questions of the 
doctoral research that is presented here called upon both qualitative and 
quantitative methods both types of data was collected.
The quantitative part of the research constituted of a comprehensive sur-
vey on child and youth work. Together the sample constituted of 2000 Ice-
landers aged 13–17, randomly selected from the Icelandic Register of Per-
sons. Totally, 952 young people responded, thus, the response rate was 48.8 
per cent. The qualitative part of the research constitute on the other hand, 
of group interviews with around forty 13–18 years old Icelandic teenagers, 
of both sexes, and with various social and economic background, who all 
had at least some experience of paid work. The group of the interviews were 
relatively small, between two and five young people participated in each, 
and the participants in each group knew each other beforehand, in some 
instances they were close friends, in other instances class or school mates. 
The research was conducted during the peak of the 2000s economic boom 
in Iceland, and enquired, on the one hand, on paid work during the summer 
of 2007, and, on the other hand, on term–time work during the school year 
of 2007–2008.
49 See for example Alderson, Perscilla & Morrow, Virginia (2004) Ethics, Social Research and Consulting 
with Children and Young People. Barkingside: Barnardo’s; Christensen, Pia & James, Allison (2008) 
Research with Children: Perspectives and Practices. New York and London: Routledge.
50 See for example Johnson, R. Burke & Onwuegbuzie, Anthony J. (2004) ‘Mixed Methods Research: A 
Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come’. Educational Researcher, Vol. 33, No. 7, 14–26; Tashak-
kori, Abbas & Teddlie, Charles (eds) (2003) Handbook of Mixed Methods In Social & Behaviorial 
Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication.
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Advocators of the mixed methods research disagree on whether the mix-
ing should occur at all stages of the research process, only at the last stage 
of interpretation of the data and the writing of the result, or somewhere be-
tween.51 In this research the argument of Janice M. Morse ‘that each method 
must be complete in itself; that is, all methods used must meet appropriate 
criteria for rigor’, and that the mixing should therefore only be conducted at 
the last stage of the research was taken into account.52 Hence, the quantita-
tive and the qualitative data were analysed separately, and the findings only 
mixed during the stage of writing.
Because of the commonality of summer work in Iceland the main fo-
cus of the results presented below is on why some Icelandic children and 
teenagers undertake term-time work, and what they spend their term-time 
earning on. Findings from both the qualitative and the quantitative part of 
the research are discussed.
Results
In total, 49 per cent of the respondents of the survey reported participating 
in paid term-time work during the school year 2007–2008; thereof 29 per 
cent reported being in regular employment and 20 per cent working irregu-
larly. More than half of the term-time workers reported holding a term-time 
job in the retail sector. In total, 84 per cent of the respondents reported 
working during the summer of 2007, most commonly in the work-schools 
run by most municipalities in Iceland. The respondents who reported par-
ticipating in term-time work were asked why they worked during term-
time. The participants of the group interviews were also asked why they 
participate in paid work. The findings of these quantitative and qualitative 
enquires are presented below.
51 Johnson, R. Burke, Onwuegbuzie, Anthony J. & Turner, Lisa A. (2007) ‘Toward a Definition of 
Mixed Methods Research’. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, Vol. 1, No. 2, 112–133. 
52 Morse, Janice M. (1991) ‘Approaches to Quantitative-Qualitative Methodological Triangulation’. 
Nursing Research, Vol. 40, No. 2, 120–123.
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The reasons behind term-time work of Icelandic teenagers 
The results on the question regarding why respondents of the quantitative 
research participate in term-time work are presented in Table 1. The ques-
tion was asked in a multiple choice format; i.e. each respondent could mark 
more than one option. The results head in the same direction as other re-
search findings on the issue, and reveal the importance of monetary rea-
sons for child and teenage work. Therefore, the vast majority, or 86 per cent, 
reported that they had a term-time job because they wanted to earn some 
money.
The results illustrated in Table 1 are also in accordance with other re-
search results regarding that, whereas monetary reasons are the key reasons 
behind child and teenage work, they are nevertheless not the only reasons. 
Therefore, a third of the respondents mark the option ‘to gain work experi-
ence for the future’, one out of three reported working to be able to get things 
their parents were not willing, or not able, to provide, and a quarter reported 
having term-time work because they wanted to have enough to do. Gender 
difference is only prominent in the option of ‘saving for expensive things’. 
Thus, while half of the boys work to be able to save for expensive things, 
this is the case for only one out of four girls. The difference is statistically 
significant.53
‘Just the money’
Findings from the group interviews concur with the results of the quantita-
tive part of the research regarding the fact that monetary reasons are the 
main reason for working. Thus, the vast majority of the participants of the 
group interviews answered the question regarding why they work during 
the school year, with remarks like ‘it’s the money’, ‘just the money’, and ‘just 
because I needed the money’. These answers are reminiscent of the answers 
I received in some former research on the subject, both in relation to the 
money being the most common answer, as well as in relation to the adverb 
‘just’ frequently being added in the answer.54
53 χ2(1)=4.28, p<.05
54 ‘Just’ is a translation of the Icelandic work ‘bara’. I got answers like ‘bara peningurinn’, ‘út af þvi, bara, 
mig vantaði pening’, and ‘bara aukapeningurinn’. Einarsdóttir 2004.
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‘To have something to do’
Also, the findings of the group interviews head in the same direction as 
the results of the survey regarding the possibility of other reasons than the 
monetary one motivating term-time work of Icelandic teenagers. Thus, both 
work ethics and independence emerged as important themes in the analysis 
of the interview, although, notably, a concern about future work experience 
did not. These reasons were, nevertheless, seldom the first reasons brought 
up by the participants when asked why they participated in term-time work, 
but rather a further explanation of the financial reason. This becomes clear 
in the answer of Valdemar. He gave his answer after my reaffirmation of the 
monetary reasons being the only reason for working, and, emphasized the 
requisite for being industrious:
...I would just find it rather awkward not to be working anywhere, to 
be doing nothing. Just, when you come home from school, just go 
home and do nothing.
Table 1.  Reasons for term-time work of Icelandic teenagers  
(in per cent).
Reason Percentage
To earn some money 86
To save for something expensive (i.e. computer, travel abroad) 43
To gain some work experience for the future 33
To get or do things my parents are not willing, or not able, to provide for 30
To have enough to do 25
My parents think I should work 16
To have as much spending money as my peers 15
Wanted to try how it is to work during term-time 10
Because everyone else works during term-time 2
Other reasons 11
Total 271
N: 411
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Emphasis on being industrious appears in the account of some other 
participants of the group interviews and one girl even argued that she first 
and foremost works during term-time because she ‘doesn’t have anything 
better to do’.
‘It’s terribly boring asking your mum for money’
The group interviews reveal that some of the participants, especially the 
younger ones, are more or less dependent on their family financially, and 
may, therefore, be perceived as being economic recipients, rather than eco-
nomic providers. Thus, the accounts of some of the participants who were 
still in compulsory education reveal that not only were they dependent on 
their parents and/or other family members in relation to food and shel-
ter, but also more or less in relation to savings and money for spending. 
None reported receiving ‘pocket money’ from their parents, but quite a few 
recounted that they ‘just own money’. My enquiry into the origin of that 
money revealed that a part of it might be income from odd jobs, like occa-
sional babysitting, but it could also be a birthday gift and/or savings from an 
amount of money a parent has given the child with the purpose of spending 
it on food in school, on school journeys, etcetera.
The accounts of other participants of the group interviews, especially 
the older ones, reveal, on the other hand, that at some point the economic 
equilibrium between the generations is disturbed. The young individuals 
begin taking on the role of an economic provider, and their journey into 
economic independence begins. It is worth noting that, not only did this 
independence surface in some of the participants emphasizing that they 
wanted to decide by themselves what to do and what to buy, but also, and 
more commonly, in the participants emphasizing that they did not want to 
be a burden on their parents.
The perception, that at some stage in the life course it is not proper for 
an individual to ask the parents for money for spending anymore, and, con-
sequently, that the individual needs some income of his/her own appeared 
as an important theme in the group interviews. The perception is apparent 
in this discussion between two 17-year-old girls:
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Erla: But, you know, I think that just no one wants to ask her mum 
for money, it is just...
Bára:...yes...
Erla: ... it is just wrong, or, you know.
Bára: Just hopeless.
Erla: Not when you have become old enough to be able to work.
Bára: You know, you could get away with it when you were younger 
because it is so ‘smallish’, but now, when you are older and you are 
asking about 3000 krona to go to a disco, no, you don’t do that.
Erla: Yea, exactly.
The group interviews reveal more instances of participants describing 
their unease, or unwillingness, to ask their parents for money. They appear 
in comments like ‘I don’t want to ask my mum for some money’ and ‘I think 
it’s terribly boring asking your mum for some money’. Some participants 
used stronger words than ‘ask for’, and, instead, talked about ‘begging for 
money’ or ‘mooching money’ from their parents.55 One participant even lik-
ened teenagers that do not take up a term-time job to parasites. The other 
participants of that particular group interview did not oppose his words.
 
‘Fun kids’
Socializing and fun did not appear as an important motivation of the par-
ticipants to take up a job. Nevertheless, the analysis of the group interviews 
reveals that the young Icelanders do not consider socializing and fun as un-
important. Indeed, the findings of the group interviews reveal that it is im-
portant for many of them not to be bored, and that socializing with friends, 
or other people they find amusing, and having fun are strongly connected. 
The connection between having fun and socializing with friends has been 
identified in other research.56 When I asked Sigrún, who works in a super-
market, whether she considers it important that the supermarket is mostly 
occupied with teenagers, she replied: ‘it is more fun’, and her friend Ugla 
continues:
55 The Icelandic words used here were ‘biðja’, ‘belta’, and ‘sníkja’.
56 Besen 2006; Hungerland, Liebel, Liesecke & Wihstutz 2007.
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Ugla: Of course, if you are just working alone with old ladies, or 
grown up women, it would just be like oh no!
Margrét: Boring?
Ugla: Yea.
The group interviews provide examples of the importance of socializing 
and fun affecting both the decision to carry on in a job they have started, 
and the decision where to apply for a job at a time of a great supply of part-
time jobs. Þórður, for example, found his supermarket job boring to begin 
with, and states that he only stayed in the job because his friend worked 
there too. When the friend quit, a girl from school started working in the 
supermarket and gave Þórður some company. That and the fact that he had 
also got used to the job reduced the boredom. Similarly, Embla got a sum-
mer job in a supermarket and could have stayed there after the school start-
ed but decided not to:
It was just that I didn’t find it that much fun working in the super-
market, because there were so many old people working there. There 
was no one of my age that I could talk to (laughter).
She decided to apply for a term-time job in a kiosk where most of the 
staff was her age, and got that job.
The spending patterns of Icelandic term-time workers
The research results presented in Table 2 reveal that it is most common for 
13–17-year-old Icelandic term-time workers to use their term-time income 
as ‘pocket money’. More than two thirds of the term-time workers marked 
that option. Also, slightly less than half of the term-time workers use their 
income to ‘save for certain expensive things, i.e. a computer, bicycle or to 
travel abroad’. Both options could be classified as ‘discretional spending’, e.g. 
if one accepts the definition of Greenberger and Steinberg that spending 
that can be classified as part of a commodified childhood is ‘discretional’.57 
57 Greenberger & Steinberg 1986.
margrét einarsdóttir
120
However, the results do not indicate that the young workers only spend 
their income on certain trivial things. Slightly less than three quarters spend 
their money on clothes for themselves, more than half saves for the future, 
and a fifth uses their income to buy schoolbooks. A tenth of the term-time 
workers reported paying for expenses related to organized leisure activities, 
slightly less than a tenth reported buying food for the household, and 7 per 
cent reported paying their school fees. A small fraction of the term-time 
workers, or 1.5 per cent, reported using their income to pay an allowance 
to their parents.
Gender difference is notable in relation to both saving for expensive 
things and purchasing clothes. The difference is statistically significant 
in both instances.58 The gender difference in terms of purchasing clothes 
is particularly salient. Whilst 73 per cent of the girls reported using their 
term-time income to buy clothes for themselves, only 43 per cent of the boys 
58 Purchasing clothes: χ2(1)=32.62, p<.01. Saving for an expensive thing: χ2(1)=4.60, p<.05.
Table 2.  How Icelandic teenagers spend their term-time income  
(in per cent).
Spending Percentage
Pocket money (i.e. to pay for sweets, pizza, movies) 68
Buy clothes for myself 63
Save for the future 54
Save for a certain expensive thing (i.e. a computer, travel) 45
Pay for schoolbooks 19
Pay for organized leisure activities 10
Buy food for the home 9
Pay school fees 7
Pay an allowance to my parent(s) 2
Other 8
Total 285
N: 389
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did so. The boys are, on the other hand, more likely to use their term-time 
income to save for expensive things than the girls. The difference is, though, 
not as salient as before, or 52 per cent compared to 41 per cent.
The age difference in relation to the expenses as illustrated in Figure 1, 
of which all can be classified as necessities, is worth further attention. The 
figure shows that it is exceptional for the 13-year-olds to use their income 
to pay for leisure activities, schoolbooks, school fees, and/or to buy food 
for the home, but that the commonality of paying for those expenses grows 
with age, although the steepness of the growth varies. Thus, 45 per cent of 
the 17-year-olds use their term-time work to pay for school books, 21 per 
cent to buy food for the home, 19 per cent to pay for school fees, and 16 
per cent to pay for organized leisure activities. The age difference in rela-
tion to school books and school fees can, at least partly, be explained by the 
fact that, in Iceland, upper-secondary students have to buy their textbooks 
and pay a small fee to their school, whereas compulsory students have not. 
For the youngest term-time workers to use their income to buy clothes for 
themselves is not as uncommon as for them to use it on other necessities; 32 
per cent report doing so, but the frequency of the expense rises rapidly with 
age and has reached 72 per cent in the oldest year. In all instances, the age 
difference is statistically significant.
These findings on the growing participation of young workers in pur-
chasing necessities as their age rises are compatible with the findings of the 
group interview, presented above, on the interplay between young people 
undertaking paid work on the one hand and gaining independence on the 
other.
‘Just something’ 
Group interviews are not a very suitable for collecting information on in-
dividual spending as they do not allow for a detailed mapping of every par-
ticipant’s behaviour. In the case of the present study, the mapping became 
even more difficult as the participants’ incomes varied considerably; some 
had only earned relatively low amounts during the summer (less than 50 000 
ISK), while others ranged from having no or an irregular income during the 
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school year to having a relatively high and regular income all year around 
(more than 50 000 ISK per month during term-time added to the summer 
income). Nevertheless, the analysis of the group interviews of the present 
research provides some relevant results on the issue.
The group interviews do not provide detailed answers on how the par-
ticipants spend the part of their income that turned into ‘pocket money’. 
Thus, in many instances a direct enquiry of mine on the subject provoked 
unclear answers like ‘just something’ and ‘just to have some money during 
the winter’. Nevertheless, the inference can be made from the interviews that 
young Icelanders use at least part of their income on things like lunch at 
school, eating out, going to the cinema, the mall, and/or a disco.
Figure 1.  Percentage of Icelandic term-time workers spending their 
income on certain necessities, in relation to age.
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The car
The data provides more detailed information on other spending patterns 
than the data dealing with ephemeral recreational activities. Thus, the find-
ings from the qualitative research head in the same direction as the result of 
the survey and reveal that it is common for Icelandic teenagers to save for 
certain expensive things. The group interviews gave, therefore, examples of 
young workers saving for both a computer and to travel abroad. Surpris-
ingly, however, by far the most common purpose of these savings was for 
a car. Moreover, the 17-year-old age limit for a driving licence meant that 
among the oldest participants, this car-saving had turned into a spending, as 
some of them had already bought a car. Interestingly, the group interviews 
gave more than one example of young Icelanders that had bought a car sev-
eral months before they turned 17. The findings reveal that driving and car-
ownership entail more expenses than just the purchasing of the car itself. 
Therefore, a few of the participants mentioned that they needed money to 
pay for driving lessons and a driving licence, and ‘of course that costs a lot’, 
others said that they needed money to pay for the petrol, and a few had 
bought a more expensive car than their savings allowed for, and were at the 
time of the interview, therefore, paying off a loan. Interestingly, none men-
tioned paying for the insurance of the car and the annual car tax in Iceland. 
Possibly, it is a common habit of Icelandic parents to pay the insurance of 
their child’s car.
The commonality of car ownership and car expenses among the partici-
pants of the group interviews elicit the question as to whether this spend-
ing is a discretionary luxury or not. The majority of the participants of the 
group interviews would not have given a positive answer to the question. 
Therefore, many of the participants, especially the ones living either in the 
suburbs of Reykjavík or outside the capital area, argued that it was difficult 
to do anything without a car, and gave several examples of their daily activi-
ties being encumbered by the long distances and limited service of public 
transport in Iceland. These examples included both school attendance and 
organized sport activities. This argument concurs with Mortimer’s argu-
ment regarding the fact that many American teenagers probably do not 
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agree that their car expenses are discretional.59 Long distances and a limited 
public transport service are also features of American society, and in that 
respect Icelandic and American teenagers probably have more in common 
than Icelandic and many European teenagers.60
‘Always buying everything myself ’
The findings of the group interviews reveal, like the results of the survey, 
that it is not uncommon for Icelandic teenagers to use part of their income 
on things that are reasonable to define as necessities. Firstly, the majority 
of the participants reported buying clothes for themselves. Their accounts 
reveal, however, that it differs whether they only buy clothes they fancy or all 
the clothes they need. Therefore, Kristín reported mainly using her earnings 
on ‘food and clothes’, although only fast food and food in school, and all the 
clothes she needs unless:
Kristín: ...the money is gone. Yes, also if I need something, a coat or 
something, then my mum buys it.
Margrét: Yes, so your parents buy the more expensive clothes, shoes, 
and so on?
Kristín: Yes, and these extra things that I need but don’t bother buy-
ing myself.
The friends Erla and Bára, on the other hand, bought nearly all the 
clothes they need themselves. They only got clothes from their parents on 
special occasions, i.e. as a birthday or Christmas present or if their mothers 
wanted to show their affection to their daughter by inviting her to go shop-
ping.
Secondly, a minority of the participants reported paying for some other 
necessities than clothes. Therefore, there were instances of term-time work-
ers paying for at least some of the expenses related to their organized lei-
sure activities, and moreover, of term-time workers reporting ‘always pay-
59 Mortimer 2003.
60 Moreover, Reykjavík, the capital of Iceland, is a relatively new city, mostly constructed since the 
Second World War, and designed for cars rather than pedestrians.
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ing everything for myself ’. These workers argued that in addition to ‘pocket 
money’ they paid for all their clothes, for books they needed for school, for 
school fees as well as for food for the household if they bought the grocer-
ies themselves: ‘You know, if you go by yourself to the grocery shop then 
you pay for the food with your own money’. These groups of teenagers also 
argued that if they wanted something special for dinner then they had to 
pay for it themselves. Notably, though, none of the participants of the group 
interviews reported paying for their own housing.
To control one’s spending by saving
Some of the participants of the group interviews described that they were 
not able to save their earnings, and that they did not really know what they 
spent their income on. The money they earn somehow just ‘goes in one hand 
and out of the other’. On the other hand, other participants reported saving 
almost all, or at least some part, of their earnings. Saving with the purpose 
of purchasing a certain expensive thing has already been mentioned, but the 
group interviews also gave several examples of young Icelandic workers that 
put part of their earnings into a future fund and/or controlled their spending 
by saving. The examples of 14-year-old Ásbjörn and 17-year-old Theódór il-
lustrate this. Ásbjörn has a regular term-time job and can earn a substantial 
amount each month. With the help of his mother, he controls how he spends 
his earnings through different kinds of savings opportunities:
I got maybe 45 000 [ISK] for the last month, then 10 000 goes into a 
bank account, and my mum puts maybe 20 000 into a future fund, 
and then something onto the debit card.
The 10 000-per-month-saving was earmarked for the purchase of a car 
and the amount which was put onto the debit card account was for daily 
use. Theódór has had a regular income for several years, and has controlled 
his spending in a similar way, though without any help from his parents. 
For some years he put a certain amount every mouth into a ‘car fund’ that 
enabled him to buy his first car at the age of 16. At the time of the interview 
he had exchanged that car for a more expensive one.
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‘Just some extra needs’?
The findings of the group interviews not only reveal variations with regard 
to the way the participants use their income on necessities; they also re-
veal the different views of the participants towards the needs of teenagers. 
Therefore, some of the term-time workers argued that they needed the in-
come because ‘it is not possible to do anything here unless you pay for it’. 
These young workers agreed with the argument of Mizen, Pole, and Bolton 
of a commodified childhood, albeit not being familiar with the academic 
discourse.61 However, the opinion was also expressed by some of the par-
ticipants that most of the things the term-time workers used their earnings 
on were only some unnecessary ‘extra needs’, as this discussion in one of the 
group interviews sheds light on:
Margrét: Do you want to add something to the research that I have 
not enquired about yet? Something you think I should have asked 
you about?
Ísak: No, or maybe just that you don’t need to work during term-time 
if you don’t want to.
Kristín: You need to, anyway.
Ísak: No, I mean, you buy clothes [he is addressing Kristín], and he 
buys a car [he is addressing the other boy participating in the in-
terview]. I own nothing, I mean, of course I own some clothes, you 
see, just because I worked during the summer, something easy. But 
you don’t need to work during term-time. Unless you intend to buy 
lunch in every lunch break in school and buy a car instead of taking 
the bus.
Findings of the quantitative part of the research on why some Icelandic 
teenagers choose not to undertake a term-time work, not presented in detail 
here, head in the same direction as these qualitative findings, and reveal that 
a part of Icelandic teenagers decide not to work during term-time because 
they do not have the time and/or rather want to concentrate on their studies.
61 Mizen, Pole & Bolton 1999.
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Association with educational status of parents
In former research on the association between the extent of child and youth 
work and the socioeconomic status of parents, different indicators of the so-
cioeconomic status (SES) of the parents have been applied.62 Here, the sum-
mation of education of both the mother and father is used as an indicator of 
the SES of parents. Thus, the respondents were classified into three groups: 
of both parents who have only finished primary education; of both parents 
with tertiary education; and of other combinations of parents’ education 
(one with primary education, the other with secondary education, one with 
primary and the other with tertiary education, etcetera). The association 
of parental education with three indicators of employment status was ana-
lysed: with participation of summer work; with the level of employment in 
term-time work; and with the purchasing of certain necessities.
Firstly, the result shows that children of parents with tertiary education 
are less likely to participate in summer work than the children of parents 
with a lesser education, but that the association disappears amongst the 
young people who have finished their compulsory education after control-
ling for age. In other words, the results indicate that it is more common for 
children of parents with a tertiary education to be older when they start 
working during the summer than it is for children of parents with a lesser 
education.
Secondly, the results reveal that pupils of parents with a tertiary educa-
tion are less likely to undertake term-time work than pupils of parents with 
a lesser education; that those children of parents with a tertiary education 
who undertake term-time work are less likely to be in intensive (>12 hours 
per week) and regular term-time work than their counterparts of parents 
with a lesser education, and that the association persists after controlling 
for age.
Thirdly, the results reveal that children of parents with a tertiary educa-
tion are less likely to spend their term-time income on two or more of the 
following necessities: schoolbooks, school fees, food for the household; and 
62 Inter alia family form and income support, parental education and family income, and economic 
level of school areas. Middleton & Loumidis 2001; Mortimer 2003; Morrow 1994.
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allowances to their parents, than children of parents with a lesser education. 
This result must, however, be taken with the precaution that the association 
disappears after controlling for age. Interestingly, the results do not indicate 
any association of the educational status of parents with purchasing of cloth-
ing, nor with paying for organized leisure activities. A possible explanation 
of the research not indicating any association between purchasing of cloth-
ing and educational status of parents is that it did not discriminate between 
different types of clothing. It is, therefore, possible that children of worse-off 
parents prefer to spend their income on practical clothing than better-off 
children. The non-association with paying for organized leisure activities is 
not as easily explained.
Conclusion
In modern Western societies childhood has been seen as a period without 
work and responsibility, and hence a period of dependency; in other words 
as the opposite of adulthood. It has been feared that if children take on adult 
responsibilities, such as work, their childhood will be an unhappy one and 
their (subjective) well-being will be at risk.63 This construction of a work-
free childhood has been further sanctified in legislation on child labour and 
compulsory education. Moreover, the construction has been universalized 
in the UNCRC provisions on children’s rights to protection, provision, and 
education as well as the derivate right not to work.64 It has been a general 
belief that this arrangement and its placement of children outside the sphere 
of production has made child work a thing of the past and hence the well-
being of children secured in developed societies.65 However, research on the 
prevalence of paid work in this part of the world does not support the belief 
of child and teenage work being a phenomenon of the past in Western soci-
eties. It reveals the commonality of children and teenagers undertaking paid 
work, although the work is usually part-time, flexible, and often informal.66 
Participation of Icelandic youths in paid work is sometimes thought to 
63 Cunningham 1995.
64 Weston & Teerink 2005.
65 McKechnie & Hobbs 1999.
66 Einarsdóttir forthcoming.
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be exceptionally high. Research on the extent of paid work of Nordic teenag-
ers confirms that the participation of young Icelanders is, indeed, exception-
ally high regarding summer work, but also that their undertaking of work 
does not stand out when it comes to term-time work.67
But why do Western children and teenagers undertake paid work, de-
spite they supposedly having the right not to? A feasible answer from the 
perspective of the discourse of a work-free childhood is that the work is 
restricted to those with parents in economic hardship. The connection be-
tween child and teenage work and economic deprivation of parents is un-
der-researched in the Nordic contexts, but existing American research find-
ings indicate that young American workers disproportionately come from 
middle class families.68 The association between educational status of par-
ents and paid work of Icelandic teenagers was also examined in the research 
presented here. These findings do not concur with the findings of American 
studies, but indicate a negative association between educational status of 
parents and teenage work, and, hence, indicates a connection between child 
and teenage work and economic deprivation of parents. Nevertheless, be-
fore more finite conclusions are made, the association need further exami-
nation, not only in the Icelandic context but in the Nordic context as well.
Likewise, more examination is needed regarding the connection between 
child and teenage work and the upturn of consumerism in Western societ-
ies. The social meaning of consumption has been recognized, and there is 
empirical evidence of consumption playing a special role in the social life of 
teenagers.69 Also, British researchers argue for a connection between child 
and teenage work and the emergence of a ‘commodified childhood’ in the 
UK, but their research reveals that school-age workers in the UK use their 
income to consume the products, services, or experiences that are required 
as part of commodified childhood.70
However, the discussion on consumption and materialism brings forth 
the debate as to where the line between absolute and relative poverty, be-
67 Rafnsdóttir 1999.
68 Mortimer 2003.
69 Piacentini & Mailer 2004.
70 Mizen, Pole & Bolton 1999; Mizen, Pole & Bolton 2001a.
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tween necessities and luxuries, lies. In a recent report on the Icelandic stan-
dard of living, it is pointed out that a standard of living is always based on 
subjective evaluation.71 One possibility of evaluating the spending patterns 
of young workers is therefore to view it from the standpoint of the young 
people themselves. This approach has guided the present research, as the 
young Icelanders who participated in it were asked about their evaluation of 
their spending as well as why they undertake paid term-time work.
The findings revealed that Icelandic teenagers do not deviate from their 
counterparts in other Western countries regarding the money they earn by 
their work as being the main reason behind the work. Importantly, the re-
search also shows that the young workers commonly spend their income on 
things some would define as discretionary luxury – even on a car. Many of 
the participants would not use this evaluation, but considered such spend-
ing as a necessity in the life of (Icelandic) teenager. The findings also reveal 
that it is not uncommon for Icelandic teenagers, especially the older ones, 
to spend their income on things that most would classify as necessities, i.e. 
school-related items and food.
I conclude from my findings that having and spending money of their 
own is an important part of the young people’s journey towards autonomy 
and independence from parents, including from the parents’ economic sta-
tus. Thus, many of the participants stated that at a certain age it is not proper 
to ‘beg your mum for money’ any longer, and some emphasized that they 
did not want to be a burden on their parents. However, my findings also 
reveal that the young generation is not a homogeneous group, but have dif-
ferent views on how much spending money a young person needs to have 
in order to be able to participate in normal teenage life. Thus, some do not 
regard consumption that important factor in their social life, and choose 
not to work during term-time but focus on their education and leisure time 
activities instead.
This choice brings up the question about the tension that exist in the 
life of children and teenagers between their (material) well-being that paid 
71 Sturluson, Eydal & Ólafsson 2011.
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work can provide and their (subjective) well-being gained though their ab-
sence of work. There has been a tendency within the Western construction 
of a work-free childhood to ignore the existence of such a tension, but to 
the extent that this tension has been acknowledged, a one-way solution has 
been suggested: Child and teenage work has been seen as problematic and, 
hence, it has been suggested that it would be in the best interest of the young 
generation not to work.
However, the empirical fact of the commonality of child and teenage 
work in Western societies cannot be ignored and neither can the viewpoints 
of young people that, for one reason or another, undertake paid work and 
earn their own money. Their work and their income can enrich not only 
their material but also their social and psychological well-being, and the 
question must be raised if more emphasis should be placed on the right of 
the young generation right to work – meaning not only the right to employ-
ment but also rights in work (decent work condition, decent pay, etcetera) 
than at present.72 Simultaneously, it must be considered that increasing em-
phasis on children and teenagers having the right to work, might involve the 
danger of the young generation losing their right not to work, and the ad-
vantages and protection that this right can (or at least should) bring to them.
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Somewhere over the high seas there is a land 
of my dreams – Happiness and life satisfac-
tion among immigrants in Europe1
olli kangas
Introduction
The history of Homo sapiens is a history of constant movement. If we are 
creationists and believe in the Bible, the first emigrants forced out of their 
home were Adam and Eve. Those two ancestors of ours, expelled from their 
garden as such, were the start of the future trajectories for humankind that 
– according to evolutionists – has moved from Olduvai Gorge to the highest 
peak of Terra del Fuego to the banks of Bering Strait. Sometimes moves have 
been motivated by the search for a better life or a sheer desire for adventure 
and excitement. Sometimes moves are forced by violent armies or extreme 
poverty, hunger, disease and threat of premature death. Worldwide, there 
are by now about 220 million people living outside their own country. Out 
of those movers, some 50 million reside within the boundaries of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), of which 30 million come from outside the EU and 20 
million have their country of origin in some other EU member state.
1 The title of the paper is inspired by the most famous and melancholic Finnish tango written and 
composed by Unto Mononen in 1955. The lyrics of the tango tell about a desire to move overseas to 
a happy country of fairytales. Thus, the allusions in the title fit very well to my former position as an 
H. C. Andersen Professor in the happy country of Denmark. I became interested in the happiness of 
immigrants while working as H.C. Andersen Professor at the Centre of Welfare State Research, Uni-
versity of Southern Denmark. My Danish colleague Klaus Petersen once asked me whether a Finn 
becomes happier when moving to Denmark, the country that is often depicted to be the happiest 
country in the world. This study is a humble attempt to answer Klaus’s inquiry. I want to thank Wim 
van Oorschot and other participants of the ISA RC-19 annual meeting in Oslo for their valuable 
comments on the first draft of the article.
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A common procedure in welfare research is to trace differences between 
welfare states and welfare regimes. Following Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s 
seminal work, social scientists have clustered countries according to social 
policy institutions. Initially, three separate models of welfare capitalism 
existed: the Social Democratic (Nordic/Scandinavian), the Liberal (Anglo-
Saxon) and the Conservative (Continental/Central European).2 Later, two 
other models were added to the list: the South-European and Post-Socialist.3
Welfare state models are a handy tool for social scientists to use to ex-
plain almost all social phenomena when applied to regimes in different do-
mains: e.g. the incidence of poverty and social exclusion, employment and 
unemployment, gender equality and woman-friendliness, dominance and 
privilege, birth and death, health and sickness, opinions and attitudes etcet-
era.4 The aim of this chapter is to expand the field of application and take a 
look at happiness and life-satisfaction among those 50 million or so immi-
grants that have their new homes in Europe.
The views of happiness and its importance to social research vary.5 Some 
critical analysts argue that happiness is an individually generated state of 
mind, i.e. a subjective feeling and hence not a real thing. As such, it is not a 
proper object for scientific inquiry. However, psychologists, armed with fan-
cy brain probing devices, have discovered that happiness is a specific kind of 
electric activity in the frontal part of the brain. Thus, happiness obviously is 
a real and scientifically measurable thing. From the social science point of 
view, the key question to ask pertains to the kind of phenomena that cause 
2 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
3 For a more detailed discussion on welfare state models and their characteristics, see Castles, Francis, 
Leibfried, Stephan, Lewis, Jane, Obinger, Herbert & Pierson, Christopher (eds) (2010) The Oxford 
Handbook of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
4 For overviews on the research field, see for example Leira, Arnlaug (2002) Working Parents and the 
Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Ferrarini, Tommy (2006) Families, States and 
Labour Markets. Institutions, Causes and Consequences of Family Policy in Post-War Welfare States. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Wilkinson, Richard G. & Pickett, Kate (2008) ‘Income Inequality and 
Socioeconomic Gradients in Mortality’. American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 98, No. 4, 699–704; 
Cooke, Lynn Prince (2011) Gender-Class Equality in Political Economies. New York & London: 
Routledge; Kvist, Jon, Fritzell, Johan, Hvinden, Björn & Kangas, Olli (eds) (2012) Changing Social 
Equality: The Nordic Welfare Model in the 21st Century. Bristol: Policy Press; Svallfors, Stefan (ed.) 
(2012) Contested Welfare States. Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
5 Layard, Richard (2006) Happiness. Lessons from a New Science. London: Penguin Books;  Saari, Juho 
(2012) Onnellisuuspolitiikka. Helsinki: Kalevi Sorsa Säätiö.
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those positive electric waves in the brain. As there are plenty of reasons to 
explain happiness and misery, it is little wonder that a growing plethora of 
competing explanations exist pertaining to the preconditions for a happy life.
There are also a growing number of studies on immigrants and their hap-
piness. For example, the academic journal Social Indicators Research launched 
a special issue on the subjective well-being of immigrants in Europe.6 From 
our point of view, the intriguing question deals with the extent to which, 
if any, that the level of life-satisfaction and happiness of immigrants varies 
between the five different welfare state regimes. We ask whether there are 
systematic differences between the welfare states and welfare regimes and 
how immigrants coming from different regimes evaluate their happiness in 
their new surroundings. What is the role of the prosperity of the country of 
residence? How important are other contextual factors such as income dis-
tribution and the level of social protection? What about gender differences 
between regimes? Given the discussion of the woman-friendly welfare state, 
we could for example expect that the Nordic countries, in particular, should 
contribute towards life-satisfaction among female migrants. How strongly 
do the individual characteristics of immigrants – age, gender, health, in-
come, employment status and social networks affect their life-satisfaction? 
We are also interested to know whether relationships between explanatory 
variables and happiness vary between different welfare state regimes.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section depicts a 
broader theoretical frame of reference that this study is linked to. Thereafter, 
a section on previous studies in the field is presented, which also specifies 
more detailed research tasks. This is then followed by a section dealing with 
the data and methods used. The section entitled Happy immigrants live in 
happy countries presents the main analyses and empirical findings, and the 
final section discusses the results obtained.
6 Clark, Andrew, Sauger, Nicholas & Senik, Claudia (2009) ‘Welfare, Well-Being and Immigration 
in Europe: Evidence from the European Social Survey’. Social Indicators Research, Vol. 91, No. 3, 
299–426; see also Eurostat (2011) Migrants in Europe: A Statistical Portrait of the First and Second 
Generation. Luxembourg: Eurostat; Senik, Claudia (2011) The French Unhappiness Puzzle: The 
Cultural Dimension of Happiness. Paris: Paris School of Economics.
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General starting points: Individualistic and collectivistic ap-
proaches to happiness
Happiness has made a phenomenal entry into the high chambers of scien-
tific inquiry. Soft social scientists are not the only ones to be thrilled about 
studying happiness today; hard-core economists and natural scientists are 
so as well.7 Needless to say, the search for happiness takes place in differ-
ent domains and by different methods depending on the discipline of the 
scholar.
While a psychologist would search for signs of happiness in the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex of the brain, using electroencephalogram and posi-
tron emission tomography,8 a social scientist would apply surveys and ask 
people how happy they feel. Although the approaches may seem very distant 
from each other, it has been shown that there is also a close correspond-
ence between electrical activities in the left front of the brain – indicating 
happiness – and people’s own opinion of their state of mind.9 Whereas the 
psychologist tries to trace electrical waves, the issue for the social scientist 
is to discover the societal contexts and conditions that actually cause that 
positive electrical brain activity in the first place.
The possible link between an individual’s physiological status, social po-
sition and the characteristics of the society he/she lives in has been widely 
discussed by epidemiologists, and the conclusion has been that social fac-
tors – income, employment, our position in social hierarchy, social relations, 
7 Veenhoven, Ruut (1984) Conditions of Happiness. Dortrecht: Riedel; Veenhoven, Ruut (2002) ‘Why 
Social Policy Needs Subjective Indicators’ Social Indicators Research, Vol. 58, Issue 1, 33–45; Layard, 
Richard (2006) Happiness. Lessons from a New Science. London: Penguin Books; Bok, Derek (2010) 
The Politics of Happiness – What Governments Can Learn from the New Research on Well-Being. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Saari 2012; see also the contribution by Carl Marklund in this 
volume.
8 Davidson, Richard D. (2004) ‘Wellbeing and Affective Style Neural Substrates and Bio behavioural 
Correlates’. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Vol. 359, 1395–1411.
9 Layard 2006, 11–21.
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etcetera – are of importance for our health.10 Whereas an advantageous po-
sition in society has a multiplier effect leading to better education, better 
income and health, as well as to a longer and happier life, in a disadvanta-
geous position harmful things tend to accumulate: low educational attain-
ment, low income, health problems, lower experienced happiness, and life 
expectancy that is years behind that of people in better positions in society.
Within social sciences and between political camps there are substantial 
differences in the interpretations of the social prerequisites of misery and 
happiness. With some simplification, we can distinguish two main sets of 
explanations – and a vast grey area between them – that have bearing for 
this study. First, in the individualistic perspective, happiness is deeply re-
garded as an individual phenomenon that is achieved by individuals them-
selves. As such, individual freedom is set into focus, which also dictates the 
subsequent role of the national state and sets limits for state actions. In this 
approach, which originates with the ideas of classical liberals, the state is 
seen to exercise its jurisdiction through coercion that is offensive to peo-
ple’s autonomy. For example, the government levies taxes, which cuts into 
people’s personal resources and limits their personal freedom and thus their 
possibilities to choose. Liberty begins where the state ends; liberty is only 
realizable in the private sphere, not in the area of public policy.11 In order to 
maximize liberty, and hence to trigger individual happiness, the activities 
and tasks of the state should be limited. For example, when it comes to eco-
nomic growth and prosperity, often regarded as the best determinants for 
a happy life, the most important issue is to create growth and a high Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), whereas the distribution of prosperity is second-
ary. People are happy if they live in a rich country regardless of the inequal-
10 Marmot, Michael (1996) ‘The Social Pattern of Health and Disease’. In Blane, David, Brunner, Eric & 
Wilkinson, Richard G. (eds) Health and Social Organizations. London: Routledge, 42–67; Marmot, 
Michael (2002) ‘The Influence of Income on Health: Views of an Epidemiologist’. Health Affairs, Vol. 
21, No. 1, 31–46; Kawachi, Ichiro & Kennedy, Bruce P. (2006) The Health of Nations: Why Inequality 
Is Harmful to Your Health. New York: New Press; Wilkinson, Richard G. & Pickett, Kate (2009) The 
Spirit Level. Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger. New York, Berlin & London: Blooms-
bury Press; Bachans, Mona (2011) Gender Policy and Gender Equality in Public Health Perspective. 
Stockholm: Karolinska Institutet.
11 Hayek, Friedrich (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge; Nozick, Robert (1979) 
Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.
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ity concerning how the wealth in the country is distributed. This kind of 
political attitude supposedly underpins right-wing welfare thinking and in 
particular the social policy making in the US.
The second view is more collectivistic. Here, the interpretation of human 
beings, their happiness and other conditions of living are defined contextu-
ally, in relation to the prevailing standards in the society where they live. 
In contrast to the individualist approach, the collectivist tradition also pays 
attention to distributional issues: not only is the level of prosperity impor-
tant, even more important is how evenly prosperity is distributed. Equality 
is better for everyone, as Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate Pickett argue in an 
influential book, entitled The Spirit Level.12
The overarching theme of the collectivist tradition deals with the re-
sources and possibilities society offers to its members. This idea has been 
an explicit starting point in the Nordic welfare state studies and the very 
same idea is making a new entry in the clothing of the new social invest-
ment welfare state.13 The main idea has been to measure welfare with the 
help of the resources individuals have at their disposal. For example, in the 
Swedish level of living surveys, well-being was measured on nine compo-
nents: health, employment, economic resources, knowledge and education, 
social integration, housing and neighbourhood, security of life and prop-
erty, recreation and culture as well as political resources.14 The crucial point 
deals with the extent to which people have command over resources, while 
not that much attention was paid to subjective well-being. In his compara-
tive project, Erik Allardt partially utilized the Swedish approach but shifted 
focus more towards the level of need-satisfaction described by the catch-
12 Wilkinson & Pickett 2009.
13 Allardt, Erik (1975) Att ha, att älska, att vara. Om välfärd i Norden. Lund: Argos; Allardt, Erik (1993) 
‘Having, Loving and Being: An Alternative to the Swedish Model of Welfare Research’. In Nussbaum, 
Martha & Sen, Amartya (eds) The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 88–94; Ringen, Stein 
(1987) The Possibility of Politics. Oxford: The Clarendon Press; Erikson, Robert & Uusitalo, Hannu 
(1987) ‘The Scandinavian Approach to Welfare Research’. In Erikson, Robert, Hansen Erik-Jørgen, 
Ringen, Stein & Uusitalo, Hannu (eds) The Scandinavian Model. Welfare State and Welfare Research. 
Armonk, New York & London: M.E. Sharpe, 177–193; and, more recently, Morel, Nathalie, Palme, 
Joakim & Palier, Bruno (eds) (2011) Towards A Social Investment Welfare State? Ideas, Policies and 
Challenges. Bristol: Policy Press.
14 Johansson, Sten (1970) Om levnadsnivåundersökningen. Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget; Johansson, 
Sten (1979) Mot en teori om social rapportering. Stockholm: Institutet för social forskning.    
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words having, loving and being.15 Having relates to material resources, loving 
pertains to an individual’s social relations, and being refers to self-realization 
and self-esteem.
Despite differences in emphasis, the overarching theme in the Nordic 
approach is the very wide concept of welfare which includes the quality of 
life aspect. This approach has some conceptual linkages to Amartya Sen’s 
interpretation of the capabilities of individuals to fulfil their own potential.16 
According to this brand of social philosophy, when debating welfare we al-
ways have to take into consideration the ability to function, i.e. we should be 
able to make conscious life choices that we are capable of realizing. Making 
conscious choices is a fundament for human well-being and happiness and 
the very idea dates back to Aristotle’s Ethics.17
Quite naturally, differences in the philosophical interpretation of human 
society lead to diverging views on how to measure well-being and its pre-
requisites. If everyone is the architect of his or her own fortune, there is no 
point in studying societal factors as determinants of happiness. It is enough 
to only scrutinize individual factors. At the other end of the continuum, 
attention is paid to the quality of the welfare state, the capacities and poten-
tialities that the state offers to its citizens. The grey zone between disciplines 
and philosophical orientations is huge due to the deep divide in the main 
philosophical approaches on the role of the welfare state as a facilitator or 
inhibitor of happiness among human beings.18 The aim of the next section 
is to cursorily summarize previous research in the field and take a step away 
from the high spheres of social philosophy towards the more mundane and 
concrete research questions of this chapter.
15 Allardt 1975; Allardt 1993. 
16 Sen, Amartya (1992) Inequality Re-examined. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sen, Amartya (1993) 
“Capability and Well-being’. In Nussbaum, Martha & Sen, Amartya (eds) The Quality of Life. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 30–53; Sen, Amartya (2010) The Idea of Justice. London: Penguin Books.
17 Aristotle (1955) Ethics. London: Penguin Books.
18 For a mental map of different approaches, see Saari 2012, 19.
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Previous studies and research questions
The old adage states that it is better to be healthy and wealthy than sick and 
poor. There is an undeniable common sense truth in this: in most societies 
people are happier if they are healthy and have money than if they were 
poor and in ill-health. No doubt, health is good for happiness but it has 
also been shown that positive emotions are good for health.19 Positive feel-
ings improve blood chemistry and have beneficial effects on health.20 In this 
context, the concept of social capital, despite its ambiguity, has proved to be 
useful and has lots of explanatory power to health outcomes. Linkages exist 
between physical health and social capital, which are measured as trust in 
other people (individual trust) and trust in institutions (institutional trust). 
It is strongly argued that the relationship between the individual’s health 
and trust is a causal one.21
Social capital is good for society as a whole and makes it function well 
and prosper.22 While the degree of social capital is tied to certain macro 
characteristics of the state: non-corrupt, effective, guaranteeing equality of 
possibilities etcetera.23 At the micro level, social capital also places impor-
tance on the individual’s own micro networks. As suggested by Erik Allardt, 
the term ‘loving’ reveals that the quality of social relations is of crucial im-
portance for our well-being and happiness.24 Social support gained from our 
fellows helps us to muddle through periods of low mood and misery. All this 
suggests that when analysing happiness it is important, in addition to health 
19 Danner, Deborah, Snowdon, David & Friesen, Wallace (2001) ‘Positive Emotions in Early Life and 
Longevity: Findings from the Nun Study’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 80, No 5, 
804–813.
20 Davidson, Richard D. (2000) ‘Affective Style, Psychopathology, and Resilience: Brain Mechanisms 
and Plasticity’. American Psychologist, Vol. 55, No 11, 1196–1214; Davidson 2004.
21 For a detailed discussion on the issue, see for example Hyyppä, Markku T. & Mäki, Juhani (2001) 
‘Individual-Level Relationships between Social Capital and Self-Rated Health in a Bilingual Com-
munity’. Preventive Medicine Vol. 32, Issue 2, 148–155; Kawachi, Ichiro, Subramanian, S. V. & Kim, 
Daniel (2008) Social Capital and Health. New York: Springer.
22 Putnam, Robert (1993): Making Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Putnam, 
Robert (2000): Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon 
& Schuster; Whiteley, Paul (2000) ‘Economic Growth and Social Capital’. Political Studies, Vol. 48, 
443–466.
23 Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter. The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Rothstein, Bo (2003) Sociala fällor och tillitens prob-
lem. Stockholm: SNS.
24 Allardt 1975; Allardt 1993.
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and wealth indicators, to include explanatory variables pertaining to vari-
ous social factors. In our study, we shall operate on the two forms of social 
capital (trust in people and trust in institutions) and social relations (if the 
respondent has intimate friends or not).
More specifically, in this study we will ask if the impact of bad health on 
the happiness of immigrants is the same in different welfare state regimes of 
residence. Here, the hypothesis is that in all regimes bad health has a detri-
mental effect upon happiness, but the effect may be weaker in those welfare 
states that have extensive social policy programmes to cushion the immedi-
ate detrimental economic effects of sickness.
On the basis of previous studies, we expect positive and significant link-
ages between social trust and happiness. And if it is as Bo Rothstein argues 
that just institutions matter, immigrants, regardless of their origin, should 
display high levels of trust in those types of countries that are labelled as 
just, i.e. where natives also have high levels of trust in each other and in their 
institutions.25 A contamination from the context is also hypothesized: the 
Nordic countries occupy the top positions in the non-corrupt state lists.26 
Previous studies have shown that both forms of social capital, i.e. trust in 
individuals and trust in institutions, are very high in the Nordic countries.27 
Therefore, should the contamination take place, immigrants (regardless 
their origin) in the Nordic countries will display higher levels of social capi-
tal than immigrants in the other countries.
When it comes to the impact of income upon health and happiness, there 
are two sets of explanations, absolute and relative. The first one emphasizes 
the impact of the absolute sum of money. This means that the level of GDP 
is the most important thing. Residents, be they natives or immigrants, are 
happier in wealthy countries: the richer, the happier. At the individual level, 
the absolute view states that the poor have bad health because of a lack of 
25 Rothstein 1998.
26 Transparency International. Online. Available HTTP: <http://archive.transparency.org/>
27 Scheepers, Peer, Grotenhuis, Manfred Te & Gelissen, John (2002) ‘Welfare States and Dimensions 
of Social Capital’. European Societies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 185–207; Fridberg, Torben & Kangas, Olli (2008) 
‘Social Capital’. In Ervasti, Heikki, Fridberg, Torben, Hjerm, Mikael & Ringdal, Krister (eds) Nordic 
Social Attitudes In A European Perspective. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 65–85.
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money; they do not have the same possibilities to healthy nutrition as the 
better offs. Thus, it is absolute poverty that is detrimental for health and 
ill-health in turn hollows out prerequisites for happiness. The proponents 
of the relative interpretation argue that in addition to the absolute mate-
rial conditions, there are numerous behavioural factors that are harmful to 
health, and most importantly, the suppressed position of the poor causes 
stress and other forms of psychosomatic strains, which, in a gradual manner, 
permanently weaken the health and reduce mental well-being. It is argued 
that large income differences are harmful for both health and happiness and 
the negative effects cannot be attributed to differences between the absolute 
level of wealth of the country and how wealthy the people themselves are. 
Also in very affluent societies inequality has corrosive effects.28 If this state-
ment is true, we should find happier people in countries with more equal 
income distribution.
Previous research has shown that employment is not only a source of 
income, but an important factor affecting our well-being. Beginning from 
the classical Marienthal studies, there are a vast number of studies proving 
the negative effects of unemployment.29 These effects are not only negative 
in terms of income, but also affect our self-esteem, being is strongly built on 
our status in the labour markets. We can expect to find a strong negative 
association between unemployment and happiness, regardless of the immi-
grant’s country of origin or country of residence.
As discussed in the previous section, the collectivist approach to welfare 
adheres to a large welfare state and as a rule, in this brand of thinking, the 
Nordic model is set as a bench mark and an ideal towards which all other 
countries should strive. Indeed, the goals of the modern Nordic welfare 
model reach further than the goal of alleviating poverty for the deserving 
needy. There is no doubt that the Nordic countries do try to tackle poverty 
and insure against income loss, but they also address a wider range of so-
28 Wilkinson, Richard G. & Pickett, Kate (2006) ‘Income Inequality and Population Health: A Review 
and Explanation of the Evidence’. Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 62, No. 7, 1768–1784; Wilkinson 
& Pickett 2008; Wilkinson & Pickett 2009; Kawachi & Kennedy 2006.
29 Jahoda, Marie, Lazarsfeld, Paul E. & Zeisel, Hans (2002 [1933]) Marienthal. The Sociography of an 
Unemployed Community. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
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cial inequalities.30 The goal is not only to provide people with an amount of 
money they can live off, but also to provide them with the opportunities to 
become full members of the society they are living in through their own ef-
forts, primarily in the labour market. The view echoes Amartya Sen’s ideas.
Lots of heated debate has taken place as to whether the Nordic welfare 
state is woman-friendly or not. An abundance of evidence from research, 
however, shows that this indeed is the case – the Nordic way of employment 
policies, organizing social services and other social policy programmes do 
facilitate gender equality.31 However, there are also more critical voices argu-
ing that under the equality surface, there are still substantial gender inequali-
ties and in the Nordic hemisphere women are more severely hampered by 
glass-ceilings than in the Liberal countries. Moreover, the segregation into 
male and female employment sectors is strict.32 It is not the task of this study 
to evaluate the correctness of these arguments as such. In this study we only 
want to see whether there is a linkage between immigrants’ happiness and the 
level of gender equality prevailing in the country of residence, and whether 
that linkage is positive or negative. We expect to find a positive association.
One important pre-requisite for human well-being is feeling safe and 
free from discrimination. Immigrants may be objects of discrimination and 
even open hatred from the side of the native population which, needless to 
say, will increase feelings of insecurity. These negative encounters are linked 
30 Nelson, Kenneth (2003) Fighting Poverty: Comparative Studies on Social Insurance, Means-tested 
Benefits and Income Redistribution. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Social Research.
31 Korpi, Walter (2000) ‘Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class and Patterns of Inequality in Different Types 
of Welfare States’. Social Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 127–191; Korpi, Walter, Ferrarini, Tommy & Englund, 
Stefan (2011) ‘Women’s Opportunities Under Different Family Policy Constellations: Gender, Glass 
and Inequality Tradeoffs in Western Countries Re-examined’. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for 
Social Research. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www2.sofi.su.se/~wko/docs/Korpi,Ferrarini,_En-
glund,__Paper_for_Reykjavik_Nordic_Sociology_Conferences,_August_15-17,_2012_forthcoming_
in_Social_Politics..pdf> (accessed August 2012); Leira 2002; Meager, Gabriella & Szebehely, Marta 
(2012) ‘Equality in the Social Service State: Nordic Child Care Models in Comparative Perspective’. 
In Kvist, Jon, Fritzell, Johan, Hvinden, Björn & Kangas, Olli (eds) Changing Social Equality: The 
Nordic Welfare Model in the 21st Century. Bristol: Policy Press, 89–117.
32 Mandel, Hadas & Semyenov, Moshe (2006) ‘A Welfare State Paradox: State Interventions and 
Women’s Employment Opportunities in 22 Countries’. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 111, No. 
6, 1910–1949; Mandel, Hadas & Shalev, Michael (2009) ‘How Welfare States Shape the Gender Pay 
Gap: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis’. Social Forces, Vol. 87, No. 4, 1873–1912; Datta-Gupta, 
Nabanita, Smith, Nina & Verner, Mette (2008) ‘The Impact of Nordic Countries’ Family Friendly 
Policies, Employment, Wages, and Children’. Review of the Economics of the Household, Vol. 6, No. 1, 
65–89.
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to a reduced well-being. Happy immigrants live in countries with low levels 
of discrimination.
Data and methods
The data used in this study are derived from the European Social Survey 
(ESS). Since 2002, an ESS has been carried out at two-year intervals.33 The 
latest year of observation used in this study was 2010. The size of the cross-
sectional data varies from the low 579 in Iceland (2004) to the sample size of 
3032 in Germany in 2010. As a rule, bi-annual national samples vary from 
1500 to 2000. In the individual waves, the number of immigrants in most 
countries is too low and insufficient for reliable statistical analyses. In order 
to obtain more reliable estimates, we pooled the data for different years, i.e. 
we merged data for 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. In the pooled file thus 
obtained, there are a total of 228 621 respondents from 33 countries. From 
the merged data file we excluded those countries that had less than 50 im-
migrant respondents. Also Israel and Turkey were excluded. The collapsed 
data contain 17 837 observations on immigrants in 28 countries. The small-
est sample is from Bulgaria (50 observations) and the largest one, the Swiss 
sample, contains as many as 1886 immigrants. Immigrant status is attached 
to each respondent born outside the country of residence. Since we are here 
interested in those who have moved into a country, we do not include sec-
ond or third generation immigrants in the sample.
In principle there are two indicators for subjective well-being in the ESS. 
The first one is directly targeted for measuring happiness: ‘how happy would 
you say you are?’ The respondents could express their happiness on a con-
tinuous scale that runs from 0 ‘extremely unhappy’ to 10 ‘extremely happy’. 
The ESS also contains a question relating to life satisfaction: ‘how satisfied 
are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ The response alternatives were 
analogous to the happiness question. 0 indicates extreme dissatisfaction, 
while 10 indicates the highest possible level of satisfaction with one’s life. 
We can assume that while happiness is more limited a concept and measures 
33 For a closer description, see European Social Survey. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.europe-
ansocialsurvey.org> (accessed August 2012)
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a mental state of mind, satisfaction with life comes closer to traditional wel-
fare studies and reflects more broadly the respondents’ satisfaction with the 
actual circumstances in which they are living.
Figure 1 constitutes a preamble to the subsequent, more detailed study. As 
can be seen, the Nordic countries, together with Switzerland, top the league 
when the questions on happiness or the more general dimension of life satis-
faction, are concerned. At the other end of the continuum we find – perhaps 
not that surprisingly – the Post-Socialist countries and poorer Southern Eu-
ropean countries displaying significantly lower levels of happiness. The cor-
respondence between the two variables is very high. At the individual level, 
the correlation coefficient (r) is .70**, and at the aggregate country level, it is 
as high as .98***. Correlations are almost exactly the same if we look at the 
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Figure 3. Happiness, gender, regime of birth 
and the regime of residence in Europe.
Figure 1. Happiness and life satisfaction.
Source: European Social Survey.
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Figure 1. Happiness and life satisfaction.
Source: European Social Survey.
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native population or immigrants separately. A preliminary conclusion of this 
first inspection is that happy and satisfied immigrants are found in countries 
where the natives, too, are happy and satisfied (see Figure 2).
To gain a more robust measure for subjective well-being, we merged the 
two variables and constructed an additive index ((happiness + life satisfac-
tion)/2). The new variable also varies between the low 0 (very unhappy) and 
high 10 (very happy). For the sake of simplicity we call the additive index 
‘happiness’.
As indicated above, in welfare research it is a common practice to clus-
ter countries in welfare state regimes reflecting the underpinning rationale 
and institutional characteristics in national social policy solutions. On the 
basis of this family resemblance countries of residence are here grouped into 
five welfare clusters: The Post-Socialist regime (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Ukraine); the Southern European regime (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain); the Anglo regime (Ireland and the UK); the Central European regime 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Swit-
zerland) and the Nordic cluster (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden).34
When classifying the regime of birth, a sixth regime ‘Other’ has been 
added to catch all those respondents coming from countries outside the Eu-
ropean hemisphere (also Turkey and Israel, that are included in the ESS, are 
classified as ‘others’).35 These clusters will be used, on the one hand, to evalu-
ate how happy immigrants emigrating from different welfare regimes are, 
and on the other, the regimes of residence will be used when analysing how 
explanatory factors perform in various contextual settings. The background 
characteristics of the regimes are depicted in Appendix Table A1.
Before proceeding further, a few words about the methods applied are 
warranted. When describing and discussing the construction of variables, 
we preliminarily make references to the relative importance of our key vari-
34 Iceland (a country that displays a very high level of happiness) was left out of the analysis because of 
the insufficient number of immigrant respondents.
35 Design weight is used in regression models when operating with countries, while data are weighted 
by population weight when analysing data regime-wise. For clustering countries, see Castles, Leib-
fried, Lewis, Obinger & Pierson 2010.
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ables. This importance is measured by multilevel models where we have 
included the country and the variable in question into the analyses. Ap-
plication of this kind of multilevel modelling provides us with possibilities 
to preliminarily evaluate the magnitude of the variance that the variable in 
question explains within and between countries. The coefficients are given 
in Appendix Table A2 and are occasionally discussed in the text.
Social capital is measured by two dimensions. The first dimension per-
tains to individual trust and is a combination of three separate statements: 
‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful.’ ‘Most people try to 
take advantage of you, or try to be fair.’ ‘Most of the time people are helpful 
or mostly looking out for themselves.’
Respondents could give their answers in a continuum where 0 indicated 
the lowest trust and 10 the highest. With the help of principal component 
analysis the three questions were collapsed into one dimension (analysis re-
sulted in one component) ‘personal trust’ that consists of factor loadings of 
those three questions. The second dimension ‘institutional trust’ is as well a 
combined factor of three questions on trust in the country’s parliament, trust 
in the legal system of the country and trust in the police. The scale was the 
same (0 to 10) as in previous questions, and also here factor analysis was used 
to get one indicator. The higher the value, the stronger the trust. Both factors 
perform very well. While personal trust explains 30 per cent of the within 
country and almost 10 per cent of the variation between countries, trust in 
national institutions explains more than 40 per cent of the variation in happi-
ness within a country and some 10 per cent of the between country variance 
(Appendix Table A2). Preliminarily we can conclude that trust is a very im-
portant precondition for happiness and just institutions matter.36 Indeed, the 
macro-level correlation between the non-corrupt index and trust in people 
is 0,82** and trust in national institutions as high as 0,86**. One can discuss 
whether social capital is a personal characteristic attached to an individual 
or whether it is a country level factor that should be linked to the quality of 
the state. Here we have treated social capital as an individual level variable.
36 Rothstein 1998; Rothstein 2003.
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The quality of social relations is based on a question pertaining to 
whether a respondent has a close person with whom to discuss intimate and 
personal matters. The variable is dichotomous (0 = has a close person/s; 1 
= does not have a close person/s). Respondents’ experiences on discrimina-
tion are asked dichotomously (‘Are you a member of a group discriminated 
against in this country?’). Two other subjective welfare indicators, i.e. health 
status and feeling safe were dichotomized. We recoded the health status into 
‘Bad health’, value 1 consisting of the original alternatives ‘very bad’ and 
‘bad’ and ‘fair’, whereas ‘good’ and ‘very good’ were assigned a value 0. The 
same kind of procedure was applied to feeling safe. The ESS asked whether 
the respondent feels safe when walking alone after dark in a local area. ‘Very 
unsafe’ and ‘unsafe’ responses were grouped into ‘Feeling unsafe’ (value = 1) 
and the rest got the value 0.
Unfortunately, income data in the ESS are not ideal: income is catego-
rized into 10 income groups, and in richer countries into 12. However, the 
groups do provide some possibilities to evaluate the economic position of 
the respondent. As such, the original variable is a categorical measure of a 
household’s absolute income level. As can be seen in Appendix Table A2, the 
variable is a powerful explanatory factor both when it comes to the within 
country variance (between individuals living in the same country) or to the 
variance between countries (variances explained are 18 per cent and 6 per 
cent, respectively).
By recoding the original income variable it is possible to rank households 
according to their income and to use those rankings as proxies of nationally 
organized deciles, quintiles or quartiles. Here we grouped the respondents 
into quartiles to obtain more observations in each quartile. Although the 
relative placing of the individual is of importance, the effect of the absolute 
level seems to be stronger (Appendix Table A2). However, instead of abso-
lute income levels we use quartiles in regression models, and after the indi-
vidual level factors are controlled for, we regress country dummies against 
national GDP per capita data which are an indicator of the overall level of 
prosperity of the country.
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In addition, we include a third income variable into the analyses. The 
ESS also asks the respondents to provide their own perception on their 
present income. Answers were reanalysed into a new dichotomous variable 
called ‘economic difficulties’. Value 1 was given to all those who said that 
they have difficulties in coping on their incomes, and those with no prob-
lems getting on were assigned a value 0. Preliminarily, one can already say 
that the subjective experience of economic difficulties, together with self-
evaluated health, is one of the most important explanatory factors for hap-
piness. Indeed, experiences on economic hardship explain as much as 45 
per cent of variations in happiness within countries and 10 per cent between 
countries. For the health problems, the corresponding shares of explanation 
are almost as high (Appendix Table A2).
The variables discussed above all pertain to individual level characteris-
tics and they have a close correspondence to the variables used in the Nordic 
level of living surveys. In order to take into consideration contextual factors, 
we include a number of country level variables. To complement analyses of 
the significance of monetary living conditions, GDP per capita (in Euros 
modified by Purchasing Power Parities in 2006 prices) is included. The GDP 
is used as a general measure of the prosperity of the country. As discussed 
above, it may be worthwhile to include some country-level indicators on so-
cial inequalities. Therefore, the Gini coefficient, social security spending as a 
percentage of the GDP (indicating the state involvement in guaranteeing so-
cial protection to residents),37 relative poverty rate (60 per cent poverty line) 
and Gender Inequality Index (GII) are used as contextual variables against 
which OLS-regression coefficients of country dummies are projected. If we 
are to believe Wilkinson and Pickett, a negative correlation (after control-
ling for individual level variables) between happiness and inequality can be 
expected. Correspondingly, there should be a negative linkage between the 
GII and happiness, whereas the happiness and prosperity of nations should 
37 Eurostat. Expenditure on Social Protection as % GDP. Online. Available HTTP: <http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/images/0/0f/Expenditure_on_social_protection_as_%25GDP.
PNG> (accessed August 2012)
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go hand in hand.38
In subsequent analyses, regression models are used for the total sample 
of all immigrants and regime-wise subsamples to see if there are differences 
in how the explanatory variables listed in Appendix Table A2 perform in 
different welfare state settings. From the regression model on the total im-
migrant sample we derive coefficients for each country (countries are in-
cluded into the models as dummies). Using Sweden (that many analysts re-
gard as the welfare state) as a reference, a positive regression coefficient for a 
country indicates a greater level of happiness in the country in question and 
a negative value a lower level of happiness than in Sweden when individual 
level characteristics are controlled for. Finally, the country coefficients are 
depicted against the most important country-level variables to see if there 
are connections at the macro level. We visualize interactions between hap-
piness, gender, regime of origin, regime of residence and some other key 
variables by plots from univariate linear models (LM) which are handy de-
vices to present rather complicated two and three level interactions in easily 
interpretable and understandable graphs.
Happy immigrants live in happy countries
Previous studies have shown that the level of happiness is lower among im-
migrants than native residents.39 Although there are numerous interesting 
reasons for that, the issue falls outside the scope of this study. Here we only 
take a cursory glance over the situation. In Figure 2, the levels of happiness 
are portrayed separately for immigrants and for the native population. The 
main story of the graph is that happy immigrants tend to live in countries 
with happy natives and most probably the same factors inhibit or generate 
happiness among both natives and immigrants. The overall level of happi-
38 Indicators are for the year 2006 which is in the middle of our observation period. A better strategy 
would have been to take an average for the entire observation period. However, all the indicators 
used here are rather sticky and changes in them are slow. Therefore, the choice to use the 2006 values 
instead of averages for 2002–2010 does not affect the results. Data are taken from United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). Going Beyond GDP, UNDP Proposes Human Development 
Measure of Sustainability. Online. Available HTTP: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/> (accessed August 
2012)
39 Senik 2011.
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ness is high in Denmark, Switzerland and Finland followed by Norway and 
Sweden. In these countries also the immigrants say that they are happy. Also 
Ireland and Austria, together with the Low Countries – Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands – are happy countries, but differences between 
natives and immigrants are substantial, comparatively speaking.
Table 1 gives a summary of the importance of each individual explana-
tory variable when the other variables are controlled for. The two indicators 
of social trust are statistically significant in all country-settings, as expected. 
Whereas unemployment, bad health and experienced economic problems 
are also significant regardless of the regime, the importance of the other 
variables depends on the sample of countries. For example, income quartile 
is significant in the total sample, in Post-Socialist countries and in Central 
Europe, but not significant in the other regimes. Correspondingly, while 
having no friends and experiences of discrimination are important in the 
Southern European regime, they play no major role in the Anglo regime. 
When it comes to the origin of the immigrants, those who emigrated from 
9,0
8,0
7,0
6,0
5,0
4,0
Figure 2. Happiness (combined happiness and life satisfaction) 
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Figure 2.  Happiness (combined happiness and life satisfaction) among 
natives and immigrants in Europe.
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a Post-Socialist country into some other Post-Socialist country are signifi-
cantly less happy than the non-European immigrants. Whereas Central-
European emigrants seem to be happy in another Continental country or in 
South Europe, they are not that happy if their destination happens to be the 
Anglo regime. In relation to non-European immigrants, the Anglo movers 
are happiest in a Southern European country.
Our interim conclusion so far could be that there are some regime-de-
pendent differences in the explanatory power of the whole model – as indi-
cated in the Adjuster R squared – and while some variables (health, expe-
rienced economic difficulties, unemployment and social capital) are robust 
to welfare regimes, some other variables (e.g. gender, age, income quartile, 
feeling unsafe, and regime of origin) are more context sensitive.
On average, although the level of happiness is the highest in the Nor-
dic hemisphere, the picture is much more thrilling than simply that. Table 
1 showed that immigrants coming from the same regime of origin dis-
play different levels of happiness depending on their regime of residence. 
In Figure 3 – which is a result from LM models where other variables are 
controlled for – we have visualized three-way interactions, i.e. regime of 
residence*regime of origin*gender. Based on this, some interesting regime 
and gender patterns appear. Whereas Southern European males express low 
levels of satisfaction in the Anglo countries, they are satisfied in the North, 
as are other Northeners and men from Eastern Europe. Female immigrants 
from the Nordic regime express the highest levels of happiness in the An-
glo countries, Southern European women are not that happy in the Nordic 
countries, and Eastern European and non-European female immigrants are 
happy in the South.
A number of cultural and language factors may contribute to these re-
sults. As can be seen in Appendix Table A1, while the share of non-Europe-
an immigrants is the largest in Anglo and Southern European regimes, the 
share of Nordic immigrants is the largest in the Nordic hemisphere and im-
migrants in the Post-Socialist countries tend to have moved in from another 
post-socialist country or from outside Europe. These factors may have some 
ramifications for the level of happiness among immigrants. Due to lingual 
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All countries Post Socialist South Anglo
Central 
Europe
Nordic
Constant 8,247*** 7,827*** 9,708*** 8,105*** 7,852*** 8,604***
Gender 0,096** 0,155** -0,196* 0,070 0,234*** 0,079
Age -0,038*** -0,032** -0,068*** -0,036** -0,045 -0,058**
Age squared/1000 0,402*** 0,282 0,613*** 0,494*** 0,453*** 0,658**
Economic difficulties -1,001*** -1,090*** -0,842*** -1,041*** -0,977*** -0,769***
Quartile 0,050*** 0,178*** 0,018 0,009 .139*** 0,076
Bad health -0,684*** -0,612*** -0,474*** -0,534*** -0,611*** -0,666***
Unemployed -0,402*** -0,702*** -0,288* -0,640*** -0,301*** -0,504*
No friends -0,533*** -0,777*** -0,851*** -0,205 -0,607*** -0,789***
Feeling unsafe -0,092** -0,474*** -0,058 -0,229** 0,088 -0,241
Discrimination -0,317*** -0,345*** -0,614*** -0,291** -0,248*** -0,265
Trust in people 0,306*** 0,273*** 0,221*** 0,331*** 0,270*** 0,417***
Trust in institutions 0,381*** 0,370*** 0,227*** 0,355*** 0,370*** 0,248***
Regime of origin 
(non-European = reference)
Post-socialist -0,196*** -0,340*** 0,006 -0,279 -0,029 -0,094
Southern 0,157* 0,613 0,053 -0,398* 0,158 -0,283
Anglo 0,230*** -0,263 0,787** -0,91 0,352 -0,081
Central Europe 0,208*** -0,084 0,288* -0,280* 0,277*** 0,083
Nordic 0,201** 0,614 0,215 1,111 0,176 0,038
Adj. R squared 0,305 0,302 0,222 0,258 0,247 0,228
Note: age squared was divided by 1000 in order to make coefficient visible.
Table 1.  Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients for happiness in 
different welfare state regime settings.
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resemblances, those moving within Scandinavia understand each other (the 
Finns are an exception) as do the Irish moving to Britain and vice versa. 
Many Central European movers belong to a same lingual group (French 
or German). When it comes to the impact of language, we can assume that 
the English-speaking countries are in the best position. Since English is to-
day’s lingua franca and immigrants already speak English when they enter 
the country be it Britain or Ireland, and British or Irish emigrants are also 
understood in their new country of residence as well. Many other countries, 
belonging to a group of smaller, more isolated languages, say Finland or 
Hungary, face bigger language-related problems with people moving in as 
do the Finns and Hungarians when moving out from their home countries. 
A closer analysis on the impact of language and culture falls beyond the 
scope of this study.
We can also visualize some other interactions that are concealed behind 
the regression coefficients in Table 1. In principle, we could again control 
for other variables and inspect how happiness varies when we move from 
non-unemployed to unemployed, from healthy to sick persons and from 
better-offs to those who have problems in getting on with their present in-
come. The story from all of these graphs would be more or less the same: in 
all the regimes bad conditions significantly hollow out happiness and the 
Figure 3.  Happiness, gender, regime of birth and the regime of resi-
dence in Europe.
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hollowing out effect is the biggest in the Post-Socialist regime, while the 
effect is not that steep in the Nordic countries and in the Southern Euro-
pean regimes. That kind of visualization is presented in the upper left-hand 
panel in Figure 4. Instead of presenting similar plots for economic hard-
ship and unemployment, we focus on the interaction between origin and 
health (upper right-hand panel). While there were no differences between 
the Nordic and Southern European countries when we analysed the regime 
of residence, the regime of origin inspection shows that immigrants origi-
nating from the Nordic countries have, in comparison to other immigrants, 
higher levels of happiness depending on whether they are sick or not. The 
lowest level of satisfaction and the deepest hollowing out effects are found 
in the Post-Socialist countries.
Figure 4 also contains a graphical presentation of the relationships be-
tween social capital (institutional trust in the lower left-hand panel), regime 
of origin and the regime of residence. These two graphs show how the level 
of social capital – one of the most important explanatory factors of hap-
piness – varies between various immigrant groups in different destination 
clusters. Immigrants, whatever their origin, trust in the Nordic institutions. 
It is intriguing that while the Nordic immigrants display high levels of trust 
in other people (the right-hand panel) regardless of their regime of resi-
dence, the level of the Northeners’ trust in institutions vary depending on 
the regime of residence. These results indicate that there is a kind of con-
tamination effect from ‘just’ institutions.40
Now it is time to take a look at the country level variables and try to see 
whether we can find any relationship between happiness and a number of 
macro level indicators (due to space considerations we do not graphically 
present results for all macro level inspections). Mimicking a simple two-
stage approach, the rationale in Figure 5 is that after controlling for the key 
individual level variables we can project regression coefficients for country 
dummies obtained in the first equation in Table 1, and assume that if, for 
example, the Gender Inequality Index (GII) is somehow related to female 
40 Rothstein 1998.
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happiness, that should be revealed when we regress country dummy coef-
ficients on GII, as done in the upper left-hand panel.
The correlation between GII and country coefficients is strong (-0,75** 
for women that are portrayed in the graph and -0,69** for males) and al-
though it will shrink if we omit the Post-Socialist countries, it still remains 
significant (r = -0,48). The result gives qualified support for the ideas of the 
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Figure 4. Interactions between happiness, bad health and regime of residence 
(upper left-hand panel) and regime of origin (upper right-hand panel) 
and interactions between levels of social capital (lower left-hand panel: 
trust in institutions; and lower right-hand panel: trust in people).
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woman-friendly welfare state – that also seems to make men happier.41 This 
simple inspection gives rather strong support to the ideas that some coun-
tries and clusters of countries may be more women-friendly than others.
The other correlations also run in the expected direction but they are 
substantially smaller and the relationships will be further reduced by the 
omission of the poorer countries. The correlation between social spending 
and happiness goes down from 0,38* to insignificant -0,10 if the Post-So-
cialist regime is omitted. There seems to be slight support for Wilkinson’s 
and Pickett’s kind of arguments. The lower right-hand panel depicts the re-
lationship between income inequality and happiness (r = -.59**) but this re-
lationship is also sensitive to the inclusion or omission of the Post-Socialist 
countries. While the correlation coefficients between happiness and relative 
income poverty are -0,39* for the total sample and -0,22 for West Europe, 
the measure of material deprivation, i.e. an index constructed by Eurostat 
to measure the lack of necessities, yields a much higher coefficient in all 
samples (r = -0,69** for all countries and -0,52* for the richer countries, the 
pictures of poverty are not displayed here).
The correlation between country coefficients and GDP per capita is 
modest but nevertheless it gives qualified support for the ‘absolutist’ views 
– there is a tendency that happiness and national wealth are linked to each 
other. The results were fortified in multilevel analyses. GDP per capita and 
material deprivation appeared to be mutually exclusive in regression models. 
If material deprivation and GDP were simultaneously included in the mod-
els, the material deprivation variable became significant and down-played 
the importance of GDP (sig. = ,259). However, if the deprivation index was 
omitted, GDP got significance (sig. = ,002) as well as non-corrupt state (sig. 
= ,000), gender inequality (sig. = ,000) and social security spending (,039). 
It is important to pinpoint that at the national level all the variables used 
here are linked to each other: countries that spend much on social security 
display low levels of poverty, income inequality and inequalities between 
genders. Consequently, they are the least corrupt states and all these features 
are important macro-level ingredients for a happy life.
41 Cf. Bachans 2011.
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Figure 5.  Unstandardized coefficients for country dummies (individual 
level characteristics controlled for) depicted against some 
country level characteristics.
Figure 5. Unstandardized coecients for country dummies (individual level characteristics 
controlled for) depicted against some country level characteristics.
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Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to analyse happiness among immigrants living 
in the European hemisphere. We used the basic ideological underpinnings 
of the Nordic welfare state as its platform. The goal of social policy making 
in Scandinavia has been to offer residents a wide set of possibilities to master 
their own lives. The idea has links to Amartya Sen’s philosophical thinking 
on capabilities. Everyone has to be offered a wide set of capabilities in order 
to be able to more or less fully participate in the life of the surrounding 
society. In the Nordic level of living studies, capabilities have been in the 
disguise of resources that individuals can command to master their lives. 
The idea has been that if there are sufficient resources they will produce high 
levels of material well-being which in turn produce satisfaction and hap-
piness. Having, loving and being are at high levels in the Nordic countries.
Thus, whereas the state in the Nordic discourse has been seen as a facili-
tator for a good and happy life, in liberal Hayek-inspired thinking the state 
is often regarded as a malevolent and alien force, depriving the individual 
of freedom and hence, circumscribing individual happiness. In this brand 
of thinking, distributional issues are not seen as being that important. The 
most important thing is to increase the level of material welfare, which is 
also the best guarantee for happiness. In the collectivist tradition, much em-
phasis is laid on relative differences, and huge relative differences are seen as 
being harmful not only to the worst-offs but to everyone.
Our humble results perhaps point more to the collectivist tradition: the 
happiest and most satisfied immigrants were found in countries with large and 
efficient welfare states and, comparatively speaking, small income and other 
social differences. Such social conditions create institutional settings that gen-
erate and fortify trust or social capital, if you like.   However, there was a strong 
indication that the absolute income level is important as well, and the impact, 
no doubt, is the strongest among those who are living in economic scarcity. In 
addition to experienced economic problems, bad health and unemployment 
appeared to be associated with lower levels of happiness. But the strength of 
that negative association varied between welfare state regimes. Also the im-
portance of other explanatory variables was to some extent context-bound.
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Earlier studies have shown that the most important determinant of hap-
piness and a good life is the degree of social capital the individuals have. 
That is very much true for immigrants, too. Those who have high levels of 
social capital display high levels of happiness as well. This perhaps is not 
that novel a finding. The novelty in our study is in the inspection of vari-
ous interactions between the backgrounds of immigrants and their country 
and welfare regimes of residence. For example, when it comes to the Nordic 
emigrants, i.e. those who have emigrated from their own country, they seem 
to have a higher level of social capital, and hence, they seem to be happier 
than emigrants/immigrants from other regimes. Furthermore, the Nordic 
immigrants tend to maintain their trust in people wherever they reside, but 
their level of trust in institutions changes depending on their country of 
residence. Correspondingly, those immigrants moving to the Nordic coun-
tries display higher levels of institutional trust and higher levels of happiness 
than immigrants in other regimes – something that hints towards a con-
tamination effect from just and trustworthy institutions. Happy immigrants 
live in happy countries.
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Post-Socialist South Europe Anglo Central Europe Nordic
Happiness (mean / st.dev*.) 5,50/2,28 7,06/1,82 7,22/1,77 6,98/1,96 7,68/1,76
Individual characteristics
Gender; share of women (%) 58,8 50,6 52,5 53,4 54,0
Age (mean / st.dev.) 51,8/18,1 38,3/14,1 44,2/17,4 43,8/16,6 46,3/17,4
Economic difficulties (%) 64,6 38,9 21,7 26,9 16,0
Unemployed (%) 4,5 13,3 5,5 8,8 6,8
Bad health (%) 69,0 26,1 23,3 35,1 26,7
No intimate friend (%) 15,3 10,1 9,8 9,9 10,0
Feeling unsafe (%) 48,2 20,7 33,5 25,8 19,3
Discrimination (%) 11,4 20,2 16,3 17,2 15,3
Trust in persons (mean / st.dev.) -0,45/1,1 -,23/0,9 -0,14/0,9 -0,03/0,9 0,48/0,9
Trust in national institutions (mean / st.dev.) -0,88/1,0 0,01/0,9 0,11/0,9 0,97/0,9 0,42/0,9
Regime of origin (%)
Non-European (%) 46,9 69,1 67,7 53,0 49,7
Post-socialist (%) 49,1 12,8 7,5 20,9 12,6
South Europe (%) 0,1 3,2 4,2 12,4 1,6
Anglo (%) 0,1 2,6 10,3 1,7 2,7
Central Europe (%) 3,8 11,7 9,4 11,5 8,3
Nordic (%) 0,1 0,7 0,9 0,5 25,1
Country level data
Gini coefficient / st.dev. 37,8/5,02 33,0/2,21 33,82/0,75 29,8/2,84 25,0/2,57
Poverty (%) / st.dev 19,3/6,2 18,2/1,2 17,8/1,5 13,8/1,4 12,0/0,9
GDP per capita (2006) /st.dev. 11750/4212 27259/2853 35118/667 33739/3758 38580/5590
Gender Inequality Index / st.dev. 0,31/0,05 0,13/0,01 0,20/0,01 0,09/0,02 0,07/0,01
Social spending (% of GDP) / st.dev. 15,0/4,2 22,9/2,1 22,9/3,7 27,7/3,1 27,4/3,2
Non-corrupt state index/st.dev. 5,0/1,7 5,9/1,0 8,1/0,6 8,3/0,6 9,2/0,3
* standard deviation;  Gender Inequality Index (GII) is a composite measure reflecting equality achievements between genders in 
three dimensions: health, empowerment and labour market. The higher the value the larger the gender disparity. World-wide the 
GII values vary from the low 0,05 in Sweden to 0,7 in Sierra Leone. The non-corrupt state index varies from 10 = very clean to 0 = 
highly corrupt. In 2006 the world-wide variation was from the high 9,6 in Finland to the low 1,6 in Chad. 
APPENDIX 1
Table A1.  
Summary characteristics of immigrants in different welfare state regimes.
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Variable
Variance explained 
within countries
Variance explained 
between  countries
Gender 0,0 0,1
Age 3,5 0,3
Economic difficulties 44,9 10,0
Income (quartile) 10,4 5,1
Income (absolute) 17,6 6,1
Bad health 39,3 9,9
Unemployed 0,1 1,8
No intimate friend 6,8 2,6
Feeling unsafe 13,5 1,4
Discrimination 0,3 1,4
Trust in people 30,1 7,8
Trust in national institutions 43,9 9,3
Regime of origin 11,0 0,6
Table A2.  
Within country and between country variance explained by individual 
explanatory variables; multilevel model including the country and the 
variable in question (in per cent).
pekka sulkunen & trygve ugland
168
Public health and solidarity 
– How to succeed in the population-based 
prevention of alcohol problems
pekka sulkunen & trygve ugland
Introduction
Traditional welfare state research has aimed to explain levels and distribu-
tions of objective well-being in terms of services and equality policies. Even 
recent interest in subjective indicators of well-being by economists such as 
Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi have looked at them 
from the perspective of risks posed by structural, external factors.1 Much 
less attention has been paid to a second type of risk, namely that produced 
directly by consumption. We can call this internal risk.2 Our own desires 
and choices are threats against which we must protect ourselves. The facts 
are well known. In developed countries, the five most important causes of 
the total health burden are tobacco, blood pressure, alcohol, cholesterol and 
overweight, all related to lifestyle. Across the whole world, including the 
developing countries, the most important factors are otherwise the same but 
include underweight, unsafe sex, and unsafe water; in other words indica-
1 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Sen, Amartya & Fitoussi, Jean-Paul (2009) Report by the Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Paris: Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress.
2 Sulkunen, Pekka (2011) ‘Autonomy Against Intimacy: On the Problem of Governing Lifestyle-Relat-
ed Risks’. Telos, Vol. 156, 99–112.
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tors of extreme inequality of resources appear at the top of the list.3 These 
risks, too, are the making of human societies, not of nature itself.
Once we observe this, we also observe how poor the track record of 
health and welfare policy is in this area. This incapacity is a recent phe-
nomenon. History is full of examples of society successfully controlling the 
consumption and desires of individuals, including sexuality, media culture, 
food, drugs, and alcohol. Alcohol control has in fact had been one of the 
first areas of social policy exercised by the emerging nation states in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Severe measures, including prohi-
bitions, individual rationing systems, state monopolies, high taxes to keep 
prices up, restrictions on selling hours, and outlets have been used through-
out the industrialized world.
In the individualized modern society today, such measures are incom-
patible with the dominant principles of justification of the social order, 
which include the freedom of consumers to follow their preferences, and 
the freedom of the market to satisfy them. Total prohibitions or controls 
targeted at problem users or specific risk groups – on the basis of particu-
laristic criteria such as ethnicity, gender, or class – would be experienced as 
violations of equity norms and requirements of self-responsibility.
Alcohol policy has a history of evolution from rigorous state-imposed 
controls towards increasing freedom of the market and the consumer in 
most industrialized countries since the turn of the twentieth century. This 
evolution has been accompanied by increasing consumption and by grow-
ing rates of harm to health and society. A balance between freedom and 
harm has been sought by different means, for example trying to modify be-
haviour towards less risky drinking patterns, but most of the attempts have 
either failed or been experienced as excessively normative and biased to fa-
vour the dominant middle class (male) culture.
3 World Health Organization (WHO) (2002) World Health Report. Geneva: World Health Orga-
nization; Babor, T. F., Caetano, R., Casswell, S., Edwards, G., Giesbrecht, N., Graham, K., Grube, 
J., Gruenewald, P., Hill, L., Holder, H., Homel, R., Osterberg, E., Rehm, J., Room, R. & Rossow, I. 
(2003) Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity – Research and Public Policy. Oxford and London: Oxford 
University Press.
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The Total Consumption Model
The Total Consumption Model (TCM) has been a solution that satisfies both 
sides of the balance, at least in theory. According to this model, even moder-
ate drinkers influence the prevalence of alcohol problems in any population, 
because they are the vast majority, and problems like accidents, petty crime 
and violence sometimes occur in relatively controlled drinking occasions. 
But even chronic health problems typically associated with long-term heavy 
drinking co-vary with moderate consumption. It is very difficult to reduce 
heavy use without also affecting moderate drinking, as the distribution of 
alcohol use has been observed to be very stable across populations and over 
time. The model recommends universal preventive measures to regulate the 
average consumption, such as price increases and availability restrictions, 
instead of measures directed at persons at high risk. Such measures increase 
the cost of alcohol in terms of time and money, but leave the choice to the 
consumers, and equally to all consumer groups.
This model has served as a leading policy doctrine among experts in the 
area of public health and alcohol for several decades. It has been the guide-
line of the European Alcohol Action Plans since 1993, and it has been vali-
dated and elaborated on several occasions since it was introduced almost 40 
years ago.4 However, its implementation in actual policy-making has been 
rare. Business interests, the difficulty of justifying restrictive availability and 
tax measures, and the low esteem of public health interests in comparison 
to economic and fiscal interests, have been obstacles to its implementation.
The differences in how countries utilize and implement the findings of 
the TCM can partially be explained as depending on the temperance history 
and drinking patterns of the country in question. Although all the Nordic 
countries have had similar drinking patterns, strong temperance move-
ments, and severely state-regulated alcohol markets, only Sweden, and to 
some extent Norway, have applied the TCM for any significant period of 
time. This chapter will show that there are also positive preconditions, em-
4 Bruun, Kettil, Edwards, Griffith, Lumio, Martti, Mäkelä, Klaus, Pan, Lynn, Popham, Robert E., 
Room, Robin, Schmidt, Wolfgang, Skog, Ole-Jørgen, Sulkunen, Pekka & Österberg, Esa (1975) 
Alcohol Control Policies in a Public Health Perspective. Helsinki: The Finnish Foundation for Alcohol 
Studies.
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bedded in the TCM itself, for its application in actual policy. They are less 
connected to alcohol-related harm, drinking cultures and even to temper-
ance traditions than to the mode of governance. The model presupposes a 
policy-maker governing a delimited population, individual consumer au-
tonomy, and a strong link between expertise and health policy.
This chapter will analyse four cases, comparing France with three Nor-
dic countries, Finland, Norway and Sweden, where attempts to frame alco-
hol policy as a restriction of total consumption in a population have been 
successful, at least for a while; more so in Sweden and France than in the 
other two cases. Two factors are likely to explain this: early medicalization 
of the alcohol problem, and a strong appeal to social solidarity by advocates 
of this policy. The more research-based applications of the model in Norway 
and Finland, by comparison, have not gained strong popular support, but 
for opposite reasons. In Norway, the temperance tradition has continued 
in almost all political parties and been associated with nationalism as the 
country has otherwise been integrated to the global world. Technocratic ep-
idemiological arguments were not very much needed. In Finland, the tem-
perance movement had become incapacitated as a stake-holder in alcohol 
policy at the moment when the public health argument was most needed.
The analysis of Norway, Sweden and Finland presented in this chapter 
is based on several studies already published. The French case is based on 
our original research, including press material, official documents and per-
sonal interviews of key participants in the policy process. This research has 
never before been published, and therefore it is offered here to the reader in 
greater detail than the Nordic cases.
Background: Alcohol policy and the temperance issue
With regard to alcoholic beverages, the TCM implies political restrictions 
on the free market and consumer choice. Therefore it would seem natural 
to assume that temperance history and the strong presence of socialist po-
litical parties would explain its implementation in some countries, whereas 
countries with less prominent anti-alcohol traditions and dominant market-
liberal political attitudes would be less inclined to accept it as the alcohol 
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policy guideline. The cultural traditions of alcohol use, the political role of 
women, the Protestant religion and the dominance of the rural population 
are all related to the temperance history of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Therefore, one would assume that these factors should 
also be relevant determinants of whether the TCM will gain popular ac-
ceptance or not.5
At a closer look, however, the relationships between these background 
factors and alcohol policy are very complex. In countries where the socialist 
working-class parties carried the anti-alcohol flag until the first decades of 
the twentieth century, the alcohol policy regimes remained more restrictive 
of the market and consumer freedom than in countries where the socialist 
platform dismissed the alcohol issue early on. This holds, for example, for 
comparisons between Belgium and Germany or France, between Scotland 
and England, and between the other Nordic countries and Denmark, the 
second of these pairs of comparison having been more liberal in their alco-
hol policy regimes than the first, in which the socialist parties maintained 
the alcohol issue on their agendas longer. However, in the period after the 
Second World War, when alcohol regimes gradually became liberalized in 
the Nordic countries, the alcohol issue became politicized along the left-
right dimension only for a very short period of time; and again inconsist-
ently, in the 1970s. Then socialist parties accepted stronger state regulations 
than liberal or conservative parties, which labelled TCM-oriented alcohol 
policy as a ‘socialist plot’, for example in Finland.6 
Temperance history is related to Protestantism in an interesting way. 
Anglo-American Protestant movements associated with Calvinism (Meth-
odism, Baptism) are especially critical of drinking, which partly explains 
why the strongly Lutheran Denmark has had a less alcohol-critical policy 
5 Johansson, Lennart (2000) ‘Sources of the Nordic Solutions’. In Sulkunen, Pekka, Sutton, Caroline, 
Tigerstedt, Christoffer & Warpenius, Katariina (eds) Broken Spirits: Power and Ideas in Nordic Alco-
hol Control. Helsinki: Nordic Council for Alcohol and Drug Research (NAD), 17–43.  
6 Anttila, Anu-Hanna & Sulkunen, Pekka (2001) ‘The Inflammable Alcohol Issue: Alcohol Policy 
Argumentation in the Programs of Political Parties in Finland, Norway and Sweden from the 1960s 
to the 1990s’. Contemporary Drug Problems, Vol. 28, 49–86. 
public health and solidarity 
173
tradition than Sweden and Norway.7 In the post-war decades the rural dry 
option was adopted mostly in regions where these churches have been 
prominent.8 Yet many examples can be given of countries where religion 
does not seem to play a role, such as Catholic Poland with a relatively strong 
temperance tradition, and – for this chapter most relevant – the Catholic but 
officially non-religious state of France, where the TCM has played an impor-
tant role. France is also a case in point concerning women’s political roles, as 
they gained voting rights in national elections only in 1945.
As to the prominence of the rural population, the early temperance 
movements that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century repre-
sented the avant-garde of modern ideals of individual autonomy gradually 
became conservative rural traditionalists9. In most Western countries, anti-
alcohol attitudes have therefore become associated with moral conserva-
tism. Again, however, the post-war alcohol policy history is contradictory. 
For example, in Finland the rural population was larger than in the other 
Nordic countries, yet alcohol policy liberalization was more radical than in 
Sweden or Norway. In Norway, on the other hand, earlier dry rural areas had 
started to strive for off-licenses and restaurants for competitive reasons.10
Drinking patterns are even less consistently related to the implementa-
tion of the TCM than religion, politics, women’s political rights or the size 
of the rural population. Finland, with a high rate of arrests for drunkenness, 
and the UK with a high rate of binge drinking, are examples where restric-
tive alcohol policies could be expected to appear, compared to milder drink-
ing patterns in Sweden or France. Instead, both the UK and Finland have 
been reluctant to adopt the TCM and the market regulations that it implies, 
compared to Sweden and France.
7 Eriksen, Sidsel (1993) ‘Drunken Danes and Sober Swedes? Religious Revivalism and the Temper-
ance Movements as Keys to Danish and Swedish Folk Cultures’. In Stråth, Bo (ed.) Language and the 
Construction of Class Identities. The Struggle for Discursive Power in Social Organisation: Scandinavia 
and Germany after 1800. Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, 55–94.
8 Johansson 2000; Andersen, Jan (2000) ‘Municipalities Between the State and the People’. In 
Sulkunen, Pekka, Sutton, Caroline, Tigerstedt, Christoffer & Warpenius, Katariina (eds) Broken 
Spirits: Power and Ideas in Nordic Alcohol Control. Helsinki: Nordic Council for Alcohol and Drug 
Research (NAD), 183–197.
9 Sulkunen, Pekka & Warpenius, Katariina (2000) ‘Reforming the Self and the Other: The Temperance 
Movement and the Duality of Modern Subjectivity’. Critical Public Health, Vol. 10, No. 4, 423–438. 
10 Andersen 2000.
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Overall, the match between the usual background factors of temperance 
history and the application of the TCM is poor. In an earlier article we have 
shown one reason for this.11 The emergence of the TCM as an alcohol policy 
guideline was not at all an offspring of temperance politics; it was an anti-
dote to its moralistic undertones and normativity. In the mind of its early 
developer, Professor Kettil Bruun, TCM-based alcohol policy increases the 
cost of alcohol in time and money to the consumers but leaves it up to them 
to make decisions on their consumption, given the known risks to health, 
wealth and welfare. Policy was to avoid individual discrimination and other 
moral stands, and to treat all individuals in the same way, neutrally.
To get a better view of the preconditions for successful applications of 
the TCM we need to take a look at the kind of policy approach it represents 
in the field of lifestyle-related risk prevention.
Biopolitics and the pastoral welfare state 
The total consumption framework was invented in France by the demogra-
pher Sully Ledermann in the 1950s. The context was the extraordinary loss 
of male lives in and between the two world wars. He argued that the biggest 
factor of the high mortality rate was not war but the very high consumption 
of alcohol in France.  Ledermann proposed that the distribution of alcohol 
consumption is skewed and has a relatively constant form. Therefore, when 
the average consumption rate in a population increases, also the number 
and consumption level of problem drinkers, and consequently the preva-
lence of drinking problems, will increase even more. Therefore, the objec-
tive of alcohol policy should be to regulate the total consumption of a popu-
lation, by means of taxation, by regulating opening hours and by controlling 
the network of outlets for alcoholic beverages.
Ledermann’s work was almost forgotten for over a decade, but it was 
rediscovered by Canadian researchers in the 1960s, and later in other coun-
11 Sulkunen, Pekka & Warsell, Leena (2012) ‘Universalism Against Particularism. Kettil Bruun and the 
Ideological Background of the Total Consumption Model’. Nordic Studies On Alcohol And Drugs, 
Vol. 29, 217–232.
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tries.12 The Nordic countries became involved in this research for immedi-
ate policy reasons. Alcohol consumption was increasing and health care and 
alcoholism treatment systems were unprepared for the mounting problems 
and costs incurred to the public. The approach found its way back to France 
in the late 1980s in the context of the Évin Law (passed in 1990). The Euro-
pean Regional Office of the World Health Organization in Copenhagen be-
came instrumental in diffusing the message to policy makers across Europe.
The population argument is a continuation of a long historical develop-
ment in which the life of the population became the object of state power 
in modern societies. As Michel Foucault has argued, the modern process 
shifts the emphasis of power to the size of the population, its health, hygiene, 
sexuality and mental fitness, instead of disciplining deviant or rebellious in-
dividuals.13 Increasingly also civilized manners and ways of thinking were 
conceived as products of good government. The populations of national so-
cieties were not only the objects of national states; they were also the source 
of the states’ sovereignty. The people, le peuple, das Volk, folket, kansa, was 
thought to act on itself through the institutions of parliamentary politics 
that were expected to reflect not only the people’s needs but also its common 
will. Nation states are societies with geographic boundaries, independent 
political institutions, a more or less shared culture – and a population.
Ideologically the TCM represents the type of governance that Michel 
Foucault has described with the metaphor ‘pastoral power’.14 Pastoral 
authority, the shepherd, knows the herd and its needs, leads it from one 
meadow to another, and cares for the lost sheep. It is an inclusive and uni-
versalistic form of power that assumes a high degree of solidarity among 
the members of the flock. These metaphors perfectly describe the welfare 
state until the last third of the twentieth century because they stress that the 
function of social policy was, besides the well-being of the population, the 
12 de Lint, Jan & Schmidt, Wolfgang (1971) ‘Consumption Averages and Alcoholism Prevalence: 
A Brief Review of Epidemiological Investigations’. British Journal of Addiction, Vol. 66, 97–107; 
Popham, Robert (1970) ‘Indirect Methods of Alcoholism Prevalence Estimation: A Critical Evalua-
tion’. In Popham, Robert (ed.) Alcohol and Alcoholism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
13 Foucault, Michel (1976) Histoire de la sexualité 1. La volonté de savoir. Paris: Gallimard; Foucault, 
Michel (1991) ‘Governmentality’. In Burchell, Graham, Gordon, Colin & Miller, Peter (eds) The 
Foucault Effect. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 87–104.
14 Foucault 1991, 87–104.
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consolidation of social order by treating all citizens in the same way. In the 
welfare state literature this is called the universality principle.
To succeed, such an approach cares for the population while leaving it to 
individuals themselves to weigh their pleasures against the risks. However, 
two further conditions must be met. First, there must be a centralized state 
that represents the generalized interest of the population in terms of the 
commonly accepted good, in this case the health, well-being and security 
of the population, instead of only particular interests or values of particular 
groups. This centralized power must draw its legitimacy from the will of the 
people, expressed through parliamentary elections. Second, it must be based 
on transparent scientific evidence to prove that it works, and it must have 
measurable objectives to demonstrate that it attains the goals set for it. The 
second requirement implies that the TCM is justified on the basis of expert 
knowledge. No one individual, from his or her own experience, can judge 
whether price increases actually have an impact on alcohol-related harm 
rates in the population, even if personal evidence on individuals’ reactions 
is available to everyone. This must be demonstrated with statistical knowl-
edge. Even less can individuals observe from their own experience how the 
consumption-harm relation can be expected to react when policy measures 
are implemented. This requires expert knowledge about the regularities of 
the consumption distribution, risk functions and methods of aggregating 
the burden of harm, not only in one population but across several popula-
tions in time and place. In the next two sub-sections we shall examine how 
these preconditions were met, first in the three Nordic countries Norway, 
Sweden and Finland, and then in France.
The Nordic cases
The total consumption model landed in a fertile soil in the Nordic coun-
tries with their state alcohol monopolies, not only because of the increasing 
alcohol-related problems but also for general ideological reasons related to 
the societal context. The Nordic welfare states were in the process of con-
solidation, albeit Finland was somewhat behind the others. Welfare states, 
especially in the Nordic context, were national projects that continued the 
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nation-building process of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.15
Nordic alcohol policy in the mid-twentieth century was a prime example 
of the gradual shift from discipline to concerns about the health and welfare 
of the population.16 Rigorous state control of drinking by the state has been 
relaxed in three waves. The first occurred in the 1950s and can be called the 
civilizing wave, with increasing consumption levels and a gradually liberal-
izing availability policy. The second was the wave of welfare state liberalism, 
and the total consumption approach became part of that approach in the 
1970s and 1980s. The increasing availability of alcohol from both off- and 
on-premise outlets was frozen in all countries, and although political con-
cern was expressed about rising alcohol problems, otherwise the policy re-
actions varied between them. The third occurred as a consequence of the 
evolving new consumer society in the ‘crazy decade’ of the 1980s, when 
non-socialist coalition governments were in power, the monetary market 
was liberalized, public services were outsourced and credit-based consump-
tion boomed.17 Also alcohol markets were liberalized, and this turn became 
a challenge to the total consumption approach. On-premise availability 
increased drastically. Moreover, the state-owned off-licences (monopoly 
stores in effect) increased in number and were modernized, wine columns 
started to appear in the printed media, beer societies were founded, and all 
three countries faced the need to adjust their alcohol policy systems in light 
of European Union (EU) rules. However, each country reacted differently in 
terms of implementing this new policy.18
The dominant idea of the first wave of liberalization was that since prohi-
bitions did not work, drinking behaviour should be civilized and controlled 
by individuals themselves autonomously. The civilizing discourse was lib-
15 Sulkunen, Pekka (2009) The Saturated Society. Governing Lifestyles and Risks in Consumer Culture. 
London: Sage, ch. 4.
16 Mäkelä, Klaus & Viikari, Matti (1977) ‘Notes on Alcohol and the State’. Acta Sociologica, Vol. 20, 
155–179.
17 Mjøset, Lars (2011) ‘Nordic Political Economy after Financial Deregulation: Banking Crises, Eco-
nomic Experts and the Role of Neoliberalism’. In Mjøset, Lars (ed) The Nordic Varieties of Capitalism. 
Bingley: Emerald Books, 365–420.
18 Sulkunen, Pekka (2000) ‘The Liberal Arguments’. In Sulkunen, Pekka, Sutton, Caroline, Tigerstedt, 
Christoffer & Warpenius, Katariina (eds) Broken Spirits: Power and Ideas in Nordic Alcohol Control. 
Helsinki: NAD-Publication, 72–90.
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eral in the sense that it purported to replace the polarity of drinking versus 
abstinence by more nuanced images of alcohol use, borrowed from Euro-
pean, especially French bourgeois culture. To achieve this, alcoholic bever-
ages should be allowed in the legal market, but under supervision by state 
monopolies and other government control agencies. The main motivation 
of the policy was the fear of the drunken worker.19 The viina, renat or bren-
nevin (distilled white grain spirits) was the drink of intoxication, revolt and 
uproar as well as the cause of social misery, especially grave on the family 
and its welfare that depended on the man’s reliability and sense of respon-
sibility (skötsamhet in Swedish). It was believed that if working-men would 
drink wine instead of spirits, the drinking pattern and the sociability around 
it would also become tamed according to the self-controlling bourgeois 
model. The monopolies gave advice on the proper way of serving drinks, 
informed the customers about the origins and characteristics of different 
‘wine cultures’ and favoured ‘mild’ beverages in their pricing policies.
Consequently, availability restrictions were gradually lifted in the Nordic 
countries, which culminated in the licensed sale of medium beer in grocery 
stores in Sweden and Finland in 1966 and 1969 respectively. Furthermore, 
age limits for buying alcoholic beverages were lowered in all three Nordic 
countries. This reinforced the increasing long-term trend in alcohol con-
sumption that could be observed throughout the Western world. This trend 
was widely believed to be a natural consequence of modernization that al-
cohol policy could not prevent without perverse effects.20
In the Nordic countries serving regulations, selling practices and the in-
dividual controls exercised over problem drinkers were selective and unfair 
towards the working class, the rural population and women.21 The second 
wave of liberalization of the 1970s in Nordic alcohol policy incorporated 
19 Peltonen, Matti (1991) ‘Kieli vai kulttuuri? Väittely suomalaisesta viinapäästä keväällä 1948’. Alko-
holipolitiikka, Vol. 56, 8–25.
20 Sulkunen, Pekka (1983) ‘Alcohol Consumption and the Transformation of Living Conditions. A 
Comparative Study’. In Smart, Reginald G. (ed.) Research Advances in Alcohol and Drug Problems, 
Vol. 7. London: Plenum Publishing Corporation, 247–297; Sulkunen, Sutton, Tigerstedt & Warpe-
nius 2000.
21 Järvinen, Margareta (1991) ‘Kontrollerade kontrollörer – Kvinnor, män och alkohol’. Nordisk alko-
holtidskrift, Vol. 8, 143–152; Peltonen 1991.
public health and solidarity 
179
the total consumption approach as a reaction to such biases but also as a 
continuation of the civilizing policy. Although the TCM reacted against the 
rising overall consumption level and its harmful consequences (and was 
therefore a backlash movement as regards market and consumer freedom), 
it was ideologically liberal as it reacted against the discriminating and ineq-
uitable methods of the civilizing policy that still carried strong disciplinary 
overtones. It stressed solidarity and the need to sacrifice part of the consum-
ers’ freedom and convenience even among moderate drinkers for the benefit 
of the public good.
In contrast, the third wave of liberalization of Nordic alcohol policy from 
the early 1980s onwards emphasizes the romantic ethos of individual differ-
ence and happiness. It gives priority to individuals’ desires over social needs. 
It became dominant later, when restrictions of the marketplace were again 
relaxed and a series of price and tax cuts began.
Sweden
The start of the first liberal wave in Sweden culminated in the discontinua-
tion of the Bratt system in 1955. Paradoxically, this was considered a victory 
for the conservative temperance movement, which considered the system of 
personal monthly quotas to be a permissive alternative to total prohibition, 
and felt that the referendum of 1922 was a defeat for their cause.22 The Bratt 
system, even after its repeal, continued to have the support of the alcohol 
liberals, arguing that the personal allowance was, from the point of view of 
educating the Swedish people, much better than the personal control that 
replaced it, with blacklists, checks at purchase and other individual con-
trols.23
For the temperance folk, the repeal of the Bratt system was a double-
edged sword. The consumption level increased rapidly, and a substantial tax 
increase was implemented as a counter-measure in 1957. Already at this 
point the Swedish temperance movement saw the reduction of total con-
22 Bruun, Kettil (1985) ‘Maktens centrum – centraladministrationen’. In Bruun, Kettil & Frånberg, Per 
(eds) Den svenska supen. En historia om brännvin, Bratt och byråkrati. Stockholm: Prisma, 74–114.
23 Sulkunen 2000, 74.
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sumption as the best policy line,24 and still in the wake of new liberalization 
measures the argument was that ‘misusers are recruited from among mod-
erate consumers – therefore zero consumption is best’.25 Although divisions 
between conservative and more lenient wings of the temperance lobby – 
those close to the labour unions and students – were tense, the common 
ground was firm: less is better.
The last move of the first liberal wave in Nordic alcohol policy was again 
led by Sweden with its medium beer reform of 1965. Allowing medium-
strength beer to be sold outside the monopoly in ordinary grocery stores 
was of course a controversial idea, but the justifications used to support it 
were strongly consensual. The civilizing alcohol policy that aimed to achieve 
a society without alcohol-related harm was felt to be discriminating against 
the working class, rural people, women, youth and minorities. The number 
of blacklisted people went up to 20 000, and however neutral the selection 
mechanisms appeared on the surface, the actual sales practices in the mo-
nopoly were not. On the eve of the reform, a media storm was raised by 
the Torvald Nilsson case. He was a construction worker who wanted to 
buy seven bottles of vodka in working clothes. He was given two bottles of 
wine. The next day he dressed up in a jacket, white shirt and a tie: no ques-
tions were asked about his vodka bottles. The justification of the reform was 
unanimously solidarity and equality first, reducing alcohol-related harm 
second.26
A number of adverse consequences followed, notably an increase in the 
consumption level. The government appointed an expert committee, whose 
report was an amalgam of the continued civilizing harm-reductionism (‘de-
glorifying alcohol’) and a set of proposals to keep consumption low.27 Al-
though in this sense it was a backlash against the first wave of liberalization, 
the ideological principles of justification remained liberal and within the 
24 Tigerstedt, Christoffer (2000) ‘Discipline and Public Health’. In Sulkunen, Pekka, Sutton, Caroline, 
Tigerstedt, Christoffer & Warpenius, Katariina (eds) Broken Spirits: Power and Ideas in Nordic Alco-
hol Control. Helsinki: Nordic Council for Alcohol and Drug Research (NAD), 135–152.
25 Sulkunen 2000, 74.
26 Sulkunen 2000, 76.
27 SOU 1974:92. Alkoholpolitik: betänkande. Stockholm: Liber Förlag/Allmänna förlaget.
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pastoral regime of power. It employed measures of inclusion and solidarity 
that aimed at the whole population, not bad individuals.28 From 1977 rules 
tightened for sales hours and alcohol serving in theatres and concerts, the 
number of monopoly shops was frozen, the medium-beer was repealed, and 
an advertising ban on alcoholic beverages was passed.
From 1980 onwards expert reports commissioned by the government 
declared the TCM as the official doctrine, repeated in later reports and pre-
liminary work for legislation:29 ‘The total consumption model needs to be 
theoretically developed and completed as a foundation for a comprehensive 
alcohol policy. The principal goal is to reduce total consumption’.30 Like in 
Norway, the argument relied on both universalism and solidarity. Govern-
ment reports in 1991 insisted that alcohol-related harm affect not only alco-
holics but ‘all of us’. The question is about caring for our fellow citizens, and 
the more Swedish people drink, the more harm will be caused to the whole 
society. Even the contagion argument proposed by researchers was used:31 If 
moderate drinkers increase their consumption, the excessive users will find 
themselves in more situations where alcohol is used and therefore increase 
their consumption.32 In contrast to the earlier doctrine dominant in socialist 
discourse, attributing alcohol problems to bad social conditions – the so-
called symptom theory that saw drinking-related misery only as a side effect 
of poverty and dissatisfaction – the causal connection was now made clear:
That the alcohol question should be placed within a social context 
does not mean that it is just an expression for dissatisfying social 
conditions. Alcohol plays therewith an independent role in creat-
28 Tigerstedt 2000, 104.
29 Samordningsorganet för alkoholfrågor (SAMO) (1980) Om alkoholpolitiken. Förslag från Samord-
ningsorganet för alkoholfrågor. Stockholm: Liber Förlag/Allmänna förlaget; Sutton, Caroline (1998) 
Swedish Alcohol Discourse. Constructions of a Social Problem. Uppsala: Studia Sociologica Upsalien-
sia, 45, 100.
30 SOU 1994:24. Svensk alkoholpolitik – en strategi för framtiden. Stockholm: Fritzes; quoted in Tiger-
stedt 2000, 105.
31 Sulkunen, Pekka (1976) ‘Drinking Patterns and the Level of Alcohol Consumption: An International 
Overview’. In Gibbins, Robert J., Israel, Yedy, Kalant, Harold, Popham, Robert E., Schmidt, Wolfgang 
& Smart, Reginald G. (eds) Research Advances in Alcohol and Drug Problems, Vol. 3. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons; Skog, Ole-Jørgen (1985) ‘The Collectivity of Drinking Cultures: A Theory of the 
Distribution of Alcohol Consumption’. British Journal of Addiction, Vol. 81, Issue 3, 83–99.
32 Sutton 1998, 104–119.
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ing and exacerbating problems. Heavy consumption of alcohol is far 
from always a symptom of poor social integration.33
Two factors concerning the actors in the Swedish case deserve special 
attention. First, the alcohol monopoly Systembolaget itself very prominently 
promoted the TCM. From about 1988 onwards it published several bro-
chures for its customers on the importance of public retail monopoly and 
availability restrictions. One of them was titled: Why Must We Suffer for the 
Sake of a Few Alcoholics, and Seventeen Other Questions. One of these ar-
gued in a straightforward manner: ‘The more alcohol that is sold, the more 
Swedish people lose…’.34
The man behind this policy was Systembolaget’s Director General (1982–
1999) Gabriel Romanus, a liberal (Folkpartiet) Member of Parliament, 
former Minister of Social Affairs, and an ardent supporter of restrictive al-
cohol policy, also internationally well-known in this role. The Liberal Party 
in Sweden has traditionally been the most active in temperance politics, and 
the fact that its representative was chosen to serve in the key position in the 
alcohol control system is a strong indication of the national concern about 
alcohol as a social and health problem.  One reason why the principal com-
mercial outlet for alcoholic beverages could take such a position against its 
own business interests was that Systembolaget only controlled retail sales, 
not wholesale or production. Its control policy position was a reaction to the 
liberal trend against state monopolies: it underlined the special and prob-
lematic nature of alcohol as a consumer item, and thus the importance of 
public control over its distribution.
The second factor that helped Sweden to adopt and maintain a strong 
adherence to the TCM was the role of researchers. The state commissions 
of 1974, 1980 and 1994 were manned not only by medical scientists but by 
epidemiologists, sociologists, a criminologist, and academic researchers of 
social work and social policy.35 Evidence for the TCM itself cannot be ob-
33 SAMO 1980, 10, 29; quoted in Sutton 1998, 105.
34 Sutton 1998, 105.
35 Sutton 1998, 112–113.
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served without statistical studies, and to be convincing, aggregate informa-
tion of alcohol’s harm and cost to the whole society is necessary.
The tenacity of the Swedish policy is further stressed by the fact that both 
Social Democrats and Conservative Governments have supported it, and 
therefore the Swedish alcohol policy has had strong parliamentary support. 
Even the third wave of alcohol policy liberalism, with radical romantic over-
tones stressing consumers’ freedom and ‘modernization’ since the mid-1980s 
did not succeed in shattering the state-control of the market that the TCM 
implies.36 The Swedish adjustment of alcohol regulations to comply with EU 
rules occasioned by the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement from 
1994, and full EU membership from 1995 was conservative, minimizing the 
necessary changes despite challenges against the monopoly system.37
Norway
Norwegian alcohol researchers were among the first in the world to redis-
cover ‘the Ledermann curve’. As early as 1972 elements of the TCM were 
introduced in a governmental report and it has had a dominant role in pub-
lic policy documents ever since.38 However, it is widely believed that the 
model had little impact on actual policies, only the justification changed.39 
In a governmental report from 1987, Norwegian alcohol policy is justified 
in the following way:
We know progressively more about the harmful health and social ef-
fects of alcohol – not only for the heavy consumers, but for each and 
every consumer and for the society as a whole. We should therefore 
much more than before direct the attention towards the collective 
consequences viewed from a public health perspective.40
36 Sulkunen 2000, 84–85.
37 Ugland, Trygve (2000) ‘European Integration and the Corrupting Gaps of the Systems’. In Sulkunen, 
Pekka, Sutton, Caroline, Tigerstedt, Christoffer & Warpenius, Katariina (eds) Broken Spirits: Power 
and Ideas in Nordic Alcohol Control. Helsinki: Nordic Council for Alcohol and Drug Research 
(NAD), 185–198. 
38 Hauge, Ragnar (1998) Norsk alkohollovgivning gjennom 1000 år. Oslo: Rusmiddelsdirektoratet, 
238–239.
39 Hauge 1998, 239.
40 Our translation. Sosialdepartementet [Ministry of Social Affairs] (1987) Stortingsmelding nr 17 
(1987–1987) Alkohol og folkehelse. Oslo: Sosialdepartementet, 5–6.
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One influential view is that Norwegian alcohol policy has always been 
based on the principle of solidarity even before the TCM was introduced, 
because of the strong presence of the temperance movement.41
In contrast to Finland and Sweden, Norway had a kind of civilizing wine 
policy in place already during the ‘prohibition’ that only involved spirits and 
fortified wine. To illustrate the more pragmatic attitude towards beer and 
table wine, the state alcohol monopoly – Vinmonopolet – was established 
by a parliamentary decision in 1922, in the midst of the prohibition period 
between 1919 and 1926.
However, the same concern about alcohol problems that was felt in 
Finland and Sweden during the second backlash wave of liberalism, led to 
an advertising ban in 1975. On the other hand, no major response to the 
rising consumer culture during the third wave of liberalization occurred, 
until tax reforms and the adjustments to EU legislation in connection with 
Norway’s adoption of the EEA Agreement in 1994. However, these changes 
aroused little political fervour. The negotiations between Norway and the 
EU concerning the retail monopoly were cautious on both sides; to question 
Vinmonoplet’s role as protector of public health and social welfare would 
have issued negative signals to an already EU-sceptic population that was 
thinking in terms of national sovereignty and self-determination versus EU 
domination.42
The widely accepted interpretation of researchers is that Norwegian al-
cohol policy has been strongly influenced by the nationalistic temperance 
movement and its presence across the political spectrum, the exception 
being the utmost neo-liberal right within Høyre and the populist Frem-
skrittspartiet.43 The expert doctrine represented by the TCM has however 
been, albeit strongly supported by the research community, far less impor-
tant than in Sweden as a guideline in actual policy-making. Also, the liber-
alization that took place in Norway was gradual rather than abrupt like in 
41 Brofoss, Knut (1996) ‘Alkoholpolitikken i Norge’. In Pedersen, Willy & Waal, Helge (eds) Rusmidler 
og veivalg. Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 34–38.
42 Ugland 2000, 129.
43 Hauge, Ragnar (1986) Alkoholpolitikken i Norge. Oslo: Statens Edruskapsdirektorat; Hauge 1998; 
Tigerstedt 2000, 105; Sulkunen 2000, 86.
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Sweden and Finland. This incremental logic is illustrated by the fact that, 
despite numerous amendments, the Alcohol Act of 1927, which was estab-
lished immediately after prohibition, remained in effect until 1989, when a 
new comprehensive Alcohol Act was adopted.
Finland
Finnish researchers started to work on the TCM as a reaction to an alcohol 
policy crisis created by the first, civilizing wave of alcohol policy liberali-
zation.44 Following Sweden’s example, medium beer was released from the 
state monopoly to grocery stores in 1969. In addition, rural municipalities 
were allowed to have restaurants and monopoly stores in their area (with 
the consent of the local council), public drunkenness was decriminalized, 
advertising rules were relaxed and some other minor reforms were imple-
mented. The consequent rise in the consumption level, from a little over two 
to almost six litres of 100 per cent alcohol per capita within a few years sur-
prised everyone. Beer gradually became a national drink, instead of vodka; 
wine consumption stayed at a low level, but unruly behaviour in the streets 
increased, arrests for drunkenness did not go down and many other harm 
indicators showed alarming trends.
The response among the research community was to turn to the TCM. 
With some trouble the management of the monopoly, as well as the minis-
tries controlling it, were convinced of the need to control the total consump-
tion; the number of outlets was frozen, price increases (moderate) were 
implemented, the advertising ban was introduced in 1975, and in general, 
attitudes towards alcohol liberalism became more critical. About 70 rural 
communities withdrew their consent to sell medium beer in their area.45
A new state committee was commissioned to make a long-term plan, 
led by Heikki Koski, Director General of the monopoly, Alko.46 This com-
mittee was the only one in Finland who explicitly drew on the TCM as the 
theoretical guideline for its proposals. They included price increases, lower-
44 Sulkunen & Warsell 2012.
45 Sulkunen 2000, 84.
46 Alkoholikomitea [Alcohol Committee] (1978) Alkoholikomitean mietintö. Helsinki: Valtion paina-
tuskeskus.
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ing the alcohol content of beers (there were three classes: ‘mild’ beer below 
2.25 per cent vol., medium beer below 4.7 per cent, and strong up to 5.2 per 
cent), maintaining the ban on advertising, freezing the number of outlets 
and some other minor measures. None of these were implemented – the 
third wave of alcohol liberalism was already setting in, together with the turf 
of deregulating the credit market and the consequent consumption boom.47 
The alcohol policy climate was increasingly opposed to regulation, starting 
from the media and gradually turning into popular opinion and also policy.
The opinion favouring the release of wine from the monopoly went up 
from a quarter to two thirds 1984–1996, the consumption level went up 
from 7.9 to 9.5 litres in 1985–1990, the number of fully-licensed bars and 
restaurants went up from 1585 to 4274 in 1980–1997, monopoly shops were 
modernized, and advertising was reintroduced in 1995.48 The EU nego-
tiations resulted in a drastic reorganization of the monopoly, which now 
retained only its retail functions, separated from production, imports and 
wholesale. Medium beer was allowed in kiosks and service stations, at sports 
occasions, regulations on serving alcohol as well as selling hours were re-
laxed. The sale of ‘wine’ from factory outlets was allowed.49 Many of these 
changes in excess of the legal EU requirements were made directly in the 
parliament, without preparatory work, in a spirit of revolutionary freedom 
following the victorious referendum to join the EU, which for supporters 
meant modernization, cosmopolitism, and a final blow to Russo-friendly 
foreign policy. After these events, the TCM has hardly been mentioned in 
governmental policy programmes.
Comparison between Sweden, Norway and Finland
The overall picture is that alcohol policy changes in Norway have been 
gradual and perhaps even less politicized than in Sweden and Finland. Swe-
den has experimented with reforms both ways, Finland going consistently 
47 Vartiainen, Juhana (2011) ‘The Finnish Model of Economic and Social Policy – From Cold War 
Primitive Accumulation to Generational Conflicts’. In Mjøset, Lars (ed.) The Nordic Varieties of 
Capitalism. Bingley: Emerald Books, 53–88.
48 Sulkunen 2000, 87.
49 Ugland 2000.
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towards a free market. The TCM has been and still is an important policy 
guideline in Sweden but relevant only in Finnish and Norwegian alcohol 
research, not in policy.
Two related factors seem to explain the differences. First, the role of 
the temperance movement   had almost disappeared in Finland at the mo-
ment when the welfare-state based TCM was introduced. The movement 
was incorporated into political parties and lost autonomy as a stake-holder 
in specific alcohol policy issues. It took more than 10 years before the re-
maining bodies of temperance organizations realised that the TCM might 
serve their cause, but then it was too late. This is important, because the 
Finnish power structure is very dominated by corporatist bodies rather than 
the parliamentary institutions. The employers, labour unions, the Finnish 
Bank, together with the sitting government, have played decisive roles in 
economic and social policy. In contrast, lifestyle policies in general have not 
had a strong stake-holder structure at the national level. Issues around alco-
hol policy have either been subsumed to other policy concerns such as state 
finances, western orientation in foreign policy, and other fragmented policy 
interests such as the media and sports on advertising and sponsoring; de-
centralized production, imports and wholesale interests; and the food retail 
structure based on two major chains covering over 80 per cent of the total 
turnover. The alcohol monopoly has lost its role as a central national actor 
and the research expertise it once had at its disposal in the policy field has 
been removed and decentralized.
The contrast with Norway is interesting. Whereas in Finland, the public 
health lobby in the alcohol issue was weakest when it was most needed in 
the middle of ‘the crazy 1980s’, the temperance movement has remained an 
active stake-holder role in Norway within the party structure itself. Weak 
majority coalitions, even minority governments during a long period of 
1986–1997 were unwilling to rock the boat, especially as the alcohol policy 
issue was closely connected with the EU membership question that divided 
all major parties.50 Thus there has been less need for using the TCM as a 
50 Mjøset, Lars & Cappelen, Ådne (2011) ‘The Integration of the Norwegian Oil Economy into the 
World Economy’. In Mjøset, Lars (ed.) The Nordic Varieties of Capitalism. Bingley: Emerald Books.
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policy guideline to support the restrictions to the overall mild liberaliza-
tion trend domestically. The increasing number of outlets, especially in rural 
areas, has resulted from local competitive interests, not from political deci-
sions at the national level. However, the Norwegian temperance movement 
is still very active in its promotion of the TCM internationally. For instance, 
the Norwegian Policy Network on Alcohol and Drugs (ACTIS) – which re-
placed the Norwegian Temperance Alliance (Avholdsfolkets Landsråd) when 
it was dissolved in 2003 – has maintained a permanent lobby office in Brus-
sels since 1995, due to the strong impacts of the EU integration process on 
Norwegian alcohol policies.51
Sweden, therefore, is the only Nordic country where the TCM has actu-
ally served significant policy goals. Two factors stand out as explanations 
for this. First, the temperance movement, also spread across the political 
spectrum, has maintained its stake-holder role at national level politics. 
Secondly, the alcohol policy debate has remained in parliamentary hands 
at the national level, infused with independent expert knowledge through 
the political state committees that actually participate in the formulation 
of policy. An important feature of this expertise is that it has largely been 
represented by the medical, epidemiological and social science community 
in the policy-making bodies and activities. For example, in the 1980s about 
every third medical doctor signed a petition to re-introduce the rationing 
system in order to reduce alcohol-related harm and keep the consumption 
level in control.52
The French case
If the TCM has been difficult to implement in the Nordic countries with 
strong temperance traditions, unruly drinking patterns, and a centralized 
welfare state exercising pastoral power over the population, it might be even 
less likely that a country like France with a much longer history of daily 
alcohol consumption, an immense alcohol and serving industry and an in-
51 Ugland, Trygve (2011) Alcohol on the European Union’s Political Agenda: Getting Off the Policy Roller-
Coaster? Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Alcohol and Drug Research.
52 Tigerstedt 2000, 98–99.
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dividualistic, state-sceptic culture, would adopt such an approach to care for 
the well-being of its citizens. In circumstances where the availability of alco-
hol is very high and it is present everywhere, it might be expected to be very 
difficult to demonstrate that policy can have an impact on consumption, 
and, even more difficult to convince consumers that it can reduce harm.
Nevertheless, in September 2001 the French Minister for Health, Ber-
nard Kouchner, presented a new alcohol action plan, based on the idea that 
a reduction in the total consumption of alcohol is required if alcohol-related 
problems should be minimized. This policy document was not unique. It 
reflects and redefines a long public health tradition in the French alcohol 
policy arena. As is well known, the epidemiological basis of the total con-
sumption framework was originally laid in France in the 1950s in the work 
of the epidemiologist and demographer, Sully Ledermann.53 Since then, it 
has repeatedly been floated as the policy argument in alcohol control ef-
forts, disappearing occasionally only to surface again. Minister Kouchner’s 
policy paper continues the legislation pressed through the parliament in 
1989–1991 by Claude Évin, then Minister for Social affairs. The so-called 
Loi Évin, the Évin Law, marked the most radical restrictive reform in alcohol 
and tobacco policy in Western Europe in the second half of the twentieth 
century, aiming at a quasi-total prohibition of advertisement and sponsor-
ing, and introducing serious cuts in the availability of these products, espe-
cially for young people. The law created an enormous public debate in the 
media from the preliminary stages of the legislative process until the evalua-
tion report of 1999, which declared that the law was a legal failure and needs 
to be rewritten completely.54 Still the law continues to be implemented, with 
possibly reinforcing effects on a development in which alcohol consumption 
has been declining and awareness of alcohol-related risks increasing for over 
a half-century.
53 Ledermann, Sully (1956) Alcool, alcoolisme, alcoolisation. Institut national d’études démographiques. 
Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
54 Commission nationale d’évaluation (1999) Evaluation de la Loi Évin. Paris: Commission nationale 
d’évaluation.
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The historical background
Although still amongst the leading alcohol consumers in the world, the 
level of consumption by the French has declined since the 1950s. This was 
also the period when the first initiatives to control the consumption were 
taken at the political level. During his short period as Prime Minister (June 
1954–February 1955), Pierre Mendès-France introduced more than 20 de-
crees and proposals related to the objective of reducing the production and 
consumption of alcohol in the French society. For instance, his government 
proposed new restrictions in relation to the bouilleur de cru system, a set 
of fiscal measures to encourage production of sugar instead of alcohol, and 
regulations to favour milk in relation to wine. A government bill to rein-
state a ban on the advertising of pastis and whisky was presented to the 
Parliament, as was a proposal to ban the sale of aperitifs between five and 10 
o’clock in the morning.55
Perhaps most important in the long run, Mendès-France established 
the High Committee for the Study and Information on Alcoholism (Haut 
Comité d’Etudes et d’Information sur l’Alcoolisme) with Robert Debré as its 
president in 1955. This committee was an agency of the Prime Minister, and 
its main tasks were to provide information on alcohol-related problems, to 
fund research and to provide initiatives in order to reduce alcohol abuse in 
society.
All in all, the Mendès-France actions represented a comprehensive ap-
proach towards the fight against alcoholism in France. Although most of 
his proposals were defeated, the attention concerning alcohol related prob-
lems was raised, and this attention was institutionalized through the High 
Committee for the Study and Information on Alcoholism. Public aware-
ness about the risks related to alcohol use increased and has ever since been 
an important factor in the historical decline in alcohol consumption in 
France.56
55 Prestwich, Patricia E. (1988) Drink and the Politics of Social Reform: Antialcoholism in France Since 
1870. Palo Alto, CA: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship.
56 Sulkunen, Pekka (1989) ‘Drinking in France 1965–1979. An Analysis of Household Consumption 
Data’. British Journal of Addiction, Vol. 84, No. 1, 61–72; Aigrain, Pierre, Boulet, Daniel, Lambert, 
Jean L. & Laporte, Jean P. (1991) La consummation du vin en France en 1990. Montpellier: INRA.
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Despite these initiatives, the public health interest in relation to alcohol 
did not manage to make a consistent and continuous impact in the French 
society, as the economic and market interests seemed to dominate the arena 
during the next decade. However, the public health interests never disap-
peared completely, and their balance with commercial and economic inter-
ests has been unstable. The Minister for Social affairs, Maurice Schumann, 
expressed his opinion on the subject in 1968, when he claimed that ‘alcohol-
ism is the worst and most poorly fought of all our social diseases [fléaux]’. 
Legislation allowing random breath testing in traffic in the early 1970s was 
the most important – and probably effective – consequence of this concern.57
The public health point of view became more visible again during the 
1980s. On request from President Giscard d’Estaing, Professor Jean Bernard 
presented a new report on alcohol prevention, education and treatment in 
1980. Since a total ban on alcohol advertising at that time was not a viable 
option, the legislation that was proposed merely intended to regulate alco-
hol advertising in a manner that had already been implemented on tobacco 
a few years earlier.
The Évin Law
Law no. 91–32 of 10 January 1991 is the official name of what has become 
known as the Évin Law. Its objective is to reduce the harm related to tobacco 
and alcohol in society. The Évin Law focuses on advertising and sponsoring, 
education, as well as the supply side in relation to tobacco and alcohol prod-
ucts. Its background documentation refers explicitly to the need to reduce 
alcohol consumption among the whole population.
The law has been in effect since 1 January 1993. It prohibits direct or in-
direct advertising of alcoholic drinks on television and cinema, in stadiums, 
public and private sports grounds, swimming pools, competition arenas and 
all areas used by youth associations or for education. Advertising was au-
thorized in the original law on radio only within certain specified time slots, 
on billboards or notices only in zones of production. Advertising is permit-
57 Prestwich 1988.
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ted, however, within sales outlets and in the press, except for publications 
aimed at young people.
The content of the advertising messages is strictly limited to product 
information concerning the alcohol content, origin, the categorization (de-
nomination), ingredients, the name and address of the producer, the agents 
and distributors, modalities of merchandizing (packaging etcetera), and the 
manner in which it is supposed to be consumed (mode de consommation).58 
Specifically, the permitted announcements must not include any encour-
agement to minors. It is forbidden to give, distribute or send documents or 
objects naming an alcoholic drink to those under age. Lastly, advertisements 
for alcoholic drinks must include a health warning stating that alcohol abuse 
is dangerous to health.
A specific aim of the legislation was to avoid the possibilities of indirect 
advertising that had been extensively used under previous legal restrictions. 
Sponsoring involving advertisements for tobacco and alcohol products was 
completely banned, which violated serious interests in mass media sports, 
especially soccer and Formula 1 racing, but was felt necessary because of the 
widespread use of indirect advertisement before.
In the controversy, the alcohol lobby argued that tobacco and alcohol 
should not be combined in the same law since the nature of the problem is 
completely different in the two cases. The wine lobby attempted to exclude 
French quality wines (appellation d’origine controlée – AOC) from the law.59 
The negotiations that ensued introduced a number of compromises and 
minor amendments in the law that later proved fatal to its intent. Also, a 
number of issues were to be ruled by the ministry later on by decrees, which 
also proved to be a problem for the implementation of the law. The advertis-
ing industry announced that the limits of the law would be pushed as far as 
the letter would allow as regards the content of the regulations.60
58 Haut Comité d’études et d’information sur l’alcoolisme (1990) Actualités, No. 3–4.
59 Sénat. Compte rendu official, No. 60, 12 October (1990). Assemblée Nationale. Seconde session ordi-
naire de 1989–1990 (92e séance). Compte rendu integral, 2867.
60 Bureau de Vérification de la Publicité. 16 April 1992.
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The campaign
From the point of view of this chapter, the process that led to the adoption 
of the law was even more interesting than the outcome. The initiative came 
from five prestigious professors of medicine, Gérard Dubois, Claude Got, 
François Grémy, Albert Hirsch and Maurice Tubiana. Their campaign was 
carefully planned, and the outcome has been presented as the first lobby vic-
tory within the public health sector in France.61 
The background of their initiative can be traced back to 1984, when the 
High Committee for the Study and Information on Alcoholism presented a 
proposal for a ban on the advertising of alcoholic drinks directed towards 
adolescents. However, possible restrictions on alcohol advertising were 
challenged by the new media situation. As a response to pressure from the 
new commercial television channels, the restrictions of beer advertising 
were relaxed in 1985 and again in 1986. Then Prime Minister Jacques Chi-
rac announced that although alcohol advertising could be banned in public 
television by an administrative decision, a ban in the commercial TV chan-
nels would require a new law.62 In 1987, this initiative was formalized in a 
new law (Loi no 87–588 30 July 1987), often referred to as the Loi Barzach 
after the then Minister for Health, Michèle Barzach, herself a medical doctor 
by training. This law banned alcohol advertising on TV for the first time in 
France, but made an exception for beer.
Because beer advertising was still allowed, the five professors were not 
content with this law, arguing that the ‘dangerousness of alcohol does not 
depend on the amount of water that surrounds it’. Professors Dubois and 
Got were at that time members of the High Committee for the Study and In-
formation on Alcoholism. Claude Got left the High Committee as a protest, 
which received considerable attention in the media. Together with Grémy, 
Hirsch and Tubiana they decided to launch a campaign to get a new and 
more restrictive law on alcohol advertising. The medical professional socie-
ties, the deans of medical faculties and important personalities among the 
medical professions including some Nobel Prize winners joined in to make 
61 Personal interview with Gérard Dubois on 12 October 1992.
62 Personal interview with Laurence Nart (Direction générale de la santé) on 9 October 1992.
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it known to the Minister for Health that alcohol is still the number one public 
health problem in France.63 This was done in the form of a petition that also 
included a subscription to collect money for paid advertising on the issue.64
When Claude Got was commissioned to prepare a new policy paper on 
the prevention of AIDS in 1988, he decided with his close colleagues to also 
address public health issues that were regarded as even more important, 
namely traffic accidents, smoking and alcoholism.65 The process towards the 
Évin Law picked up speed in 1989, when the five professors were commis-
sioned to prepare a white paper on these three issues by the Minister for 
Social affairs, Claude Évin. In this paper, they raised the need for firmer ac-
tions in order to reduce the harm resulting from alcohol consumption. Their 
proposal for the new legislation included a wide range of public health is-
sues: screening for certain cancers, reducing the number of traffic fatalities, 
and excessive use of psychotropic drugs, which is high in France.
The Minister for Social Affairs accepted the proposals from the five pro-
fessors on tobacco and alcohol, and decided to present a new law before the 
Parliament in May 1990. The new law was presented using the procedure 
of urgency. After a very intensive debate on alcohol – the legislation con-
cerning tobacco was less controversial – the law was passed by the National 
Assembly on 27 June 1990, and with some modifications by the Senate on 
16 October the same year. The Senate, however, excluded the restrictions on 
alcohol advertising. The revised text then went back both to the National 
Assembly and the Senate, where the final text was adopted in December 
1990 and became law in January 1991. In the Assembly, the Socialist Party 
voted in corpore for the legislation presented by the socialist minister, but 
in the Senate the socialists were first opposed. The communists were against 
the legislation throughout the process, whereas the bourgeois parties were 
divided. Despite the amendments that were adopted in this process, the final 
legislation was for the most part in line with the proposal of the five profes-
sors.
63 Personal interview with G. Dubois on 12 October 1992. Active support was given by the internation-
ally reknown and prestigious professor of haematology and cancerology Jean Bernard, Member of 
the Academie de France and Academie des sciences. Le Monde, 18 April 1990.
64 Personal interview with G. Dubois, 12 October 1992.
65 Personal interview with Claude Got on 29 October 1992.
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An important part of the campaign was an article bearing the title ‘No 
to a ministry of disease!’ that appeared in Le Monde the day after the white 
paper was published.66 The authors claimed that ‘the government should not 
hesitate in implementing a public health policy, and not delay measures that 
have a general interest and the support from the majority of the population 
and of the politicians’. The media approach was combined with active lob-
bying in the political arena. An opinion poll commissioned in 1989 by the 
Catholic newspaper La Croix l’Événement that opened their columns to the 
campaign showed that 69 percent of the population supported a ban on to-
bacco advertising, and 61 per cent supported a ban on alcohol advertising.67
The total consumption framework was central in the argumentation of 
the five professors, and a number of references were made to the work of 
Ledermann in the background material, as well as in the document pre-
pared by the Ministry of Social Affairs to introduce the legislation to the 
public.68 The universalism of the population argument was an important 
part of the campaign. The restrictions on advertising and availability that 
they proposed in the name of the public good concern everyone in the same 
way. It is important that especially the media to which all are exposed re-
gardless of their will should be free of advertising. A further aspect of the 
universalism is the solidarity argument involved. The professors published 
a second article just before the bill was presented to the Assembly, writing 
that:
The 100 million premature deaths caused by alcohol and tobacco are 
not randomly distributed. The life expectancy of a manual worker at 
the age of 35 is eight years less than his male counterpart belonging 
to the upper middle class. These inequalities are largely explained by 
the superior capacity to manage alcohol- and tobacco-related risks 
66 Dubois, Gérard, Got, Claude, Hirsch, Albert, Grémy, François & Tubiana, Maurice (1989) ‘Non au 
Ministere de la Maladie!’. Le Monde, 15 Nov.
67 Dubois, Gérard, Got, Claude, Grémy, François, Hirsch, Albert & Tubiana, Maurice (1990) ‘L’état est 
en retard sur l’opinion’. La Croix l’Événement. 10 Jan.
68 Ministère de la Santé et de la Protection sociale [Ministry of Social Affairs] (1989) L’action politique 
dans le domaine de la santé publique et de la prévention. Propositions de Gérard Dubois, Claude Got, 
François Grémy, Albert Hirsch et Maurice Tubiana. Paris: Ministère de la Santé et de la Protection 
sociale.
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by social groups that are in a favourable familial and educational en-
vironment.69
In their public articles, the professors employed the rhetorical format 
of the pending narrative, placing themselves on the side of the public good 
against the threatening private interests. The scene is set, the characters of 
the plot are positioned, the task of the protagonist is defined, but the solu-
tion of the story is pending70 – and depending on the support of the public: 
the readers.71 However, they also wanted to get around the political elite, 
resorting to the classical method of French intellectual movements since the 
Dreyfus Affair – the petition:72
The group prepared, we had an idea, and since we had the support 
of the Nobelists etc., we said, yes, let’s make a petition to the people: 
destroy the politicians! The politicians are intermediaries, elected by 
the people. When you turn directly to the people, you ignore the 
politicians, which is for them the most disagreeable thing. So we 
made an appeal to people in Le Monde asking them to subscribe and 
to send us money.73 
The new and strange aspect of this self-definition is not that intellectuals 
represent themselves as vanguards of the people; what is striking is that this 
time the vanguards did not come from the margins of intellectual life – the 
literary circles and the artists, but from what according to Pierrre Bourdieu’s 
analysis is the most legitimate centre of the intellectual field.74
But the margins were against. A group of social workers who were at the 
time in the process of establishing their own national network of ‘alcoolo-
69 Dubois, Gérard, Got, Claude, Hirsch, Albert, Grémy, François & Tubiana, Maurice (1990) ‘Un hon-
neur pour notre démocratie’. Le Monde, 29 Mar.
70 A pending narrative is a semiotic structure where the setting of the story is ready, with threats, 
objectives, and heroes, but the narrative does not unfold to the end, as if the solution would depend 
on the support of the audience. Pending narratives are typically used in persuasive texts such as 
editorials.
71 Sulkunen, Pekka & Törrönen, Jukka (1997) ‘The Production of Values: The Concept of Modality in 
Textual Discourse Analysis’. Semiotica, Vol. 113, Issue 1/2, 43–69.
72 Ory, Pascal & Sirinelli, Jean-François (1986) Les intellectuels en France de l’Affaire Dreyfus à nos jours. 
Paris: Armand Colin.
73 Personal interview with G. Dubois on 9 October 1992.
74 Bourdieu, Pierre (1986) Homo Academicus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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gists’ as a counterbalance to the medically dominated and temperance-affili-
ated treatment community, decided to rally with the industry and the media 
that opposed the law.75 They considered the initiative to be hypocritical, and 
argued that it was paternalistic to attack the advertising and availability of 
alcohol, while the real issues of poverty, exclusion and education were not 
addressed. The working class and ordinary people should be educated and 
given the opportunity to appreciate wine and to avoid the risks of alcohol-
ism.76 The group calls itself Alcoologie plurielle and publishes a review bear-
ing that name. The review and other activities of the group are supported 
financially by the French distilling industry, but it is also significant that 
the ‘pluralism’ of the group contrasts with the traditional medically-oriented 
French anti-alcoholism movement Association Nationale de Prévention de 
l’Alcoolisme (ANPA) and its commitment to total abstinence in treatment. 
Alcoologie plurielle collaborates closely with ex-drinkers’ associations but 
is in favour or moderation rather than abstinence. The group argued that 
the Évin Law is scape-goating the producers, the advertising industry and 
the drinkers, and is not based on firm evidence on the impact advertising 
has on drinking problems; rather, it represents neo-prohibitionism. Instead, 
alcohol advertising should be taxed to support treatment institutions and 
self-help organizations. Emphasis should be placed on regional rather than 
national structures and institutions.77
In sum, the Évin Law was a victory for the public health lobby over the 
alcohol and advertising industries, and France has adopted the most restric-
tive legislation on alcohol advertising in the EU. Like the beverage laws that 
were adopted by the Mendès-France government (Code de Boissons), the 
public health interests had won a more or less unexpected victory. The cam-
paign fought by the five professors of medicine was crucial in this process, 
infused with references to the values of the modern welfare state: universal-
ism, solidarity and justice as well as science and health.
75 A counter ‘manifest’ was signed and published in July 1990 by the Breton regional activist G. Caro 
and by P. Zolotareff, together with a number of psychiatrists, treatment personnel and some social 
scientists.
76 Personal interview with P. Zolotareff on 15 October 1992.
77 ‘Loi Évin – le débat se poursuit’. Alcoologie Plurielle, No. 9. Nov. 1990, 6–13.
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Attacks and resilience
The Évin Law has been highly controversial throughout its existence, and its 
implementation has been systematically maimed not only by the alcoholic 
beverage industries, but, to an even higher degree, by advertising and the 
media. One of its immediate effects has been to deprive the press of about 
one fifth of its advertising revenue.78
With respect to alcohol, the controversies over the Évin Law have led 
to a number of important modifications following lobbying pressures. The 
legislation has been watered down in relation to alcohol advertising, distri-
bution and sponsoring. The evaluation, much delayed from what was in-
tended, argued that the law is excessively ambiguous and leads to a waste of 
resources in continuous court cases on what is and what is not allowed in 
alcohol advertising. 
The initiative by Health Minister Kouchner – himself a medical doctor 
and co-founder of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) – in 2001 was a decisive 
step towards consolidating the Évin law, suggesting that the established ob-
jective of promoting ‘moderate alcohol consumption’ should be replaced by 
‘low alcohol consumption’. The argument is based on the recommendations 
of the WHO and scientific literature. It claims that the idea of moderate 
drinking has to be abandoned because this notion allows individuals to de-
fine for themselves what is moderate drinking. These individual definitions 
are said to be too often above what is epidemiologically defined as low risk. 
The traditional focus on problem drinkers must be replaced by a ‘new focus’ 
on speeding up the process of reducing the total consumption and on heavy 
drinking occasions. And furthermore: To speak to the total population in 
order to reduce the total consumption does not mean to address an abstract 
population but to put into place means which are aimed at different seg-
ments of population and its different consumption patterns.79
The Évin Law is assumed to play a key role in connection with this new 
strategy, and the ambition is to strengthen the law. It is claimed that the 
ideas behind the Évin Law are good, but it has not worked practice. The 
78 Dorozynski, Alain (1995) ‘France Dilutes Tobacco and Alcohol Advertising Ban’. British Medical 
Journal, Vol. 310, Issue 6985, 962.
79 Stratégie d’action alcool. Stratégie d’action alcool: Intensifier la prévention et le traitement des prob-
lèmes de santé liés à la consommation d’alcool. Paris: Direction générale de la Santé, 2001.
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response to the evaluation report of October 1999, which underlined the 
incoherence between the legislative dispositions and the present regulations 
were to strengthen the law by eliminating the number of exceptions in the 
area of publicity within sports, as well in the fields of culture and science.80
The arguments presented in favour of the Évin Law not only rely on the 
TCM but, even more interestingly, closely resemble the rhetoric of Pastoral 
power, especially the principles of universalism and solidarity. The essential 
factor in its success was that it was backed by the expert authority of the 
medical community. The medical community has always been in an im-
portant role in promoting that awareness, ever since the foundation of the 
French association against the abuse of alcohol in 1872. Like in Sweden the 
‘medicalization’ of the problem did not first and foremost concern treatment 
but prevention. In France, the focus of attention was placed especially on the 
bouilleurs de cru (traditional distillers) and the cheap alcohol that they made 
available to the people.81 The Évin Law successfully maintained the health 
promotion image of a restrictive alcohol policy by combining alcohol and 
tobacco.
The Évin Law marks, however, an important change in the French de-
bate over alcohol. In the earlier phases of its history, this conflict has been 
very complex politically. The medical profession has not been prone to turn 
towards socialism, not even in the social democratic sense. Neither has the 
socialist party and even less the French communist party been unanimous 
in its support of a public health-oriented alcohol policy. On the contrary, the 
socialists have had a stronghold in the viticulture regions, and consequently 
their attitudes towards restrictive attempts have tended to be negative. The 
process around the Évin Law has markedly changed this. Like in the Nordic 
countries, alcohol policy has become a left-right political issue only in the 
course of the last quarter of the twentieth century. This may make it even 
more vulnerable to political tides than before.
80 Stratégie d’action alcool 2001.
81 Nourrisson, Didier (1987) Alcoolisme et antialcoolisme en France sous la Troisième République. Vol. 2. 
Paris: Haut Comité d’études et d’information sur l’alcoolisme.
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Conclusions
The comparisons we have made in this chapter concerning the Total Con-
sumption Model in alcohol policy demonstrate that the viability of the 
public health approach in lifestyle regulation policy depends not only on 
epidemiological arguments per se but on the match between the social phi-
losophy in which it is formulated and the political context in which it is 
applied. The public health concern in the alcohol question has for long been 
severe in France, and it was strongly surfacing in the Nordic countries in 
the crazy 1980s, when consumption levels were already high and rising still. 
Yet the TCM gained force only in France and Sweden, among the countries 
studied in this chapter. In Norway it was strong among researchers but less 
needed in policy implementation, since the anti-alcohol attitudes continued 
to be built into the political apparatus, amalgamated with the EU issue. In 
Finland, the corporatist power structure has tended to downplay the promi-
nence of lifestyle regulation policy at the expense of economic and interest-
based social policy concerns. The parliamentary political structure has been 
weak, leaving the alcohol field open to particular interest lobbies precisely 
when the public health argument was most needed. Even the parliament 
was carried away by the liberal gusto of the crazy 1980s, when it passed the 
reforms of the alcohol regime to adapt it to the EU-membership in 1994.
The population argument is part of the ‘bio-political’ discourse that has 
been characteristic of modern national societies in the course of the twenti-
eth century. The responsibility of the state has been not only to correct devi-
ant individuals but to place emphasis on the public good, the well-being of 
the population, solidarity, and the values of rational and scientifically-based 
central planning. In the French case, the attractiveness of the population ar-
gument and its success in justifying the initial formulations of the Évin Law 
was based on two of its properties. Firstly, it holds an expert position – only 
research can provide the necessary evidence on the relationship between the 
number of deaths and the consumption of alcohol in the population. Sec-
ondly, it appeals by its universalism, and by the argument of solidarity that it 
implies. It applies to every citizen in the same way by restricting the choice 
itself, and only makes an argument about the consequences of drinking at 
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the population level rather than against indulging in the pleasures of drink-
ing by individuals. Both of these values are well adapted to contemporary 
modern and pluralistic societies, where it would be very difficult to agree on 
whose drinking and what kind of drinking should be permitted or rejected, 
and where the calculation of risks rather than guarding over behaviour is the 
proper role of experts.
But the comparisons also show that these two aspects of the epidemio-
logical argument are also its weaknesses. The statistical relationship between 
total consumption and the prevalence of problems is not obvious to the 
public, and evokes the issue of trust in a world impregnated with suspicion 
for hidden agendas. The struggle against total consumption is never only 
a technical matter but always also involves priorities, and some priorities 
necessarily imply a sacrifice of others. Pastoral power implies the notion 
of the public good and its priority over private gain. The idea of the public 
good can only be enforced if it is made to appear as the will of the nation 
through parliamentary processes, and the population becomes not only the 
object of governmental power but also its source. The temperance history at 
the turn of the century therefore does not explain the success of prioritizing 
public health in this matter, unlike the liberalism of the Finnish case, and 
the determination of the French policy show. Rather, it seems to matter to 
what extent public health experts and advocates are able to join forces at 
the national level in the central institutions of parliamentary power. The 
fragmentation of the Finnish corporatist stake-holder structure and the par-
liamentary structure in Sweden and France are extreme points on a scale.
The similarities between France and Sweden documented in this chapter 
can also be identified in their relationships with the EU. It has for instance 
been illustrated how the French and Swedish governments have actively 
supported each other in discussions and disputes over alcohol policy ques-
tions at the EU-level.82
Our analysis shows that the conditions for the successful use of the TCM 
are unique, precarious and probably exceptions, rather than the rule in the 
contemporary world. On the other hand, French public health policy shows 
82 Ugland, Trygve (2003) ‘A Case of Strange Bedfellows in the EU: An Institutional Perspective on the 
French-Swedish Cooperation on Alcohol Control’. Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, 
269–286.
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that there is no absolute reason why the values of solidarity and the public 
good could not stand up to private interests and individualism even today, 
but there is no guarantee of their success either.
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The return of happiness – the end of utopia? 
Rankings of subjective well-being and the 
politics of happiness1 
carl marklund
Introduction
In July 2011, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously ad-
opted Resolution 65/309. Entitled ‘Happiness: towards a holistic approach 
to development’, the Resolution recognized ‘the need for a more inclusive, 
equitable and balanced approach to economic growth’ with the aim of pro-
moting ‘sustainable development, poverty eradication, happiness and well-
being of all peoples’ in line with the Millennium Development Goals. Mem-
ber States were invited to elaborate measures that can better capture the 
importance of the pursuit of happiness and well-being with a view to guide 
future public policy. The Resolution also called upon Members States as well 
as regional and international organizations to develop new indicators and 
to share information on these at upcoming sessions of the UN General As-
sembly.2
Following the aims spelled out in the Resolution, the world’s first World 
Happiness Report was released in early April 2012. Commissioned by the 
‘United Nations Conference on Happiness’ – also a global first – the report 
begins by noting that ‘happier countries tend to be richer countries’. Ac-
cording to the report, the happiest countries in the world are clustered in 
1 The author wishes to thank Anna Alanko, Nicholas Aylott, Inga Brandell, Yonhyok Choe, Pauli Ket-
tunen, Klaus Petersen, Hannele Sauli, Varda Soskolne, Michael Kuur Sørensen, and Jaakko Turunen 
for valuable comments and critique on an earlier draft of this chapter.
2 United Nations (2011) Resolution 65/309. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/309> (accessed October 2012)
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Northern Europe, with Denmark, Norway, Finland, and the Netherlands at 
the top. The least happy countries are all in Sub-Saharan Africa, with Togo, 
Benin, Central African Republic, and Sierra Leone registering the lowest 
self-reported happiness.3
But it is not just wealth that makes people happy, the report underlines: 
Political freedom, strong social networks, and absence of corruption are – if 
taken together – more important factors than income in explaining well-being 
differences between the top and bottom countries, according to the authors. 
At the individual level, good mental and physical health, job security, and 
stable families are crucial, as well as having ‘someone to count on’.4 ‘Behaving 
well’ makes people happier, too. In addition, the report also tracks differences 
between different groups with regard to happiness. In advanced countries, for 
example, women are generally happier than men, while the situation is more 
mixed in poorer countries. Happiness is lowest in middle age. The report con-
firms that mental health is the biggest single factor affecting happiness in any 
country. Yet, only a quarter of mentally ill people get treatment for their con-
dition in advanced countries and still fewer in poorer countries.5
On average, the report states, the world has become ‘a little happier in the 
last 30 years’. However, as living standards rise, self-reported happiness has 
increased in some countries, but not in others.6 Apparently, happiness does 
not rise in tandem with economic growth.7 Several recent studies suggest 
that affluence and wealth has a tendency to generate new sets of problems 
which are detrimental to self-reported happiness.8 This observation has also 
been connected with the widespread notion that wealthy Westerners have 
become relatively unhappier throughout the past half century.9
3 Helliwell, John F., Layard, Richard & Sachs, Jeffrey D. (eds) (2012) World Happiness Report. New 
York: The Earth Institute, Columbia University.
4 See also Marmot, Michael & Wilkinson, Richard (eds) (2003) Social Determinants of Health: The 
Solid Facts. Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe. 
5 Helliwell, Layard & Sachs 2012, 74.
6 Frey, Bruno S. & Stutzer, Alois (2002) ‘What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?’ Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, Vol. 40, No. 2, 402–435.
7 Layard, Richard (2005) Happiness: Lessons From A New Science. London: Penguin.
8 Offer, Avner (2006) The Challenge of Affluence. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Lane, Robert E. 
(2001) The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press; James, 
Oliver (1998) Britain On the Couch: Why We Are Unhappier Compared to 1950 Despite Being Richer. 
London: Arrow Books.
9 James 1998; Simonson, Nisse (2008) Varför mår vi så dåligt när vi har det så bra? Stockholm: Brom-
bergs; Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (2008) Storeulvsyndromet: Jakten på lykken i overflodssamfunnet. 
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While increasing income thus has a direct and positive impact upon 
self-reported happiness in poor countries, the correlation is weaker in rich 
countries, as growth itself appears to generate problems of adaptation and 
adjustment. Thus, economic growth and level of income does not neces-
sarily improve self-reported happiness, as first scientifically observed by 
American economist Richard Easterlin.10 The so-called ‘Easterlin paradox’ 
observes that richer individuals may be happier than poorer persons at any 
particular time, but that society as a whole does not become happier as it 
becomes richer. The most common explanation for the Easterlin paradox 
is that people compare themselves to others: When the economy as a whole 
improves, individuals’ relative status remains unchanged as those who gain 
the most quickly adapt to their new higher income while the gains may not 
have been evenly shared.11 
Yet another aspect of the paradoxical relationship between income, 
wealth, and happiness is identified by the authors of the World Happiness 
Report. They observe that various ‘societal factors’ may have ‘counteracted 
any benefits felt from the higher incomes’, noting that ‘[u]ncertainties and 
anxieties are high, social and economic inequalities have widened con-
siderably, social trust is in decline, and confidence in government is at an 
all-time low’.12 By inference, social policies that target the improvement of 
social conditions and generate social equality – or a less competitive work 
culture and excluding labour market, one may add – may thus have a posi-
tive impact upon self-reported happiness, which in turn can have positive 
effects upon the economy.13
Happiness is thus not necessarily a primarily private affair, but something 
which is inextricably linked with economical, political, and social structures 
10 Easterlin, Richard (1974) ‘Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?’ In David, Paul A.  & 
Reder, Melvin Warren (eds) Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses 
Abramovitz. New York: Academic Press, 89–125; Easterlin, Richard (1995) ‘Will Raising the Incomes 
of All Increase the Happiness of All?’. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 27, 
35–47.
11 Helliwell, Layard & Sachs 2012.
12 Helliwell, Layard & Sachs 2012.
13 Greve, Bent (ed.) (2010) Happiness and Social Policy in Europe. Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar; Saari, Juho 
(2012) Onnellisuuspolitiikka – Kohti sosiaalisesti kestävää Suomea. Helsinki: Kalevi Sorsa Säätiö; 
Wilkinson, Richard G. & Pickett, Kate (2009) The Spirit Level – Why More Equal Societies Almost 
Always Do Better. London: Penguin. 
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and hence, human agency. But the Easterlin paradox is not unanimously ac-
cepted by happiness researchers, and the complex relation between income, 
wealth, and happiness as delineated in the World Happiness Report remains 
at the core of contest in contemporary happiness research.14 
Taking this observation as its point of departure, this chapter analyzes 
the ‘return’ of happiness in public debate, looking at the tension between 
happiness as an (il)legitimate goal of politics and happiness as an (ir)rele-
vant study object of science. It first looks at how happiness was marginalized 
as a political and scientific category in Western public discourse after the 
Second World War. It then analyzes its initially slow return from the 1970s 
and onwards to today’s dramatically rising interest in happiness rankings by 
international organizations and national governments alike. 
While there is an emerging literature on the business appropriation of 
happiness, its scientific-cum-political utilization has not yet been analyzed 
in any greater detail. With a few exceptions, most studies have been prima-
rily been concerned with the quality of the scientific evidence presented in 
support of the claims to measure what scholars call ‘subjective well-being’ 
(SWB).15 
By contrast, this chapter does not discuss the methods and results of 
these rankings, most of which are easily accessible and subject to lively de-
bate among social statisticians.16 Instead, it asks why these rankings are be-
ing produced to begin with and what they may entail for public policy.
14 Most notably, it has been criticized by Ruut Veenhoven, whose statistics show a strong correlation 
between happiness and income, both on the societal and the individual level, see Veenhoven, Ruut 
(2008) World Database of Happiness: Continuous Register of Scientific Research on Subjective Appre-
ciation of Life. Rotterdam: Erasmus University; Gasper, Des (2007) ‘Uncounted or Illusory Blessings? 
Competing Responses to the Easterlin, Easterbrook and Schwartz Paradoxes of Well-Being’. Journal 
of International Development, Special Issue: Human Security, Well-Being And Sustainability, Vol. 19, 
Issue 4, 473–492.
15 Dolan, Paul, Peasgood, Tessa & White, Mathew (2008) ‘Do We Really Know What Makes Us Happy? 
A Review of the Economic Literature on the Factors Associated With Subjective Well Being’. Journal 
of Economic Psychology, Vol. 29, 94–122; Thin, Neil (2012) Social Happiness: Theory Into Policy and 
Practice. Bristol: The Policy Press.
16 For a comprehensive overview of different rankings of happiness and SWB and their different means 
and ends, see European Communities (2009) Beyond GDP—Measuring Progress, True Wealth and 
the Well-being of Nations. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communi-
ties. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.beyond gdp.eu/proceedings/bgdp_proceedings_full.pdf> 
(accessed October 2012)
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Scepticism towards happiness
While the recent concern with well-being has generated high-profile initia-
tives of governments and international organizations alike, scientific inter-
est in measuring happiness is not new. Early and largely theoretical efforts to 
quantify happiness were made by enlightenment philosophers and utilitar-
ian liberals, perhaps most notably evidenced by Jeremy Bentham’s concept 
of the ‘felicific calculus’.17 
Nevertheless, in bringing the explicit concept of happiness back into the 
scope of global governance, the World Happiness Report marks a new depar-
ture from a long tradition of scepticism towards happiness in the social sci-
ences. Western social sciences have largely viewed happiness as emotional, 
personal, and highly subjective.18 Hence, social scientists tended to regard 
it as either irrelevant or found alternative ways of conceptualizing it. When 
used – although sparingly, as noted by Easterlin19 – it was most often as 
a vague analogy to ‘welfare’ in welfare economics, primarily in theoretical 
discussions of the difference between ‘wealth’ and ‘welfare’.20 
Yet, the subject matter of happiness – the match between needs and hu-
man satisfaction – never ceased to be of interest to social scientists. But that 
interest had to be channelled through proxy concepts such as well-being, 
satisfaction with life, and quality of life. Partly, this purging seems to have 
been the result of the success and influence of American behaviourism on 
modern psychology and social science. With its insistence upon only re-
searching those phenomena which can be empirically observed – i.e. actions 
and behaviour of humans and conditions of environment and heredity – 
behaviourism had by the mid-1950s established a firm consensus on social 
‘cause and effect’ and psychological ‘stimulus and response’ as the preferred 
paradigm of Western social science.
17 Bentham, Jeremy (1907 [1780/1789]) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
18 McMahon, Darrin M. (2006) Happiness: A History. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
19 Easterlin 1974.
20 Pigou, Arthur Cecil (1912) Wealth and Welfare. London: Macmillan; Little, I. M. D. (1950) A 
Critique of Welfare Economics. London & New York: Clarendon Press; Mishan, E. J. (1968) ‘Welfare 
Economics’. In International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 16. New York: Macmillan, 
504–512; Eckaus, Richard S. (1972) Basic Economics. Boston: Little, Brown.
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In so doing, behaviourism also bypassed the problem of subjectivity 
of (dis)satisfaction by deploying an objective standard of (dis)satisfaction 
through the concept of ‘needs’, e.g. Abraham Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ 
with physiological needs at the bottom, followed by needs for safety, love, 
esteem, and ‘self-actualization’ on the top. Since happiness could not be tied 
to any particular set of cause and effect or stimulus and response it could 
neither be empirically connected with the fulfilment of concrete needs nor 
be observed experimentally. Thus, the category of happiness thus remained 
something of a ‘blind spot’ for modern social science until methods for pub-
lic opinion polling were being more widely applied by social psychologists 
in the 1960s. 
In an early effort to address the scientific blindness vis-à-vis human hap-
piness, American public opinion scholar Hadley Cantril collected data in 
1957–1963 from 14 countries – both capitalist and communist societies, rich 
and poor – asking open-ended questions about what people want out of life 
and what they would need for their lives to be completely happy.21 Despite 
the vast socio-economic and cultural disparities among the countries, peo-
ple’s responses were strikingly similar, ranking level of living, happy family 
life, personal and family health, work, emotional stability, personal worth, 
and self-discipline as the most important factors, in that order. According 
to Cantril’s findings, factors such as war, civil rights, political liberties, and 
social equality, mattered less, but this did not mean that respondents valued 
these factors less. It only meant that the interviewees tended to regard these 
factors as largely exogenous.22 
Another example of explicit social science interest in happiness dates 
from a collaborative Nordic sociological project in the early 1970s, where 
subjective happiness was directly connected with material welfare and in-
cluded in the questionnaires used for sampling perceptions of welfare in 
21 The 14 nations included in the original study cover Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
India, Israel, Japan, Nigeria, the Philippines, Panama, Poland, the United States, West Germany, and 
Yugoslavia. The study employed a ‘Self-Anchoring Striving Scale’, asking the respondent to define 
hopes and fears for self and the nation. Cantril, Hadley (1965) The Pattern of Human Concerns. New 
Brunswick, Rutgers University Press.
22 Easterlin, Richard (2004) ‘The Economics of Happiness’. Daedalus, Vol. 133, Issue 2, 26–33.
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the Nordic countries. Yet, the study used the abstract, existential, and hence 
rather depersonalized question of whether the respondent finds that ‘Life is 
happy’, the answer to which need not necessarily tell the researcher much 
about the actual SWB of the respondent.23
Despite these early attempts at approaching explicit notions of happi-
ness scientifically, ‘satisfaction with life’ proved the most popular analytical 
category throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Part of its appeal rested in its 
connection to then current theories on ‘development’, largely understood as 
the fulfilment of material needs, commensurate with ‘objective well-being’ 
(OWB) and often treated as synonymous with ‘standard of living’.24 
However, as standard of living gradually evolved into a rhetorical weap-
on in the Cold War struggle between capitalism and communism, alterna-
tive and supposedly more neutral concepts such as ‘quality of life’ had to be 
developed. Quality of life proved politically attractive, as most clearly indi-
cated by US President Richard Nixon’s state of the union address in January 
1970 and the Quality of Life review process as established in October 1971. 
The political appropriation of this concept clearly reflected the shift from 
‘materialist’ to ‘post-materialist’ values which could be registered through-
out the politically tumultuous and economically insecure 1970s.25 
Rankings of happiness
Over the past decade, however, the explicit concept of ‘happiness’ has begun 
to reappear more frequently in scholarly literature and university textbooks 
across a number of disciplines, alongside the expanding and progressively 
more inclusive concept of ‘well-being’.26 While academic interest in develop-
ing statistical methods for conducting surveys and rankings of SWB found 
a platform in the journal Social Indicators Research, founded in 1974, The 
Journal of Happiness Studies has since 2000 catered for the more specific 
23 Allardt, Erik (1975) Att ha, att älska, att vara: Om välfärd i Norden. Lund: Argos. 
24 Gasper, Des (2005) ‘Subjective and Objective Well-Being in Relation to Economic Inputs: Puzzles 
and Responses’. Review of Social Economy, Vol. 63, Issue 2, 177–206.
25 Inglehart, Ronald (1977) The Silent Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
26 Huppert, Felicia & Linley, P. Alex (eds) (2011) Happiness and Well-being: Critical Concepts in Psy-
chology. New York: Routledge.
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interest in the subject matter of happiness. Today, ‘happiness research’ has 
been established as an independent field of multidisciplinary academic re-
search, including economics, psychology, sociology, and management stud-
ies.27
Alongside the development of the academic discipline, one of the most 
high-level initiatives has been undertaken by the Organisation for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development (OECD) from the beginning of the 2000s. 
Using substantive analysis and surveys, the OECD has sought to address 
the limits of official statistics in measuring the progress of societies’ mate-
rial living conditions, quality of life and sustainability. In 2001, the OECD 
launched its so-called Better Life Initiative to this end.28 In 2011, the Better 
Life Initiative released a report entitled How’s Life? Measuring Well-being as 
part of its ongoing work to promote ‘Better Policies for Better Lives’.29 
Together with the launching of the so-called ‘Your Better Life Index’, the 
release of the report has been widely noted in the media as a step towards 
going ‘beyond GNP’ by measuring and valuing ‘happiness’ as an independ-
ent social objective alongside the more traditional economic measures ac-
cording to which societies are usually ranked.30 In a related undertaking, the 
OECD-sponsored Global Project on ‘Measuring the Progress of Societies’ 
seeks to develop progress indicators as well as to create a community work-
ing together to determine how to measure the well-being of societies. To 
ensure legitimacy and authority, it includes representatives of NGOs, gov-
ernments, and researchers worldwide. The OECD World Forum in Istanbul 
in June 2007 made the ‘Measuring and Fostering the Progress of Societies’ 
its core topic:
27 Layard 2005; Martin, Paul (2005) Making Happy People: The Nature of Happiness and its Origins in 
Childhood. London: Fourth Estate.
28 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011) ‘Better Life Initiative: 
Measuring Well-being and Progress’. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.oecd.org/statistics/
betterlifeinitiativemeasuringwell-beingandprogress.htm> (accessed October 2012)
29 OECD (2011) How’s Life? Measuring Well-being. Online. Available HTTP: <http://wwwu.uni-klu.
ac.at/nwohlgem/makrooekonomik/topics/How%20is%20life.%20measuring%20wellbeing.pdf> (ac-
cessed October 2012)
30 OECD (2012) ‘Better Life Index’. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org> 
(accessed October 2012)
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Is life getting better? Are our societies making progress? Indeed, 
what does ‘progress’ mean to the world’s citizens? For a good portion 
of the 20th century there was an implicit assumption that economic 
growth was synonymous with progress: an assumption that a grow-
ing GDP meant life must be getting better. But we now recognise that 
it isn’t quite as simple as that. Access to accurate information is vital 
when we come to judge our politicians and hold them accountable. 
But access to a comprehensive and intelligible portrait of that most 
important of questions – whether or not life has got and is likely to 
get better – is lacking in many societies.31
At the World Forum, the Istanbul Declaration was signed by representa-
tives of the European Commission, the OECD, the Organisation of the Is-
lamic Conference, the United Nations, the United Nations Development 
Programme and the World Bank. The Declaration states that:
A culture of evidence-based decision making has to be promoted at 
all levels, to increase the welfare of societies. And in the ‘information 
age’, welfare depends in part on transparent and accountable public 
policy making. The availability of statistical indicators of economic, 
social, and environmental outcomes and their dissemination to citi-
zens can contribute to promoting good governance and the improve-
ment of democratic processes. It can strengthen citizens’ capacity to 
influence the goals of the societies they live in through debate and 
consensus building, and increase the accountability of public poli-
cies.32
Noting that ‘[o]fficial statistics are a key “public good” that foster the 
progress of societies’, the Declaration ‘urge[s] statistical offices, public and 
private organizations, and academic experts to work alongside representa-
tives of their communities to produce high-quality, facts-based information 
31 OECD (2008) Statistics, Knowledge and Policy 2007: Measuring and Fostering the Progress of Societies. 
Paris: OECD Publishing.
32 Istanbul Declaration (2007) Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.wikiprogress.org/images//Istan-
bul_Declaration.pdf> (accessed October 2012)
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that can be used by all of society to form a shared view of societal well-being 
and its evolution over time’.33 
In November 2007, this largely OECD-driven quest for ‘a shared view of 
societal well-being’ resulted in a conference in the European Parliament in 
Brussels on the topic ‘Beyond GDP – Measuring progress, true wealth, and 
the well-being of nations’, jointly organized by the European Commission, 
European Parliament, Club of Rome, WWF and OECD.34 The conference 
sought to initiate the selection and inclusion of various new indexes pur-
porting to measure happiness and well-being in official statistics, providing 
a ‘Virtual Indicator Exhibition’ where some 20 complementing and compet-
ing indexes were presented. In gathering the authors of these indexes, it also 
provided a platform for a general discussion on the political applicability of 
these measures, i.e. for making and shaping policy initiatives. 
At the conference, a basic dividing line emerged between those who 
view these new measures as a complement to GDP and those who argue 
that these measures should also contribute to a shift in (inter)national policy 
objectives, away from promoting free market liberalism in favour of global 
equality, justice, and welfare. Neither side turns openly against the order of 
priority held by the other. Instead, the debate is focused on the degree to 
which ‘societal well-being’ or ‘happiness’ can at all be measured with any 
accuracy. While the policy implications remain rather underdeveloped in 
these discussions, the evidence presented by both sides appear to support 
a link between happiness and welfare policies, as long as the latter are ad-
equately provided for.35
Through evaluation of policy outcomes and peer pressure, the OECD 
has been instrumental in promoting policy diffusion and norm entrepre-
33 Istanbul Declaration 2007.
34 European Communities (2009), Beyond GDP—Measuring Progress, True Wealth and the Well-being 
of Nations. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Online 
Available HTTP: <http://www.beyond-gdp.eu/proceedings/bgdp_proceedings_full.pdf> (accessed 
October 2012); see also Costanza, Robert, Hart, Maureen, Posner, Stephen & Talberth, John (2009) 
Beyond GDP: The Need for New Measures of Progress. Boston: The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the 
Study of the Longer-Range Future.
35 The argument can be found in a more developed form in Frey, Bruno S. & Stutzer, Alois (2007) 
‘Should National Happiness Be Maximized?’ Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University 
of Zurich Working Paper, No. 306. Online. Available HTTP:  <http://www.iew.uzh.ch/wp/iewwp306.
pdf> (accessed October 2012)
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neurship in a wide variety of different policy areas.36 Since 2008 and on-
wards, its advocacy for including happiness in official statistics appears to 
win ground internationally. In the USA, for example, similar ideas have 
been expressed by advisers of President Barack Obama’s administration. In 
their 2008 book Nudge: How to Improve Decisions About Wealth, Health, 
and Happiness, economist Richard H. Thaler and lawyer Cass R. Sunstein 
(until August 2012 head of the US Government’s Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, OIRA) argue that individuals are frequently led astray 
from making the decisions which would improve their SWB by following 
the wrong cues. A measure of ‘libertarian paternalism’ – which is distinct 
from paternalism according to Thaler and Sunstein in that it does not pro-
hibit, but rather attempt to ‘nudge’ people’s decisions in certain, presumably 
favourable directions – can, the authors suggest, improve general levels of 
happiness by reframing the ‘choice architecture’ of a given society.37 
In December 2011, a panel of experts in psychology and economics – 
including Daniel Kahneman, psychologist and Nobel laureate in econom-
ics and prolific writer on the topic of well-being and ‘hedonic psychology’ 
– began convening in Washington D.C. to try to define reliable measures 
of SWB.38 The panel enjoys the explicit support of President Obama’s chief 
economic adviser and chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, Alan B. 
Krueger, who has previously proposed a method for generating a national 
statistic covering ‘the flow of emotional experience during daily activities’.39
Mainly funded by the US Department of Health and Human Services 
and organized by the non-profit National Academies, the panel has been 
36 Recent examples where the OECD has influenced member state policies include anti-corruption, 
educational policy, investment policy, labour market policy, and tax policy.
37 Thaler, Richard H. & Sunstein, Cass R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press; see also Sunstein, Cass R. (2010) Law and Happiness. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
38 Kahneman, Daniel, Wakker, Peter P. & Sarin, Rakesh (1997). ‘Back to Bentham? Explorations of Ex-
perienced Utility’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 2, 375–406; Kahneman, Daniel, 
Diener, Ed & Schwartz, Norbert (eds) (1999) Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology.
New York: Russel Sage Foundation; Whoriskey, Peter (2012) ‘If you’re happy and you know it ... let 
the government know’. The Washington Post. Online. Available HTTP:  <http://articles.washing-
tonpost.com/2012-03-29/business/35450353_1_gross-national-happiness-alan-krueger-measure> 
(accessed October 2012)
39 Krueger, Alan B. & Kahneman, Daniel (2006) ‘Developments in the Measurement of Subjective 
Well-Being’. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 20, No. 1, 3–24.
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promoting the message that a more accurate measure of happiness is a 
helpful tool for evaluating the success or failure of a range of government 
policies. As such, it could help analyze citizen preferences and government 
policy priorities with regard to trade-offs between health benefits, educa-
tion, employment, and higher income levels, besides probing the complex 
and changing relationships between these human needs and policy goals. It 
might also detect extremes of inequality or imbalances in how people divide 
their time between work and leisure. If deemed reliable, the measures under 
development by the panel could become part of official US statistics, includ-
ing that of the US Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. If 
so, the USA would become ‘the latest country to clamber aboard a happiness 
bandwagon’, as noted by The Economist.40
The happiness discourse is by no means reserved by ‘progressive’ ac-
tors such as the current US administration. Conservatives on both sides of 
the Atlantic, have also been keen to appropriate the happiness discourse. In 
2008, former French President Nicholas Sarkozy convened a commission, 
consisting of Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, stating 
that ‘time is ripe for our measurement system to shift emphasis from meas-
uring economic production to measuring people’s well-being’. The Commis-
sion on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress 
– also known as the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission – concluded in Sep-
tember 2009 that a broad range of measures and indicators about people’s 
well-being and societal progress should be used alongside more standard 
economic measures such as GDP.41 In 2009, the French government started 
publishing its own happiness indicator, in line with OECD recommenda-
tions.
In 2011, also the British Coalition Government began surveys, asking 
respondents ‘Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?’ and ‘Overall, how 
satisfied are you with your life nowadays?’ More specifically, the connection 
40 ‘Happiness – No Longer the Dismal Science?’ The Economist. 6 April 2012. Online. Available HTTP:  
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/feastandfamine/2012/04/happiness> (accessed October 2012)
41 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Sen, Amartya & Fitoussi, Jean-Paul (2009) Report by the Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Paris: Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress.
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between happiness and sustainability has been underlined by a UK govern-
ment initiative entitled the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC). 
In cooperation with Earthscan, the SDC proposed ways in which to refocus 
public policy in line with the principle of ‘prosperity without growth’. This 
interpretation could favour an increased attention to sustainability and an 
emphasis upon ‘downshifting’ or ‘descaling’ the economy.42 The SDC was 
set up by the Labour Government in June 2000 as a non-departmental pub-
lic body responsible for advising the government on sustainable develop-
ment and related issues. The SDC was closed by the Coalition Government 
in March 2011, but its reports have since been cited favourably by British 
Prime Minister David Cameron, noting ‘it’s time we focused not just on 
GDP but on GWB – general well-being’. Along similar lines, British econo-
mist Richard Layard has argued that General National Happiness (GNH) 
could positively complement GDP.43 
In addition to these governmental initiatives, there have also been nu-
merous attempts at measuring SWB launched by universities, research in-
stitutions, think tanks, and NGOs. While these rankings usually either pool 
together variables which are already measured by traditional indexes or rely 
upon interviews and surveys where the informants state their own percep-
tion of their SWB, they are often represented in the media as claiming to 
chart happiness. As such, they signal a new type of interest in SWB which 
goes a long way towards ‘rehabilitating’ the concept of happiness in public 
debate. For example, the reference objects of these rankings have recently 
shifted from various qualified and limited notions ‘perceived’ quality of life 
or ‘self-reported’ or ‘avowed’ happiness to make direct and explicit refer-
ences to happiness. 
Paradoxes of happiness
While these rankings all factor in non-material concerns, the authors of 
these indexes usually do not claim that these new measures should replace 
42 Jackson, Tim (2009) Prosperity without Growth. Economics for a Finite Planet. London: Earthscan. 
43 The modern formulation of the idea of GNH finds its origin in a conservative context, having first 
been proposed by the King of Bhutan in 1972, see Ura, Karma & Galay, Karma (eds) (2004) Gross 
National Happiness and Development. Thimphu: The Centre for Bhutan Studies; Layard 2005. 
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the traditional economical measures which have dominated the assessment 
of societies. Instead, the addition of social factors through the notion of 
SWB should simply prevent it from becoming solely deducible from eco-
nomic and material factors.44 But how much importance should be give to 
the one or the other? Is it possible to weigh these factors against one another 
in an accurate manner? And are they really distinct from one another, after 
all? A number of different paradoxes or tensions emerge when the concept 
of happiness is introduced as a parameter for assessing socio-economic con-
ditions as well as policy outcomes. 
Progressives highlight that the societies which tend to register the high-
est levels of SWB are characterized by a high level of economic equality and 
social security, as exemplified by the Nordic countries.45 Indeed, several sur-
veys report the Danes as being the most satisfied.46 Several studies have sug-
gested that the universalistic welfare state has been a decisive factor for the 
high levels of SWB and public trust recorded in the Nordic countries.47 This 
would apparently favour a universalistic welfare state of the Nordic model 
which combines economic growth with social redistribution, in addition to 
placing a strong focus upon democracy and sustainability.
These interpretations have troubled self-designated neoliberal observers 
for a variety of reasons. First, there is scepticism regarding the inclusion of 
rankings of SWB in the work of various international organizations. Second, 
there has been a neoliberally-slanted criticism which claims that the notion 
of legitimate needs could imply a limiting of free choice in consumption and 
44 Diener, Ed & Seligman, Martin E. P. (2004) ‘Beyond Money—Towards and Economy of Wellbeing’. 
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1–31; Costanza, Robert, Fisher, Brendan, 
Ali, Saleem, Beer, Caroline, Bond, Lynne, Boemans, Roelof, Danigelis, Nicholas L., Dickinson, 
Jennifer, Elliott, Carolyn, Farley, Joshua, Gayer, Diane Elliott, Glenn, Linda MacDonald, Hudspeth, 
Thomas, Mahoney, Dennis, McCahill, Laurence, McIntosh, Barbara, Reed, Brian, Rizvi, S. Abu 
Turab, Rizzo, Donna M., Simpatico, Thomas & Snapp, Robert (2007) ‘Quality of Life: An Approach 
Integrating Opportunities, Human Needs, and Subjective Well-Being’. Ecological Economics, Vol. 
61, Issues 2–3, 267–276; Brown, Kirk & Kasser, Tim (2005) ‘Are Psychological and Ecological Well-
Being Compatible? The Role of Values, Mindfulness and Lifestyle’. Social Indicators Research, Vol. 74, 
No. 2,  349–369; Abdallah, Saamah, Thompson, Sam & Marks, Nic (2008) ‘Estimating Worldwide 
Life Satisfaction’. Ecological Economics, Vol. 65, No. 1, 35–47.
45 Wilkinson & Pickett 2009.
46 Greve 2010.
47 Rothstein, Bo (2011) ‘Social tillit, lycka, korruption och välfärdsstat’. In Holmberg, Sören, Weibull, 
Lennart & Oscarsson, Per (eds) Lycksalighetens ö. Göteborg: SOM-institutet, 65–84.
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production and hence an infringement upon the free market forces. Third, 
there is a tendency to question the link between the welfare state and hap-
piness on the one hand and the link between sustainability and happiness 
on the other. 
The criticism has unfolded in two different directions in response to the 
progressive challenge posed by the new happiness discourse to free market 
liberalism. One direction has actually ‘joined the choir’. Legatum Institute, 
for example, a think tank based in Washington D.C., has pointed out that 
the contemporary policies of the Nordic welfare states which generate fa-
vourable ratings for the Nordics are just as liberal and economy-oriented as 
the policies of those societies which score worse. The difference lies in the 
determination and skill by which Nordic governments have implemented 
necessary reforms in the welfare systems, thus saving the welfare state while 
reframing the ‘Nordic model’ of the past into a new ‘Nordic Way’ of the fu-
ture which has recently won the praise of liberal newspaper The Economist.48 
Another concern has been the accuracy of the measures. Neoliberal crit-
ics frequently criticize the evidence provided by happiness researchers. In 
2007, the same year as the OECD launched its ‘Beyond GNP’ conference, 
researchers associated with the Cato Institute, another Washington-based 
think tank, argued that the data provided by happiness researchers show 
that ‘neither higher rates of government redistribution nor lower levels of 
income inequality make us happier, whereas high levels of economic free-
dom and high average incomes are among the strongest correlates of SWB’.49 
The problem rests with the diverging interpretation of the causal mecha-
nisms behind the weak correlations that the rankings point to: Not only is 
happiness research troubled by competing methodologies and conflicting 
research objectives, neoliberal critics and other sceptics argue. Happiness 
itself does not appear as ‘a simple empirical phenomenon but a cultural and 
48 ‘The Next Supermodel: Politicians from both Right and Left Could Learn from the Nordic Coun-
tries’. The Economist. 2 Feb. 2013. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21571136-politicians-both-right-and-left-could-learn-nordic-countries-next-supermodel> 
(accessed February 2013)
49 Wilkinson, Will (2007) ‘In Pursuit of Happiness Research: Is It Reliable? What Does It Imply for 
Policy?’ Policy Analysis, No. 590, 2–41. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/
files/pubs/pdf/pa590.pdf> (accessed October 2012)
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historical moving target’, defined differently by different individuals at dif-
ferent points in life – indeed, a central argument of liberal critics of the wel-
fare state for a long time. 
Politics or rhetorics of happiness?
Happiness research has this far failed to establish a singular ‘shared view 
of societal well-being’ as called for by the OECD. The question is whether 
the rather natural and seemingly neutral quest for such a shared view could 
translate from rhetorics into politics, and what kind of politics that would 
be. 
The differences between different factors in explaining happiness and 
SWB appear marginal in most rankings. This observation has lead social 
psychologists to launch the ‘set-point theory’ according to which most peo-
ple have a stable level of SWB, to which they return after various positive as 
well as negative experiences. This individual set-point is supposedly more 
determined by personality than income, wealth, health, or equality. If SWB 
is mostly determined by factors beyond the reach of politics or even human 
agency, it would follow that public policy with the aim of improving happi-
ness would carry little hope of actually increasing SWB, just as the so-called 
‘bell curve paradox’ would rule out the aggregated effects of education on 
overall levels of intelligence in a given society. A set-point theory of happi-
ness would thus rather support a neoliberal interpretation than a welfare 
state interpretation of public policy.50 
But if we accept the correlation between happiness and the welfare state 
as evidenced by the high rankings for the Nordic societies, the possibility 
of a politics of happiness would seem clear enough: It would simply be a 
question of providing for the basic social goods (education, employment, 
empowerment, and environmental protection) on a universal basis through 
the means of public participation to secure the possibility for as many as 
possible to independently pursue their own ideas of how to achieve happi-
50 Bruni, Luigino & Porta, Pier Luigi (eds) (2007) Handbook on the Economics of Happiness Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar; Easterlin 2004; Inglehart, Ronald & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (2000) Genes, 
Culture and Happiness. Boston: MIT Press.
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ness.51 It would then be a rather basic and very practical question of setting 
up systems of social care which as far as possible address social conditions 
which are known to correlate with unhappiness and deteriorating mental 
health, rather than some utopian attempt at downscaling the economy or 
to ‘maximize happiness’ for all through some ambitious scheme of ‘social 
engineering’. 
However, it must also be observed that the universalism of the welfare 
state may produce potential tensions, too. The principle of universalism se-
cures some measure of equality which translates into public trust and SWB 
as well as legitimacy of the welfare state. To be able to afford this universal-
ism, however, the welfare state requires a rather high level of productivity to 
allow for a comparatively high level of both private and public consumption. 
This means that a substantial source of stress and dissatisfaction will likely 
remain inbuilt into the system.52 
The levels of stress among the employed, well-integrated, and more or 
less well-paid middle classes are reportedly on the rise, not only in the West 
generally, but in the Nordic countries, too. This generates growing demands 
for mental health care and crowding out scarce resources for those who al-
ready suffer from unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, and/or mental 
problems – whose well-being in turn is imperilled by the rising require-
ments for employability.53 If the happiness discourse would be embraced by 
the universalistic welfare state, the latter would also need to accommodate 
the rather different needs of both these groups. Medical definitions would 
become even more important than they are today. Where do we draw the 
line between the happiness which should be the concern of the individual 
and the unhappiness which should be the concern of society as a whole? 
This issue is complicated by the suggestion that the welfare state – in 
the Nordic countries as well as elsewhere – is undergoing a transformation 
51 See discussion in European Communities (2009); Frey & Stutzer 2007.
52 Bunting, Madeleine (2005) Willing Slaves: How the Overwork Culture is Ruining Our Lives. London: 
Harper. 
53 For a discussion, see Fallov, Mia Arp (2011) ‘Constructing the Capacity of Employability, and the 
Government of Inclusion’. In Blomberg, Helena & Kildal, Nanna (eds) Workfare and Welfare State 
Legitimacy. Helsinki: Nordic Centre of Excellence NordWel, 125–160.  
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towards a more neoliberal mode of governance by gradually and piece by 
piece abandoning the principle of universalism, so that it becomes a ques-
tion of interpretation whether the eventual success of the Nordic welfare 
model is rather the result of whatever traditional welfare state is left or fol-
lows from the competition state reforms, which, according to some, may 
spell the end of traditional welfare policies.54
The increasing attention to the immaterial factors for happiness and 
SWB unfold in parallel with the current economic recession. The ‘softer’ 
measures of economic and social performance of societies do indeed seem 
to reflect some of the post-materialist values which have become more 
widely accepted during the last decades, in Western Europe, the USA, and 
increasingly also in Southeast Asia. It would be politically sound for both 
conservative and progressive politicians to rhetorically embrace more post-
materialist values in a time of crisis, while retaining a focus upon traditional 
economic policy goals in actual policies, just as Nixon once sought to chan-
nel counter-culture sentiments in the USA during the high-tide of radical-
ism in the early 1970s while conducting relatively traditional economic poli-
cies.
Assuming that the Easterlin paradox holds some truth, governmental 
interest in SWB may then increase when economic figures point downward 
or when income disparity is on the rise. Similar rhetorics have, for exam-
ple, been utilized by various South East Asian governments, notably by the 
Chinese Government invoking the concept of xiaokang [‘basic well-being’] 
during the rapid growth of the 1990s or by the Thai Government in the wake 
of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, as citizens were ecouraged to focus on 
‘sufficiency economy’ and to moderate their consumption rather than to 
expect increased governmental relief or press for an expansion of welfare 
programmes in times of need.55 
54 Blomberg, Helena & Kildal, Nanna (eds) (2011) Workfare and Welfare State Legitimacy. Helsinki: 
Nordic Centre of Excellence NordWel; Heiskala, Risto & Kantola, Anu (2010) ‘Vallan uudet ideat: 
hyvinvointivaltion huomasta valmentajavaltion valvontaan’. In Pietikäinen, Petteri (ed.) Valta 
Suomessa. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 124–148. 
55 Noy, Darren (2011) ‘Thailand’s Sufficiency Economy: Origins and Comparisons with Other Systems 
of Religious Economics’. Social Compass, Vol. 58, No. 4, 593–610.
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The inclusion of happiness and SWB by conservative governments and 
traditionally free-trade-oriented international organizations can also chan-
nel public criticism away from economic failure, rising income disparity, 
and welfare state retrenchment. So it has been suggested that former French 
President Sarkozy’s embracing of the new happiness agenda was designated 
to compensate for criticism in the context of the lowering of the French 
credit rating in 2011. In any case, the conservative appropriation of the hap-
piness discourse is not very likely to herald massively increased government 
spending on public goods. 
Conclusion
The new rankings of happiness have had some political impact, as witnessed 
by the high-level interest from the UN and the OECD as well as national 
governments. The close relationship between political agency and scientific 
knowledge production, especially the political function of statistics is well-
known: Numbers, rankings, and scientific verifiable knowledge have long 
been considered a precondition for the turning of various social problems 
into targets of evidence-based policy making (EBP).56 But, as of yet, this in-
terest remains on the level of political rhetoric. Even if the social statisticians 
working with official statistics may perceive an increased pressure from gov-
ernments and international organizations to conform to the new norms, a 
pressure which can be said to be ‘political’, the happiness discourse appears 
rather ‘under-politicized’ for now. 
Yet, the popular reception of rankings and measures has actualized an 
essentially political struggle between different interpretations of happiness 
rankings and research. Through its vague and non-committal character, the 
happiness discourse can be bent for different political purposes. For some, 
the happiness discourse can be used as an argument for the expansion of 
the welfare state to also include more qualitative social services with more 
ambitious aims in terms of health and happiness. For others, it can be used 
56 Piironen, Ossi & Erkkilä, Tero (2009) ‘Politics and Numbers: The Iron Cage of Governance Indica-
tors’. In Cox III, R. W. (ed.) Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
125–145.
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to drive home the point that we are all individually responsible for our own 
happiness. Still others may use the happiness discourse to promote an envi-
ronmentalist agenda of descaling, downsizing, redistribution, and extended 
regulation of the financial markets in the interest of sustainability. 
It may perhaps seem paradoxical that happiness returns as a political 
concern at a point in time when politics is widely thought to have been re-
placed by the market and public policy-making is supposedly supplanted by 
‘post-political regulation’.57 The idea that individual happiness can be mea-
sured is strangely familiar with the idea that individual happiness could, for 
all of its complexity, be made into a political objective in its own right – in-
deed, a most utopian idea in itself. This would appear even more puzzling, 
since utopian or visionary ideas are supposedly in short supply today, both 
on the left as well as on the right.58
Proponents argue that there is a demand for better measurements due 
to the rather natural interest in ascertaining a better balance between OWB 
and SWB – between economical and social concerns – when evaluating 
policy effects and designing new policy measures. At the same time, the 
causality between various policies and the reported SWB in a partcular so-
ciety remains elusive at best, national social statisticians warn, beyond the 
subjective character of happiness to begin with. Yet, the way in which the 
goal of individual happiness is articulated ties in with societal well-being is 
an important issue if we are interested in how the limits of politics are being 
changed and re-negotiated under conditions of globalization, post-modern 
values, and post-political regulation.59  
For now, it remains a question for debate whether the rising interest in 
57 For a discussion of the concept of ‘post-political regulation’, see Garsten, Christina & Jacobsson, 
Kerstin (2013) ‘Post-Political Regulation: Soft Power and Post-Political Visions in Global 
Governance’. Critical Sociology. Online. Available HTTP: <http://crs.sagepub.com/content/ear-
ly/2012/06/22/0896920511413942> (accessed February 2013)
58 For the notion of ‘end of utopia’, see successive discussions in Marcuse, Herbert (1970) ‘The End 
of Utopia’. In Marcuse, Herbert, Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 62–82; Habermas, Jürgen (1986) ‘The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the 
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies’. Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1–18; Bauman, Zyg-
munt (1999) In Search of Politics. Cambridge: Polity; Berghahn, Klaus L. (2008) ‘The End of Utopia?’ 
Telos, No. 143, 171–180.
59 Cf. Inglehart, Ronald (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political 
Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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happiness will be politicized and, if so, to what degree and with what con-
sequences. A first political implication is that these rankings do not only 
answer to a perceived need for knowledge, but also contribute to sustain 
and expand this need. This need will either be filled by ‘pseudo-science’ 
marginalizing official statistics, or official statistics will have to adapt to the 
demand, even if official social statisticians may be wary and skeptical of po-
litical pressure to expand the scope of their discipline. 
Indeed, identifying, measuring, and ranking performance is not only a 
way of generating better knowledge about social conditions and policy out-
comes with a view of improving both. It is also a means of communicating 
a message to the electorate and to shape public opinion. Rankings, even if 
they do not necessarily herald a new start for welfare state policies, do signal 
at least a symbolic response on the part of international and national policy-
making elites to widespread popular concerns with life satisfaction, health, 
and environment beyond the scope of individual economy. 
Second, it may today simply not be possible for politicians to focus sin-
gularly on economic growth as the primary policy objective, despite the cur-
rent crisis. Cynics may remark that this would be rather fitting, since market 
performance is more volatile and appears less susceptible to political control 
now than in the past. It would hence be unwise for politicians to make them-
selves too dependent upon economical performance as the single most im-
portant parameter of policy evaluation. Novel concerns with ‘soft issues’ can 
be used to offset growing dissatisfaction with faltering economic policies 
and demonstrable weakness of politics. Nordic countries, for example, rank 
nicely in the statistics, while social inequalities are on the rise, indicating 
that overall perfomance may be good even if the least privileged members of 
society fare ill or do not share the benefits of stability and growth.
A third political implication, or rather symptom, is that the concern with 
rankings corresponds to the ‘evacuation of politics’ in evidence in contem-
porary governance in a multitude of policy fields, such as care, education, 
and unemployment policies.60 Overarching social conflicts and party po-
60 See for example discussions on neoliberal governance in educational policies in Giroux, Henry A. 
(2008) Against the Terror of Neoliberalism: Beyond the Politics of Greed. Boulder: Paradigm.
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litical contests are reduced as economic and social problems are isolated 
into targets for specialized policy administration.61 In the ‘political void’ 
that is left, global non-political organizations increasingly take up the role 
of visionaries, norm-entrepreneurs, and policy promoters, exactly through 
producing and disseminating new knowledge, new standards, and new best 
practices in a general movement towards post-political regulation. For all 
of its concern with accountability and transparency, it is of interest to note 
how post-political governance is tasking itself with yet more complex policy 
goals, identifying categories that, strictly speaking, cannot be as accurately 
and unambiguously quantified, compared, and evaluated as the traditional 
policy goals of work, security, justice, growth, and equality. 
This raises the question whether contemporary discourses on happiness 
will serve to expand the duties of public policy to include more immaterial 
notions of welfare or to limit the reach of politics, further pointing to the 
responsibility of the individual for her own happiness. Due to this tension 
in the recent attention to happiness, the primary political importance of the 
recent rankings of SWB does not seem to concern their eventual ability to 
actually measure happiness but rather to rhetorically challenge the primacy 
of economy as the single most important basis for public policy and to un-
derscore the social component of economic performance. 
As such, it answers to a utopian drive in an era of utopian exhaustion. It 
is paradoxical, as the increased political and scientific interest in the vague 
and causally under-determined phenomenon of happiness can go in two 
directions: It may either divert attention away from the economy in order to 
further strengthen its grips on our public policies, or – quite on the contrary 
– further emphasize the need for alternative, non-monetary yardsticks by 
which to assess the well-being in the contemporary welfare state.  
61 For a discussion, see Mair, Peter (2000) ‘Partyless Democracy? Solving the Paradox of New Labour?’. 
New Left Review, No. 2, 21–35; Mair, Peter (2006) ‘Ruling the Void? The Hollowing of Western 
Democracy’. New Left Review, Vol. 42, 25–51.
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